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Abstract

The annual average cost of healthcare for services utilization by a Medicare
beneficiary is projected to grow from about $10,000 to over $16,000 by 2023. As an
ongoing initiative to address this trend, the federal government contracts with private
insurance companies and other entities, called Medicare Advantage Organizations
(MAOs), to develop and administer alternative health insurance plans designed to
contain service utilization and costs. One feature of some Medicare Advantage plans
is the presence of risk-bearing contracts with primary care physician organizations
that voluntarily accept financial responsibility for the overall cost of care for patients
attributed to them. In this arrangement, the MAO delegates medical care, care
management oversight, and discretionary spending authority to the physician
organization. For services rendered, the physician organization accepts as payment the
surplus or deficit derived from annual budgetary results (as negotiated in their contract
with the MAO) rather than the traditional per-encounter or service-specific payments
associated with fee-for-service payment schemes. This study uses an extensive and novel
data set from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as well as third-party
sources, to examine how Missouri beneficiary’s attributes (age, gender, race, and health
status), presumed financial resources and education, access to doctors and hospitals, and
Medicare plan choices help to predict services utilization. We use summary statistics,
tests of differences in means, CHAID decision trees, and Poisson regression to analyze
beneficiaries’ utilization of five service categories (inpatient care, skilled nursing care,
outpatient services, home health services, and other provider services, including
physicians). The study reveals three critical findings. First, specific beneficiary attributes

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
such as age and race, and beneficiary access to doctors and hospitals are predictors of
one’s chosen Medicare plan. Notably, some Medicare beneficiary groups are more likely
to enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan rather than others. Second, beneficiary
characteristics, doctor and hospital access, and plan choice collectively have a strong
association with service utilization. Those enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans use
fewer services than their Traditional Medicare counterparts. Lastly, beneficiaries enrolled
in a Medicare Advantage plan that engages risk-bearing primary care physician groups
use fewer services than beneficiaries in other plans.

Keywords: Medicare, Advantage, health insurance, utilization, risk, contracts,
physicians, capitation
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CMS – Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
CPT – Current Procedural Terminology
DRG – Diagnostic Related Group
FFS – Fee-for-Service
HCPCS – Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
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ICD – International Classification of Diseases (Versions 9 & 10)
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Scope
The United States has the most expensive health care system of any developed
nation (Nahass and Rodriguez, 2015). As shown in Exhibit 1, its nearly $10,000 per
capita, annual health expenditure far exceeds that of the other thirty-four members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The U.S. costs per
capita are more than twice the OECD average.
Furthermore, U.S. healthcare costs are escalating, in part, because of an increasing
population of older adults who receive health insurance from a federal government
program known as Medicare. Annual Medicare expenditures are projected to exceed one
trillion dollars by 2023, equating to more than $16,000 per beneficiary per year (Keehan
et al., 2020). To help combat these rising healthcare service costs, the government’s
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has implemented a strategy of
encouraging Medicare-eligible beneficiaries to enroll in Medicare Advantage plans, also
known as Medicare Part C, rather than the Traditional Medicare program.
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Exhibit 1. Annual Per Capita Healthcare Expenditures for 35 OECD Countries

To implement its strategy, CMS, as the principal, relies on contracts with private
insurers, known as Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs), who serve as CMS’
agents and accept the operational and financial risk of their attributed enrollees. MAOs,
in the role of principals, seek to delegate clinical care duties and shift financial risk to
their agents, which include risk-bearing (RB) providers such as primary care physician
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(PCP) groups. MAOs and RB providers understand that their financial success is
dependent on effective management of patient services.
CMS mandates that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries receive equal or better
benefits than those received by beneficiaries in the Traditional Medicare plan. Also,
MAOs are required to meet or exceed standards imposed by CMS to assure that
beneficiaries receive adequate access to healthcare providers and services. In
response to those mandates, many MAOs offer plan features that include expanded
benefits schedules at lower costs, thus enticing beneficiaries both to enroll in their
Medicare Advantage plans and to engage in better health practices.
MAOs receive a fixed monthly payment from CMS for each beneficiary
enrolled in their plans, thus placing the MAO at financial risk for the volume and
cost of services attributable to its insured members. MAOs create service delivery
networks in part by entering into agreements with medical providers who render
services in exchange for payment. Payment methods vary and may include fee-forservice (FFS), modified FFS, capitation, or other RB arrangements.
FFS payments originate from pre-determined fee schedules that typically are
the product of negotiations between MAOs and providers. An FFS payment
generally is a one-time-only, lump-sum payment for a service such as a surgical
facility fee or physician office visit. In this arrangement, there is little compensation
risk to the provider because a known payment amount is earned for a rendered
service.
Modified FFS payments sometime incorporate both lump-sum payments and
bonus payments based on the achievement of pre-defined metrics. For example, a
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PCP might receive from the MAO a $100 payment for rendering a comprehensive
physical examination to a patient during an office visit, and then later receive a $50
bonus from the MAO for submitting written documentation that the patient received
all required elements of that comprehensive exam. In this hypothetical example, a
third of the physician’s potential compensation is subject to risk (e.g., failure to
satisfy the comprehensive exam requirements, not submitting appropriate
documentation).
Capitation typically takes the form of a negotiated, monthly payment to a
physician, physician group, health system, or other provider entity for each patient
assigned to the entity. The capitation payment is expected to cover the costs of a
defined schedule of medical services, both within and outside the entity, available to
the patient. If the patient’s medical costs exceed the capitation amount, the entity is
responsible for paying for the excess. If the costs are less than the capitation amount,
the entity enjoys retention of the surplus. In effect, the MAO transfers to the entity
the financial risks attributable to patient care costs predicted by the capitation
payment. The entity accepts that risk with an expectation that medical services and
costs can be managed more efficiently than the capitation payment implies. In some
arrangements, the MAO also may supplement the capitation payments with incentive
bonuses tied to the achievement of clinical outcomes or utilization benchmarks
associated with the pool of attributed patients. These supplemental payments can link
to such metrics as the percentage of patients complying with prescribed medications,
the percentage of male patients receiving annual prostate cancer screenings, or the
percentage of female patients receiving mammograms.
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Another form of capitation agreement occurs when an MAO and provider
enter into a shared-risk arrangement. In this scenario, each party accepts a percentage
of the deficits or surpluses stemming from the capitation revenue and medical costs
of the attributed patients. In Appendix A, we present a discussion of how RB
payment methods between MAOs and the PCPs in their networks are structured.
In this introduction, we highlighted several elements of the Medicare health
system that potentially influence healthcare service utilization. They include the
steerage of beneficiaries from Traditional Medicare to Medicare Advantage plans,
the financial risk shift from CMS to MAOs, the financial risk shift from MAOs to
providers, and an expectation that efficient service utilization will yield favorable
financial results. To these macro elements, we introduce other factors that potentially
affect service utilization. They include beneficiary characteristics (e.g., age, gender,
race, health status, wealth, and level of education) and access to providers (hospital
proximity, number of physicians). Accordingly, we obtained data for all of these
elements in our quest to understand their effects on service utilization. The sources
and uses of data are described in Chapter 4.
1.1 Research Question
Recent literature and commentary suggest that, compared to Traditional
Medicare, some MAOs deliver better outcomes at lower costs by emphasizing
primary, preventative care, along with the elimination of duplicative or unnecessary
services, or using less costly services and service providers (Bazemore, Phillips,
Glazier, & Tepper, 2018; Curto, Einav, Finkelstein, Levin, & Bhattacharya, 2017;
Landon, Zaslavsky, Saunders, Pawlson, Newhouse, & Ayanian, 2012; Pham &
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Moffit, 2018). Also, to instill incentives for efficient care, some MAOs implement
RB agreements with PCPs willing to forgo traditional FFS payments. As described
later in this paper, there are considerable, practical difficulties in gaining access to
the terms, conditions, and financial results attributable to RB agreements between
MAOs and the PCPs in their networks. Therefore, researchers may find it
challenging to conduct this portion of the research. Fortunately, our association with
a network of PCPs receiving both FFS and RB payments provides a rare and
invaluable opportunity to understand the structure of RB agreements, as well as the
arrangements between CMS and MAOs. That knowledge is useful when interpreting
the results from our quantitative analyses.
In summary, with this study, we attempt to answer our fundamental research
question: What elements affect a Medicare beneficiary’s utilization of healthcare
services? Related to this primary research question are several corollary questions.
Do specific beneficiary attributes help predict choice of Medicare plan? Does a
beneficiary’s access to doctors and hospitals relate to choice of Medicare plan? Does
the Medicare plan chosen help to predict service utilization? Do beneficiary
characteristics help to predict service utilization? Moreover, do Medicare Advantage
plans with RB PCPs show lesser utilization than other plans?
To answer these questions, we obtained data from several sources. Our
Medicare data come from CMS following a formal, multi-month application process
designed to assure that research data are appropriately used and protected. We
requested and received 2016 health records for a random sample of 999,999
beneficiaries residing in the state of Missouri. At the time of this investigation, 2016
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is the only year with the comprehensive Medicare data. For the identification and
location of Missouri hospitals, we use public data from the Missouri Department of
Health and Senior Services’ Office of Primary Care and Rural Health. The Missouri
Department of Professional Registrations is our data source for identifying the
locations of licensed physicians. Lastly, through the University of Missouri Office of
Social and Economic Data Analysis, we obtained Missouri demographical data
distributed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Discussion of the sources and uses of
data are contained in Chapter 4.
Summary statistics, tests of differences in means, CHAID decision trees, and
Poisson regression are used to evaluate service utilization patterns influenced by
patient characteristics, access to healthcare providers (hospitals and doctors), and
choice of Medicare plan types. We also look for evidence to determine if the
presence of RB PCPs in a Medicare Advantage plan impacts the number of
healthcare services received by beneficiaries in that plan.
1.2 Significance
The Medicare program, a federal health insurance program administered by the
United States Department of Health and Human Services’(HHS) Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), provides health insurance coverage to nearly 60 million
U.S. residents: approximately 50 million people ages 65 and over, and 10 million people
with permanent disabilities (KFF, 2018). Through various initiatives such as the
promotion of Medicare Advantage plans, CMS, in partnership with private insurance
companies, implements payment innovation as one means of addressing the high costs of
healthcare financing and delivery.
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Private insurers have participated in the Medicare program since 1966. However,
it was not until the Social Security amendments in 1972 that any insurer entered into an
RB contract with Medicare (Patel & Guterman, 2017). In 1982, the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act set the stage for capitated payments from Medicare to MAOs,
serving as an early impetus for MAOs to introduce RB arrangements to their network
providers.
Interest in Medicare Advantage plans has grown significantly since its
introduction in the early 1980s. In contrast to Traditional Medicare, in many cases,
Medicare Advantage offers expanded benefits schedules for those who elect to obtain
coverage from such plans. The expanded benefits incentivize Medicare-eligible members
to switch from Traditional Medicare coverage to Medicare Advantage plans. In 2018,
approximately twenty million persons enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans,
representing about one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries (Kaiser Family Foundation
2018). See Exhibit 2 for Medicare enrollment from 1999 to 2018 (with the number of
beneficiaries enrolled on the left scale, and the percentage of total Medicare enrollment in
an MA plan on the right scale). The enrollment trend since 2004 indicates an increasing
preference for Medicare Advantage, given its fifteen consecutive annual increases in
enrollment. Consequently, research into the nature of the relationships between MAOs
and providers (such as PCPs), and the characteristics of the patients served, is of
increasing relevance and importance.
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Exhibit 2. Medicare Advantage 20-year Enrollment Trend

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018

Some MAOs enter into contracts with PCP groups that voluntarily accept up to
100% of the medical cost risk attributable to the beneficiaries assigned to them. This
arrangement contrasts with the traditional reimbursement methodology, whereby
physicians receive a predetermined FFS payment. In Missouri, we are aware of the
existence of RB contracts as early as 1995, when local health systems and medical groups
first engaged in such arrangements with MAOs (Deaconess, 1995). The current level of
financial risk borne by physician groups varies with its contracts. We know of one
current arrangement whereby a PCP network has responsibility for up to 80% of the total
medical expenses of its attributed beneficiaries, as driven by the insurance benefit
schedule.
Given the growing Medicare population and CMS’ effort to steer beneficiaries
into Medicare Advantage plans, we believe it is vitally important to understand the
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implications of assigning medical care responsibilities to MAOs and their providers, both
of whom assume financial risk in this healthcare delivery model. Further, we also believe
it is critical to acknowledge the presence of the beneficiaries’ attributes, their access to
hospitals and doctors, and their Medicare plan choices as potentially relevant factors for
assessing service utilization within the Medicare program.
We wish to note that in CMS literature, Medicare Advantage plans sometimes are
called Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO). CMS’ use of the HMO moniker is
somewhat of a misnomer (as reported by CMS) because Medicare Advantage plans can
be HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPOs), exclusive provider organizations
(EPOs), special needs plans (SNP), and other plan types. Nevertheless, in this study, we
follow CMS practice in their data processing and refer to any Medicare Advantage plan
as an HMO plan. We also refer to the Traditional Medicare plan as the FFS plan.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
For this study, we investigate the effects of several Medicare beneficiary
characteristics on plan selection and utilization. In this chapter, we offer some
background information that underscores the importance of this study, discuss our choice
of explanatory variable selections, and present a theoretical underpinning for our
investigation. We conclude with a discussion of a previous study that we contrast with
our own.
2.1 Services Utilization
Our literature search uncovered various articles describing the need to re-design
or re-align healthcare organizations to move away from traditional FFS reimbursement.
Generally, value-based alternatives, such as requiring healthcare providers to assume a
degree of financial risk based on patient care outcomes, are advocated. Some literature
cites health systems’ contractual or employment schemes and insurance company
mandates that attempt to modify physician behavior to yield a more value-oriented
clinical practice of medicine. Examples of these types of administrative initiatives include
compensation linked to performance (rather than volume); pre-authorization of patient
referrals to specialists and facilities; implementation of pharmaceutical formularies; thirdparty oversight and intervention of pre-specified patient care activities; and publication of
physicians’ clinical performances These efforts to slow the growth of Medicare spending
“more generally, have had limited success, and gaps in the quality of care remain” (Fisher
et al., 2009).
Some research emphasizes the emerging importance of recruiting and organizing
an educated and engaged core of primary care physicians to drive desired changes
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inherent in value-based reimbursement structures. These physicians will play the most
critical role in clinically integrated networks as primary team leaders making the
transition to accountable care and population health management (Floyd, 2014).
However, existing literature appears to fall short in describing precisely what incentivizes
PCPs to become educated and engaged in such structures, and more importantly, why
they might choose, perhaps be compelled, to do so voluntarily.
2.2 Demographics
Age, gender, race, and level of education and wealth are variables frequently
examined in studies of all types. These data are captured by various means such as
census-taking, market research, and surveys. In healthcare-based research, patient health
status is an often-used variable, with the Charlson Co-morbidity scores frequently cited
as a measure of health. Here we present some preliminary background information about
the variables used in this study. Additional information appears in Chapter 4.
CMS deems a beneficiary’s health status as an essential consideration when
determining capitation payments to MAOs. Conceptually, a healthier beneficiary requires
fewer healthcare services, and a beneficiary with several diseases, also called comorbidities, requires more services. To calibrate each capitation payment to reflect each
beneficiary’s health status, CMS devised a risk adjustment score (RAS) as an essential
mechanism built into the capitation payment calculation. These risk scores “are
calculated by statistical analysis of diagnoses and expenditures for ‘fee-for-service’
patients” (American Action Forum, 2015). This results in MAOs receiving less capitation
for patients with fewer health risks (i.e., lower RAS score) and more capitation for
patients with more significant health risks (i.e., higher RAS score).
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Unfortunately, CMS has not released to researchers the individual beneficiary
RAS scores for 2016. As a proxy, we incorporate a version of the Charlson Co-morbidity
Index (CCMI) as an alternative means to quantify the health status of a beneficiary. We
identified several studies (e.g., Sundararajan, Henderson, Perry, Muggivan, Quan, &
Ghali, 2004; Bottle & Aylin, 2011; Austin, Wong, Uzzo, Beck, & Egleston, 2015)
validating the use of CCMI as a means for defining patient health status by predicting the
patient’s one-year mortality rates. Moreover, a critical review of various scoring methods
conducted by Groot, Beckerman, Lankhorst, and Bouter (2003) offers a compelling
argument that CCMI is one of the more reliable means for measuring comorbidity and,
therefore, is sufficient for research purposes. Other methodologies (e.g., Kaplan,
Elixhauser) for determining patient health status are available, but given the general
acceptance of CCMI as reported by the researchers mentioned above, and the relative
ease of applying CCMI algorithms to our data, we chose CCMI as the best option. The
CCMI score is the variable that allows us to account for the effect of the beneficiary’s
health status on their healthcare services utilization.
The CMS RAS, and by extension, the CCMI, are not without controversy.
Reports suggest that MAOs (and their contracted healthcare providers) more
comprehensively report the patient diagnosis codes than do FFS providers. For example,
in its March 2018 report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commissions
(MedPAC), a federal agency that advises Congress on Medicare matters, states that 2016
data show that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries’ RAS results were 8% higher than
those of comparable Traditional Medicare beneficiaries. Consequently, Congress now
requires CMS to apply annual downward adjustments to Medicare Advantage capitation
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payments to account for the differences in coding patterns submitted by providers. From
2010 through 2018, this downward adjustment is created by applying an annual coding
intensity adjustment factor ranging from -3.41% to -5.91% (Better Medicare Alliance,
2017) to reduce the Medicare Advantage coding results to be more in line with
Traditional Medicare results for comparable patients. Meanwhile, efforts are underway
by CMS to continuously improve the RAS formula (and its application to the capitation
payment formula), including the solicitation of input from industry stakeholders (CMS,
2018).
Given the importance of defining a beneficiary’s health status in the forecasting of
service utilization (and capitation payments), and in the absence of RAS scores in our
CMS files, we embrace the CCMI alternative. Our careful construction of a CCMI score
for each service category for each beneficiary, we believe, offers a sound methodology
that produces a reasonable surrogate for the unpublished RAS data.
2.3 Access to Doctors and Hospitals
CMS considers the effects of healthcare provider availability in each county when
considering whether to approve an MAO’s application to operate in a county (CMS HDS,
2016). In any such application, an MAO must demonstrate that its provider network
provides reasonable distance and drive time access for at least 90% of the beneficiaries
residing in the county. However, exceptions can be granted and, therefore, provider
availability may be differently defined in various regions. Consequently, we believe that
healthcare service utilization likely is impacted by the presence or non-presence of
healthcare providers and the beneficiaries’ ability to access them. In this study, we
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include hospital proximity and physician counts for each county as variables to account
for beneficiaries’ access to healthcare providers.
2.4 Financial Barriers
Some research focuses on a Medicare beneficiary’s ability to access medical care
(Kurichi et al., 2017). Barriers to care may affect a beneficiary’s utilization of services,
thus impacting the medical outcomes. Among their findings, Kurichi et al. found a
significant relationship between a Medicare beneficiary’s financial resources and their
ability to obtain healthcare services. They also found that financial resources are strongly
related to a beneficiary’s decision to delay healthcare services. Accordingly, we
incorporate median home value in the vicinity of the beneficiary’s place of residence as a
surrogate “wealth” variable representing a beneficiary’s ability to pay for healthcare
services.
2.5 Risk-bearing Compensation
One element of this study examines the possibility that provider compensation
structures, specifically risk-bearing (RB) arrangements, affect service utilization. An RB
compensation model for healthcare service payment also is known as “fee-for-value,”
“value-based,” “risk-sharing,” or “risk-based” reimbursement. Hosseinian and
Carmichael (2013) offer another apt description -- “gainshare/painshare” -- in their
discussion of alliances like that between CMS and its MAOs, or between an MAO and a
PCP group. In RB arrangements, CMS contracts with an MAO to provide medical care
insurance and overall administrative management of patients assigned to the MAO. In
turn, the MAO delegates significant medical care, care management oversight, and
discretionary spending authority to groups or networks of providers. In return, the
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providers’ patient care revenue emanates from budgetary surpluses or deficits and other
performance incentives (as negotiated in their contracts with the MAO) rather than the
per-encounter or service-specific payments associated with traditional FFS payment
schemes. Presumably, this global approach to patient care and payment yields better
results for all stakeholders, including MAOs, physicians, and patients (James & Poulson,
2016).
2.6 Agency Theory
One theory particularly useful in examining the financial risk-shifting that occurs
from CMS to MAOs to providers is Jensen and Meckling’s Agency Theory of the Firm,
sometimes referred to as Principal-Agent Theory. It helps to explain several dynamics
that exist in healthcare financing and delivery environs. An agency relationship is “a
contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision
making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Examples include a
board of directors hiring a chief executive officer to lead a company, or a house builder
contracting with a plumbing company to assist with home construction. In both cases,
principals delegate authority to their agents, and agents act on behalf of principals,
typically in exchange for some form of compensation. Agency Theory predicts this
relationship poses potential problems such as the moral hazard of the agent’s self-interest,
the agent’s unwillingness to assume the same level of risk that the principal is willing to
accept, and the problem of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information is any data,
communication, or knowledge held by one party that is not immediately available to the
other. Agency Theory proposes that these types of problems potentially represent
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inefficiencies and costs and, therefore, efforts to minimize or mitigate them should be
addressed in the principal-agent contractual arrangement. Gormey and Matsa (2016)
support such a viewpoint in discussing agency theory and managerial preferences.
When considering the problems posed by Agency Theory, researchers might find
it is useful to understand how agreements among CMS, MAOs, and provider groups are
sustainable. That understanding is an essential element of this research. Health plans,
provider groups, and individual providers will seek or attract various populations, and the
attributes of those populations potentially relate to plan choice and service utilization.
Therefore, we begin with an examination of the healthcare financing and delivery
continuum.
Conrad (1999) offered an early but somewhat rudimentary depiction of the
hierarchy of healthcare risks and costs (see Exhibit 3). We interpret this model as follows.
“The Health Plan” represents an MAO. “The Provider Network/Intermediary” represents
a healthcare provider network or group entering an RB contract with the MAO. “The
Independent Provider Organization” equates to a legal entity such as a primary care
medical practice corporation that is an owner of, or participant in, the provider network.
“The Individual Primary Care Physician” is an owner or member of the medical practice
corporation to which specific patients are attributed. “The Non-primary Care Specialist”
is a physician to which a PCP would refer a patient for medical care that cannot be
provided by the PCP.

28

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
Exhibit 3. Conrad’s Risk-bearing Hierarchy

Exhibit 3. Obtained from “Risk-bearing arrangements and capital financing strategies for
integrated health systems : Conceptual framework and case examples,” by D. Conrad,
1999, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 39(4) Winter 1999, p.
451. Copyright 1999 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

In Exhibit 4, we present an updated and expanded view of the RB hierarchy by
defining the many principal-agent relationships within a typical Medicare Advantage plan
structure. Here we display a series of cascading relationships whereby many players
simultaneously perform in the role of principal and agent. From the cascade’s beginning
to its end, the delegation of authority and funds dissemination diminishes with each step.
Why does this model hold up? For example, it is unclear what effect, good or bad, the RB
PCP compensation model has on the Medicare Advantage program. Nevertheless, we
know that this compensation model has been in place for MAOs and PCPs in the St.
Louis, Missouri, market for more than 20 years (Deaconess, 1995). This history raises
questions. Are agency theory’s predicted problems somehow mitigated within the
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cascade? Is there the presence of bounded self-interest as discussed by Bosse and Phillips
(2018) wherein the RB PCPs perceive their MAOs to be fair, resulting in behavior that is
rewarding to both parties? Does this RB compensation model contain incentives
compatible with the desired outcomes as contemplated by the Theory of Value-based
Payments in Conrad’s later research (2016)? Let us further examine these relationships.

Exhibit 4. The Cascading Principal-Agent Relationships of Medicare Advantage

Exhibit 4. Author’s creation.

P1-A2. The beneficiary is the insured person who relies upon the Federal
Government, the agent, to provide access to Medicare medical benefits and health
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insurance coverage. The beneficiary pays for these services via federal income tax dollars
and Medicare Part B premiums to the Federal Government’s Internal Revenue Service.
P2-A3. The Federal Government assumes the role of the principal as it delegates
the benefits and insurance coverage responsibility to its agent, HHS. HHS receives
funding via an appropriation in the annual federal budgeting process.
P3-A4. HHS assumes the role of the principal as it delegates the benefits and
insurance coverage responsibility to its agent, CMS, a unit of HHS. CMS receives
funding via general revenue, payroll taxes, and beneficiary premium payments, all of
which are collected by the federal government.
P4-A5. CMS becomes a principal as it delegates some of its responsibilities to its
agents, the private health insurance companies approved by the Medicare Advantage
program. These insurance companies are called Medicare Advantage Organizations
(MAOs). They receive a monthly capitation payment for each beneficiary insured in their
plan. The payment amounts derive from a multi-faceted methodology that incorporates
various factors such as a bidding process, patients’ health statuses, average annual costs
of care, and geographical locations.
P5-A6. The MAO, in the role of principal, delegates medical care responsibilities
to their agents, the provider networks that enter into various payment arrangements,
including RB compensation, with the MAOs. A provider network can take many forms,
such as a contracting group representing several primary care medical practices, or a
large, clinically integrated network comprising entities such as hospitals, outpatient
facilities, medical practices, and ancillary service providers.
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P6-A7. The provider network, as principal, engages PCPs as its agents, either
through sub-contracts or employment. Many MAOs require the beneficiary to select a
provider network PCP as their medical gatekeeper. The PCP directly or indirectly (via the
provider network) receives payments from up to five sources: the patient (from
deductibles, co-payments, and fee-based services); a monthly capitation payment; a share
of the surplus (or deficit) from the medical budget; and various outcomes incentive
payments from the MAO.
Other relationships after A7. PCP gatekeepers, as principals, refer patients to
other providers, their agents, as appropriate, with those provider payments assessed
against the RB budgets. These referrals typically occur when the patient’s medical needs
are beyond the clinical competency of the PCP or the service capabilities within the
PCP’s medical practice. It is from these referral and payment arrangements that the RB
model of compensation occurs. We shall later describe the specifics of this arrangement.
Downstream providers may engage other providers (e.g., hospitals contracting with
emergency medicine physicians for coverage in the emergency department) and so on.
These principal-agent relationships continue along the healthcare continuum until the
patient’s medical needs are satisfied.
Also, we note two other principal-agent associations. First is the beneficiary’s
selection of the MAO to provide a selection of Medicare Advantage plans that include
access to provider networks. Second is the beneficiary’s selection of a PCP gatekeeper
(typically required by the MAO plan). In both cases, the beneficiary is the principal
delegating authority and facilitating funding to its agents.
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It is this cascade of relationships from the beneficiary to the final healthcare
provider on the medical care continuum that demonstrates a robust presence of principalagent arrangements in the MA industry. We believe this business environment supports
our selection of Agency Theory as the context for this research.
Eisenhardt’s Agency Theory Overview offers additional support to our theoretical
approach. In our view, each of the seven elements described in her overview applies to
the MAO/PCP arrangement. In Exhibit 5, we offer our application for each of
Eisenhardt’s constructs as they relate to the MAO/PCP relationship.
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Exhibit 5. Eisenhardt’s Agency Theory Overview

Element

Eisenhardt’s Constructs

Our Application to the
MAO/PCP Relationship

Key Idea

Principal-agent relationships should reflect
efficient organization of information and riskbearing costs.

Information exchange is encouraged by both
parties as they seek to minimize risk, reduce the
cost of care, and optimize financial
performance. Much information exchange
occurs during joint conferences and via website
portals. The MAO and PCP share the enrollee’s
medical costs via mutual agreement.

Unit of Analysis

Contract between principal and agent

There is a formal agreement signed by the
MAO and PCP.

Human assumptions

Self-interest
Bounded rationality
Risk aversion

An MAO’s contractual agreement with the PCP
imposes terms, conditions, incentives, and
compromises designed to address PCP’s selfinterests, bounded rationality, and risk aversion.

Organization
assumptions

Partial goal conflict among participants
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion
Information asymmetry between principal and
agent

An MAO typically is a large corporation with
abundant resources, formal processes, and a
structured hierarchy. A PCP generally operates
in a smaller, autonomous environment with
limited resources. Cultural and operational
differences likely exist.

Information
assumption

Information as a purchasable commodity

MAOs and providers can invest in technology
and human resources to capture and exchange
information. Both seek timely information
capture and exchange. MAOs also invest in
monitoring activities to ensure adequate
information capture.

Contracting problems

Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection)
Risk sharing

MAOs and PCPs attempt to address these
concerns through prolonged contract
negotiations, complex terms and conditions, and
risk-sharing formulas designed to drive the
intended behaviors and outcomes.

Problem domain

Relationships in which the principal and agent
have partly differing goals and risk preferences
(e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership,
impression management, whistle-blowing,
vertical integration, transfer pricing)

The MAO desires for the PCPs to undertake
every possible action to optimize each
enrollee’s health while minimizing costs. The
PCPs have multiple patients, busy practices,
multiple payer agreements with MAOs, and
limited resources. Goal conflicts, inefficiencies,
and information exchange challenges are
inevitable. It is through contract terms and
information exchange that the parties seek to
engage productively with one another.

Exhibit 5: Adapted from “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” by Kathleen M.
Eisenhardt, 1989, The Academy of Management Review 14(1), p. 59. Copyright 1989 by
the Academy of Management.
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To further validate our selection of Agency Theory as the context for this study,
we found several examples of researchers incorporating Agency Theory into their works
related to healthcare subject matter. Schneider & Mathios (2006) use the principal-agent
framework in their study of healthcare utilization and the associated monitoring costs
incurred by healthcare insurers. Their discussion places the insurer as the principal and
the physician as the agent. A stylized model of the principal-agent relationship is
proposed by Kantarevic & Kralj (2015) to investigate physician payment contracts. They
identify “payers” as the principals and the physicians as the agents. Sinclair-Desgagne’ &
Spaeter (2017) examine incentive compensation in a “static principal-agent moral hazard
setting.” They identify the patient as a principal who engages the actions of a physician as
their agent. Fuloria & Zenios identify principal-agent problems involving treatment
intensity. Their principals are the purchasers of healthcare services, and the agents are the
providers of healthcare services. Jiang, Pang, & Savin evaluate principal-agent
contracting models for the allocation of outpatient capacity. In their model, purchasers of
healthcare services are the principals, and healthcare providers are the agents. Each of
these studies examines various aspects of predicted principal-agent problems such as
asymmetric information, incentive alignment, and inefficiency. In conclusion, we find
that the use of Agency Theory as a theoretical underpinning in healthcare research is not
uncommon.
2.7 Other Research
Our research uncovered only one study (Landon et al. 2012) that offered a
comprehensive comparison of Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage services
utilization. The study concluded that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries utilize fewer
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services than those in Traditional Medicare. Like ours, that study controlled for attributes
such as race/ethnicity, age, sex, residence zip code, and expected socio-economic status.
Each beneficiary’s race/ethnicity, age, sex, and residence zip codes were extracted from
the CMS Master Beneficiary Summary Files. One of the study’s two socio-economic
variables was “beneficiaries age greater than 65 living below the federal poverty level.”
The second socio-economic variable was “urban.” While there is no mention of the data
sources, we surmise that the beneficiaries’ residences zip codes likely were the bases for
those determinations.
Because they lacked the diagnostic codes for individual Medicare Advantage
patients and were unable to calculate risk adjustment scores, the researchers used data
from the Medicare Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems surveys
as a proxy for the beneficiaries’ health statuses. Over several years, the surveys were
conducted by mail with telephone follow-up to secure random, representative samples of
the Traditional Medicare and Medicare advantage populations. The survey respondents
were asked to report their general and mental health statuses using a scale of excellent to
poor. This health status proxy is cited as a limitation in the study.
The study also did not consider the compensation arrangements of PCPs. The
authors suggested that more research is needed to understand the management practices
of Medicare Advantage plans, the plan designs, and how they relate to healthcare
financing and delivery reform. Nevertheless, our literature review suggests that this was
the first and perhaps only comprehensive study that compares service utilization patterns
for Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage beneficiaries, and does so with
consideration to beneficiary characteristics.
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Our study contrasts with this previous research. First, we identify all major
stakeholders in the Medicare program to better understand the critical players in the
federal government’s effort to reform healthcare and how that relates to the growth of
Medicare Advantage enrollment. Second, we incorporate a theoretical basis, Agency
Theory, to understand the relationships, issues, and challenges among those stakeholders.
Third, from our field research and physician interviews, we describe the nature of RB
compensation arrangements between MAOs and PCPs. Fourth, by calculating the CCMI
score for each service category for each beneficiary using the reported diagnostic codes
from patients’ medical claims and encounter records, we present an improved method for
defining the beneficiary’s health status. Fifth, we incorporate values for hospital
proximity and physician presence to control for health services availability and to assess
their impact on plan choices and services utilization. Sixth, we consider the impact of
various Medicare plan choices on beneficiary services utilization. Seventh, by limiting
our study to a regional market, in this case, the state of Missouri, we incorporate a known
RB PCP compensation arrangement (gleaned from our field research) as a variable that is
useful in assessing the effect of that arrangement on service utilization. Lastly, our access
to 2016 data allows us to conduct analyses based on recent information. With these
enhancements, we construct an improved framework for understanding many inner
workings of the Medicare program while investigating the effects of a beneficiary’s
attributes, Medicare plan choice, and access to providers on service utilization.
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Chapter 3: Initial Research and Hypotheses
Early in this research, we undertook two initiatives. First, we conducted a limited,
qualitative research project with a PCP group to better understand the research domain,
especially concerning what incentivizes them to engage in RB contracts and to learn
more about the nature of those contracts. As part of that experience, we attended several
meetings between the group and two MAOs. In all meetings, the parties discussed
performance metrics and related information. Second, we developed a model (see
Appendix A for additional discussion) that simulates many of the financial elements of
RB contracts that might exist between MAOs and PCPs. The following section
summarizes these efforts.
3.1 Incentives for PCPs to engage in risk-bearing contracts
To enhance our domain knowledge, on four occasions during the year prior to the
start of this study, we observed business meetings of Harmony IPA, LLC (Harmony), an
independent physician association (IPA) operating in the St. Louis, Missouri,
metropolitan area. Harmony’s membership is comprised of ten Board-certified, primary
care physicians. Harmony is a physician-owned, physician-led firm created for the
exclusive purpose of contracting with Medicare Advantage plans and managing the care
of the attributed patients. A “sub-agency” relationship exists between Harmony and each
physician member who contractually agrees to accept the terms and conditions in the
agreements between Harmony and the MAOs.
All members were invited to attend their business meetings (each lasted about two
and a half hours), and a majority did during our presence. At these business meetings,
among other agenda items, we discussed our research, their experience with risk-based
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compensation, and their relationships with MAOs. During three meetings, part of the
agenda was devoted to discussions with representatives from MAOs, an exercise known
as the Joint Operation Committee (JOC) meetings. Separately, we also conducted a semistructured interview with each of the Harmony PCPs. The interviews were designed
principally to encourage each PCP to discuss their understanding of their RB agreements,
their relationships with the MAOs, and the impact of Medicare Advantage plans on their
IPA, medical practices, and patients.
Harmony has about 3,000 Medicare Advantage beneficiaries attributed to them by
two different MAOs, and its PCPs accept up to 80% of the medical cost risk associated
with those beneficiaries. Harmony PCPs say this is because the St. Louis area was an
early adopter of Medicare Advantage plans. Most Harmony PCPs, through various
corporate structures, have participated in RB payment arrangements for more than 20
years. Some of the Harmony physicians spoke of their association with Deaconess
Hospital and its St. Louis Medical Group dating to the early 1990s when the organization
contracted with Medicare Advantage plans when they first appeared in the area. The
PCPs tell us that their experience and financial success with RB agreements offer
confidence and comfort to continue with those engagements.
We note that MAOs, depending on the laws in the states where they operate, may
have the option of employing their medical providers or otherwise owning medical
practices, rather than contracting with entities like Harmony to provide such services. In
Missouri, the MAOs could do so because there is no statutory prohibition against the
corporate practice of medicine (“Health care regulatory primer,” 2017). From the PCPs
and MAOs’ representatives we have interviewed, we conclude that the MAOs in the St.
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Louis area generally prefer the third party arrangement, hence the agency relationship
with Harmony and other provider organizations.
Based on our interviews with Harmony physicians and witnessing their
interactions with MAOs, we offer three observations. First, MAOs enter into contracts
with CMS because the MAOs believe they have the expertise needed to care for a defined
patient population, and can do so profitably. The two MAOs that contract with Harmony
are large corporations, one with a national presence and one with a regional presence. In
Missouri, these two MAOs enroll about 27% of the Medicare Advantage beneficiaries.
They each have local offices staffed with dozens of professionals that include but are not
limited to administrators, marketers, provider recruiters, information technologists, nurse
case managers, auditors, actuaries, and clerical support staff. The MAO representatives
stated that the St. Louis-area operations are among the most profitable in their companies.
Second, the Harmony PCPs report there are significant financial incentives to
manage aggressively the overall cost of care for the Medicare Advantage patients
assigned to them. Consequently, they must proactively monitor patient care activity both
inside and outside of their medical practices. For example, they insist that facilities and
specialists to whom they refer patients provide regular updates or reports that inform each
patient’s status. Another example is the importance of timely communications from
hospital emergency department physicians who attend to the PCPs’ patients. In both
cases, they expect to participate in the care management planning for their patients to
avoid duplicative testing, clinically unnecessary procedures, and unmanaged referrals.
During their interviews, several Harmony PCPs told us that they believe their care
management techniques carry over to their Traditional Medicare patients. They have
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adopted these disciplines as part of their ordinary office operations even though the
financial rewards are significantly less. Third, within a PCP’s medical practice, a PCP
will have a more exceptional ability to manage the overall cost of care for Medicare
Advantage patients than their Traditional Medicare patients because they (PCPs) receive
informational and operational support from the MAOs. This type of support includes the
MAO’s provision of a website portal where PCPs and their staff can access timely
clinical and financial information about their attributed patients. Other examples include
but are not limited to: a) assistance with on-site medical record audits and documentation
to assure that procedure and diagnostic codes are adequately documented, b) MAOgenerated prompts that remind PCPs and their staff to encourage patients to schedule
appointments for routine care such as annual physical exams or specialized care such as
eye examinations for diabetic patients, c) identification of patient care opportunities that
lead to improved financial results and d) access to price information that is useful when
considering where to refer patients. They do not receive this same level of support from
the Traditional Medicare program because there is not an administrative infrastructure in
place to do so.
Related to PCP care management activity, including referral patterns and
communication with other providers, is the composition of an MAO’s provider network.
CMS guidelines state:
“CMS requires that organizations contract with a sufficient number of providers
and facilities to ensure that at least 90 percent of enrollees within a county can
access care within specific travel time and distance maximums” (cms.gov,
2017).”
CMS’ health service delivery manual entitled “CY2016 MA HSD Provider and Facility
Specialties and Network Adequacy Criteria Guidance” describes expectations for the
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minimum number of doctors, hospitals, and other service providers that must be present
in each county of the MAO’s plan coverage area. Those expectations are based on county
type. There are five county types: a) Large Metro, b) Metro, c) Micro, d) Rural and e)
Counties with Extreme Access. Doctor coverage, for example, also includes requirements
for each of several specialties. Other service requirements may be defined as programs,
provider affiliations, or facilities. Each minimum coverage requirement generally is
stated as a ratio per 1,000 beneficiaries residing in a county. For example, CMS set a
standard of 12.2 inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 beneficiaries in a county. MAOs make
these various calculations when submitting their plan applications to CMS. They also
must submit justifications for any guideline exceptions. According to CMS, some
exceptions are allowed. Consequently, the composition of provider networks may differ
among MAO plans, and provider access may vary by county within a plan coverage area.
Therefore, we conclude that an MAO’s plan profile is shaped, in part, by its provider
network, and that affects a beneficiary’s access to and use of doctors and hospitals.
From our research, fieldwork, contract reviews, and industry experience, we
propose in Exhibit 6, a conceptual design of the relationships and processes existing
among the players in this environment. It also demonstrates how those relationships
affect patient health status, services utilization, and financial outcomes (note: the
author is a healthcare administrator with thirty-five years’ experience that includes
negotiating several Medicare Advantage agreements between insurers and providers).
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Exhibit 6. Significant Factors in the Medicare Advantage System

CMS
Contract Terms

Beneficiary Attributes
1. Age, Gender, Race
2. Health Status/CCMI
3. Income & Education
4. Access to Providers

Provider Attributes
1. FFS vs. RB
2. Network Composition

Medicare
Plan

Services
Utilization

Beneficiary
Health Status

Beneficiary
Out of Pocket
Expenses

MAO Plan
Financial Results

Provider
Financial Results

The boxes in Exhibit 6 diagram indicate factors in the healthcare financing and
delivery environment that affect Medicare Advantage stakeholders. The initiating
party, CMS, supplies contract terms and conditions that define the various Medicare
plan choices. The CMS contract terms influence the MAO’s plan contracts with the
beneficiaries and providers recruited by the MAO for participation in its plan. The
characteristics of the beneficiary, plan, and PCPs influence the process by which
PCPs render healthcare services (including mix and quantity) to each beneficiary.
The mix and quantity of services consumed by the beneficiary influence the
beneficiary’s health status and potentially drive successive service utilization events.
Service utilization also impacts the beneficiary’s out-of-pocket costs, the MAO’s
financial results, and the compensation paid to PCPs, all of which are related to the
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contract terms first initiated in the process. The process concludes with reconciled
payments from the MAO to PCP. This basic diagram is useful in exposing the
various financial risks assumed by the parties.
3.2 Financial Risk Models
Our understanding of financial risk comes from a review of current service
agreements between Harmony and two MAOs. The definition is also informed by
previous payer-provider negotiations experience. The contract language within these
agreements, combined with Harmony’s internal risk-assignment protocols, reveals
numerous and complex terms whereby the PCPs collectively and individually incur
financial risk. We also discovered that these contracts contain confidentiality statements
that prohibit public and private disclosure (even for research purposes) of the specific
terms and conditions, the MAOs’ proprietary information, and Harmony’s financial
performance resulting from the contracts. Nevertheless, from our interviews with
Harmony participants, our contract reviews, our fieldwork, and our thirty-five years’
healthcare administration experience, we can extract distinctive features of these types of
agreements. These features reveal representative components of the compensation paid to
RB PCPs that care for Medicare beneficiaries. In Exhibit 7, we display a prototypical
model that incorporates several of these features. Also, see Appendix A for more
discussion of PCP RB compensation arrangements with MAOs.
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Exhibit 7. Author’s Depiction of RB Funds Flow

Beneficiary

Health Insurance Premium Payments

Co-Pays, Unmet Deductibles
Advances

Medical
Expense
Pool*

PCP
Organization

S

Incentive
Bonuses

FF

Share of Surplus
Or Deficit

Capitation

Pool Funding

CMS

MAO
Plan

Share of Surplus
Or Deficit

*For payment of services provided by Physicians (PCPs and Specialists), Hospitals and
Other Facilities, Ancillary Service Providers, Durable Medical Equipment, Home
Healthcare, Pharmacies, Re-insurance Premiums, Etc.

In Exhibit 7, the solid boxes represent the stakeholders, the arrows represent the
flow of dollars, and the shaded box represents the pool of funds available to pay the
beneficiary’s medical costs. The model demonstrates how the PCP organization may
generate revenue from any of five sources: a) MAO’s advances, b) MAO bonus
payments, c) FFS payments, d) share of surplus or deficit, and e) beneficiary co-payments
or unmet deductible obligations. Financial risk resides with the Medical Expense Pool.
The complexity of the model is due to various contractual terms that incorporate
several pages of definitions, formulas, and inter-related payment methods that
collectively determine the PCPs’ compensation. For example, an MAO-PCP contract
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may include advance capitation payments that must be return in full or part if the medical
pool reconciles to a deficit position. Another example concerns the percentage share of a
pool surplus. The PCP’s share may be determined, in part, by the achievement or nonachievement of benchmarks for clinical outcomes or service utilization. These types of
post-service delivery arrangements can materially affect the amount of financial risk
assumed by the PCP. Consequently, the RB funds flow model is much more complicated
than the FFS model (see Exhibit 8), whereby PCPs generate revenue from any of three
sources: a) FFS payments, b) incentive bonuses, and c) beneficiary co-payments or unmet
deductible obligations.

Exhibit 8. Author’s Depiction of FFS Funds Flow

Premium
Payment

Beneficiary

Co-pays and Unmet Deductibles
FFS

CMS
Incentive
Bonuses

PCP
Organization

Table 1 contrasts these two forms of payment (RB and FFS). The dollar amounts
and quantities of services shown are hypothetical, but they reasonably approximate actual
data. Let us assume that CMS actuaries have determined that a specific patient is allotted
an annual budget of $10,000, the anticipated cost of all covered benefits, for the
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upcoming calendar year. This amount stems from an algorithm based on several factors,
such as the patient’s gender, age, health status, and place of residence, as well as the
average historical cost of care demographically comparable Medicare patients. In the FFS
program, a patient may see a PCP four times per calendar year. In this illustration, the
payment from CMS to the PCP averages $120 per visit, totaling $480 annually (4 visits at
$120 each) and leaving a balance of $9,520 for payments to other healthcare services.
The $480 total payments equate to an average of about $40 per month. If more than
$10,000 of budgeted costs are incurred in this calendar year, CMS incurs them. If less
than the budgeted costs are incurred in the calendar year, CMS retains the unspent funds.
In the RB model, the calendar year budget is paid in monthly installments by
CMS to the MAO for each beneficiary enrolled with the MAO. In this illustration, the
annual payment for one specific patient is $10,000. The MAO typically retains a portion
of the budget, say 15%, to cover its operating costs, to pay for some specialized services
for the patients, to establish reserves for unexpected losses, and, presumably, to capture a
profit. The PCP group may or may not receive from the MAO any direct payments for
services rendered to the patient. Any direct payments are defined by the contract terms
between the PCP group and the MAO. In this illustration, a PCP group member assigned
as the patient’s medical gatekeeper aggressively manages the patient’s care, offers
abundant services in the primary care setting, and limits patient referrals to only the most
efficient and effective healthcare providers outside the PCP’s medical practice location.
As a result, the total amount paid to all providers is $6,500 for the calendar year. That
amount, added to the $1,500 MAO’s retention, totals $8,000, leaving a $2,000 surplus. In
this hypothetical contract between the MAO and the PCP group, the MAO apportions
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80% of the surplus (or deficit) to the PCP group. In this case, the $2,000 annual surplus
yields a $1,600 total annual payment to the group, for a monthly average of $133 for this
one patient. The distribution of the surplus within the group is a function of contractual
payment arrangements agreed upon by the group’s members. The balance of the surplus
is retained by the MAO, which, in this case, is $400 annually or about $33 per month.

Table 1 FFS vs. RB Compensation Illustration
FFS vs. RB Compensation Illustration
(Dollars except as otherwise indicated)
Fee-forService
Patient’s Annual Budget

Riskbearing

10,000

10,000

MAO Retention

n/a

1,500

PCP FFS Payments

480

0

9,520

6,500

10,000

8,000

0

2,000

PCP Share of Surplus/Deficit

n/a

80%

PCP Earnings

n/a

1,600

PCP Average Earnings per Month

40

133

Other Provider Payments
Total

Net Surplus/Deficit

Note: n/a = not applicable

By comparing the average monthly earnings for the two scenarios, one observes that the
RB PCP earns approximately three times the FFS arrangement. To put this in further
perspective, we reviewed actual data indicating that Harmony PCPs averaged more than
$170 per member (beneficiary) per month for fourteen years with one of the MAOs. For
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example, a Harmony physician having 100 patients in this plan would realize annual
revenue of approximately $204,000 (100 patients x $170/month x 12 months) based on
this MAO’s contract with Harmony. Furthermore, this revenue (i.e., $204,000) is in
addition to earnings received from the other patients in the medical practice. This level of
financial success suggests that the principal-agent relationship, and corresponding
contract, must be mutually beneficial because both parties continue in a similar
contractual relationship today. Furthermore, it suggests the contract terms and the parties’
relationship with one another mitigates problems predicted by agency theory.
3.3 Hypotheses
We formulate the following hypotheses based on the collective insights gleaned
from our literature review, fieldwork, contract reviews, funds flow models, and
compensation comparisons.
Hypothesis 1. We expect that a beneficiary’s traits of age, gender, race, and
health status (as defined by their CCMI score) will have statistical relevance to the
Medicare plan choice. Also, we expect a beneficiary’s access to medical care (as defined
by their proximity to hospitals and the number of doctors in their county) is a significant
factor in plan choice. Further, it is believed that a beneficiary’s presumed income and
educational attainment, as determined by their residence zip code and county, are
additional factors that also affect plan choice. Accordingly, we state H1: Medicare plan
choice is statistically related to a beneficiary’s traits, access to healthcare, and presumed
levels of income and education.
Hypothesis 2. Medical services received by Medicare beneficiaries will vary
according to beneficiary characteristics, access to medical care in their county of
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residence, the demographic characteristics of individuals who reside in the same Postal
Zip code, and the choice of Medicare plans. Therefore, we propose H2: A beneficiary’s
traits, access to healthcare, presumed levels of income and education, and Medicare plan
choice collectively are statistically related to service utilization.
Hypothesis 3. RB PCPs pro-actively engage in medical care and care
management activity designed for efficient care delivery both inside and outside their
medical practice locations. They also receive operational support from the MAO’s with
whom they have contracts. Accordingly, we state H3 as follows: Beneficiaries of HMO
plans that contract with RB PCPs as medical gatekeepers use fewer healthcare services
than do beneficiaries of other plans, and those differences are statistically significant.
In Exhibit 9, we insert these hypotheses into the significant factors model to
demonstrate their presence in the model.
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Exhibit 9. Hypotheses within the Significant Factors Model

To summarize, we predict that beneficiary personal attributes, access to doctors and
hospitals, and presumed levels of income and education all are statistically relevant to
Medicare plan choices (H1). Furthermore, we predict that the explanatory variables in
H1, along with Medicare plan choice, are statistically related to service utilization (H2).
We also expect that the presence of RB PCPs results in fewer, per-beneficiary services
utilization as compared to the FFS model (H3). Operationally, we propose that these
significant factors have downstream implications, namely the beneficiary’s ongoing
health status and the stakeholders’ financial results.
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Chapter 4: Methods
This research requires an in-depth understanding of the Medicare system and the
technical data contained in the research files. There are dozens of Medicare plan options,
hundreds of unique variables, and tens of thousands of standardized diagnosis and
procedure codes. Some of the data describe each beneficiary’s attributes, insurance plan,
and the schedule of benefits received from their insurance plans. Other data describe the
disease diagnoses, medical procedures, the places of those procedures, and incurred costs
attributable to each beneficiary. There are numerous instructions, data dictionaries, and
record layout files, both public and private, compiled to guide researchers in the proper
use and interpretation of these data. Also, the research data have some limitations that, if
ignored, might result in spurious conclusions from statistical analysis. In this chapter, we
offer an overview of many of the essential data elements that compose the Medicare
research files. We also discuss the approach for our study.
4.1 Medicare Data
CMS produces more than fifty archival data files for use in research. It contracts
with a third party to operate the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC), a resource
agency designed to assist researchers in facilitating requests for research data and
interpreting that data. ResDAC, located at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, is
staffed by faculty and staff to assist researchers with their CMS-related projects. The FFS
data are derived from insurance claims processed by CMS third-party contractors,
and the HMO data come from encounter data reported by MAOs. All data are stored
in and retrieved from CMS’ data repository called the Chronic Conditions
Warehouse. Researchers may access the data via an interactive, online capability
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made available by CMS. Alternatively, a researcher may request to purchase the data
placed on an external storage medium shipped to the researcher -- the method
selected for this study.
The CMS file structure complexities, and the quantity of data elements contained
therein, can be daunting to researchers. Fortunately, ResDAC also offers an instructional
website and annually hosts several workshops to educate researchers. We attended two of
the multi-day workshops. One workshop focused on using Traditional Medicare data and
the other on the use of Medicare Advantage data. The information disseminated at these
workshops, coupled with the staff’s technical guidance, was instrumental in our
successful application and receipt of Medicare research data.
4.2 Medicare Codes
CMS utilizes various coding systems in its administration of health insurance
benefits programs, including the Medicare programs. Coding is integral to administering
both Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage programs because it is the basis for
reporting types and volumes of services rendered by healthcare providers. Further, the
research data from CMS incorporates the entirety of each coding system. Because we
organize some of the research data using standard grouping conventions and apply those
conventions to the development of some variables, it is essential to provide an overview
of these coding systems.
4.2.1 ICD Diagnosis codes. The World Health Organization (WHO) is
responsible for defining and continuously updating a code set known as the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD). According to WHO, the
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“ICD is the foundation for the identification of health trends and statistics
globally, and the international standard for reporting diseases and health
conditions. It is the diagnostic classification standard for all clinical and
research purposes. ICD defines the universe of diseases, disorders, injuries and
other related health conditions, listed in a comprehensive, hierarchical fashion
…”
Virtually every hospital, outpatient, and physician encounter record within CMS’ massive
data warehouse contains one or more ICD codes representing the injuries and diseases
experienced by each beneficiary.
In the third quarter of 2015, the ICD codes underwent a significant revision that
expanded the number of codes from about 14,000 codes (identified as the ICD 9th
revision or ICD-9) to approximately 68,000 codes and sub-codes (identified as the ICD
10th revision or ICD-10). Consequently, in 2015 and 2016, some CMS records contain
both ICD-9 codes and ICD-10 codes. Fortunately, the codes can be placed into general
groupings that allow researchers to aggregate the individual codes into logical categories
(see Table 2). Also, because ICD-9 codes and ICD-10 codes contain different prefixes,
we can identify codes from either version.
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Table 2 International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Versions 9 & 10
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Versions 9 & 10
________________________________________________________________________
Version 9
Version 10
Description
______________________________________________________________________________
001-139
140-239
240-279

A00-B99
C00-D49
E00-E89

Infectious and Parasitic Diseases
Neoplasms
Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, and Immunity
Disorders
280-289
D50-D89
Diseases of the Blood and Blood-Forming Organs
290-319
F01-F99
Mental Disorders
320-389
G00-H95
Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs
390-459
I00-I99
Diseases of the Circulatory System
460-519
J00-J99
Diseases of the Respiratory System
520-579
K00-K95
Diseases of the Digestive System
580-629
N00-N99
Diseases of the Genitourinary System
630-677
O00-O9A
Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium
680-709
L00-L99
Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue
710-739
M00-M99
Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue
740-759
Q00-Q99
Congenital Anomalies
760-779
P00-P96
Certain Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period
780-799
R00-R99
Symptoms, Signs, and Ill-Defined Conditions
800-999
S00-T88
Injury and Poisoning
V01-V86
Z00-Z99
Supplementary Classification of Factors Influencing Health
Status and Contact with Health Services
E800-E999
V00-Y99
Supplementary Classification of External Causes of Injury and
Poisoning
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Adapted from ICD-10-CM, International Classification of Diseases, 9th & 10th Revisions, p. vi.
Copyright 2014 by Practice Management Information Corporation.

4.2.2 ICD Procedure codes. Related to the ICD-9 and ICD-10 diagnostic codes
are the ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure codes. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) mandated that providers submit these procedure
codes on all inpatient medical claims submitted to Medicare (American Hospital
Association, 2009). In the Medicare programs, there are no other required uses of these
codes. ICD-9 procedure codes are identified as Volume 3 codes and contain three to four
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digits (including two decimals). There are approximately 3,800 such codes. ICD-10
procedure codes are identified as Procedure Coding System (PCS) codes and contain
seven alpha-numeric characters. There are more than 70,000 ICD-10 PCS codes. Tables 3
and 4 demonstrate the code groupings from the two ICD coding systems in effect
beginning in 2015.

Table 3 2015 ICD-9 Volume 3 Procedure Code Groups
2015 ICD-9 Volume 3 Procedure Code Groups
______________________________________________________________________________
Codes Descriptions
______________________________________________________________________________
00-00 Procedures and Interventions, Not Elsewhere Classified
01-05 Operations on the Nervous System
06-07 Operations on the Endocrine System
08-16 Operations on the Eye
17-17 Other Miscellaneous Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures
18-20 Operations on the Ear
21-29 Operations on the Nose, Mouth, and Pharynx
30-34 Operations on the Respiratory System
35-39 Operations on the Cardiovascular System
40-41 Operations on the Hemic and Lymphatic System
42-54 Operations on the Digestive System
55-59 Operations on the Urinary System
60-64 Operations on the Male Genital Organs
65-71 Operations on the Female Genital Organs
72-75 Obstetrical Procedures
76-84 Operations on the Musculoskeletal System
85-86 Operations on the Integumentary System
87-99 Miscellaneous Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Adapted from International Classification of Diseases 9th Revision, p. vi. Copyright 2014 by Practice
Management Information Corporation.
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Table 4 ICD-10 PCS Procedure Code Groups
ICD-10 PCS Procedure Code Groups
______________________________________________________________________________
Codes
Descriptions
______________________________________________________________________________
0016070-0YWBXYZ
102073Z-10Y07ZY
2W00X0Z-2Y55X5Z
30230AZ-3E1Y38Z
4A0002Z-4B0FXVZ
5A02110-5A2204Z

Section 0 - Medical and Surgical
Section 1 - Obstetrics
Section 2 - Placement
Section 3 - Administration
Section 4 - Measurement and Monitoring
Section 5 - Extracorporeal or Systemic Assistance and
Performance
6A0Z0ZZ-6ABT0BZ
Section 6 - Extracorporeal or Systemic Therapies
7W00X0Z-7W09X9Z
Section 7 - Osteopathic
8C01X6J-8E0ZXY6
Section 8 - Other Procedures
9WB0XBZ-9WB9XLZ
Section 9 - Chiropractic
B00B0ZZ-BY4GZZZ
Section B - Imaging
C0101ZZ-CW7YYZZ
Section C - Nuclear Medicine
D0000ZZ-DWY6FZZ
Section D - Radiation Therapy
F003GKZ-F15Z7ZZ
Section F - Physical Rehabilitation and Diagnostic Audiology
GZ10ZZZ-GZJZZZZ
Section G - Mental Health
HZ2ZZZZ-HZ99ZZZ
Section H - Substance Abuse Treatment
X2A5312-XY0VX83
Section X - New Technology
02VW0DJ-XNS4432
-/+ Deleted, Replaced, Expanded Codes
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Information obtained at https://www.findacode.com/code-set.php?set=ICD10PCS

4.2.3 HCPCS Procedure codes. CMS, in coordination with the American
Medical Association, publishes the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
(HCPCS). “HCPCS is a collection of standardized codes that represent medical
procedures, supplies, products, and services. The codes are used to facilitate the
processing of health insurance claims by Medicare and other insurers… HCPCS is
divided into two subsystems, Level I and Level II. Level I comprise Current Procedural
Terminology® codes (CPT), each consisting of five numeric digits, some containing an
additional two-digit modifier that helps to describe additional or unusual services or
circumstances. Level II HCPCS codes identify products, supplies, and services not
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included in CPT. Level II codes consist of a letter followed by four numeric digits”
(National Institute of Health, 2020).
Additionally, CMS organizes the HCPCS codes into medical service groups (see
Table 5). Our research utilizes these groups to organize and simplify the data used in our
study. For reference only, we also include a detailed listing of the HCPCS Level II codes
(see Table 6).

Table 5 HCPCS Level I Code Groupings
HCPCS Level I Code Groupings
________________________________________________
Codes
Description
________________________________________________
99201-99499
Evaluation and Management
00100-01999
Anesthesia
10021-69990
Surgery
76496-79999
Radiology
80047-89398
Pathology and Lab
90281-99199
Medicine
A0001-Z9999
Level II (transportation, materials, supplies)
All other
Other or not-defined
________________________________________________
Note: Adapted from two sources. CPT Standard Edition 2015, p. xii. Copyright 2014 by American Medical
Association. HCPCS National Level II Medicare Codes 2014. Copyright 2013 by Practice Management
Information Corporation.
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Table 6 HCPCS Level II Code Sections
HCPCS Level II Code Sections
______________________________________________________________________________
Codes
Description
______________________________________________________________________________
A0000-A0999 Transportation
A4000-A7509 Medical and Surgical Supplies
A9000-A9999 Miscellaneous and Experimental
B0000-B9999 Enteral and Parenteral Therapy
C0000-C9999 Temporary Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System
D0000-D9999 Dental Codes
E0000-E9999 Durable Medical Equipment
G0000-G9999 Temporary Procedures and Professional Services
H0000-H9999 Rehabilitative Services
J0000-J8999 Drugs Administered Other Than Oral Method
J9000-J9999 Chemotherapy Drugs
K0000-K9999 Temporary Codes for Durable Medical Equipment Regional Carriers
L0000-L4999 Orthotic Services
L5000-L9999 Prosthetic Procedures
M0000-M9999 Medical Services
P0000-P9999 Pathology and Laboratory
Q0000-Q9999 Temporary Codes
R0000-R9999 Diagnostic Radiology Services
S0000-S9999 Private Payer Codes
T0000-T9999 State Medicaid Agency Codes
V0000-V2999 Vision Services
V5000-5999 Hearing Services
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Adapted from HCPCS National Level II Medicare Codes 2014, pp. 2-3. Copyright 2013 by Practice
Management Information Corporation.
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4.2.4 Diagnostic related groups. Hospitalized patients are classified into
clinically comparable groups using categorizations called Diagnostic Related Groups
(DRGs) that acknowledge each patient’s illness severity, prognosis, treatment difficulty,
need for intervention, and resource intensity. These categories collectively represent
degrees of clinical care complexity. According to CMS: “The DRGs are a patient
classification scheme which provides a means of relating the type of patients a hospital
treats (i.e., its case mix) to the costs incurred by the hospital” (CMS, 2019). Table 7
displays the categorization of DRG code groupings.

Table 7 Diagnostic Related Group Codes
Diagnostic Related Group Codes
Codes Range

Description

001-017

Pre-MDC

020-103

Diseases & Disorders of the Nervous System

113-125

Diseases & Disorders of the Eye

129-159

Diseases & Disorders of the Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat

163-208

Diseases & Disorders of the Respiratory System

215-320

Diseases & Disorders of the Circulatory System

326-395

Diseases & Disorders of the Digestive System

405-446

Diseases & Disorders of the Hepatobiliary System & Pancreas

453-566

Diseases & Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System & Connective Tissue

570-607

Diseases & Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue & Breast

614-645

Endocrine, Nutritional & Metabolic Diseases & Disorders

652-700

Diseases & Disorders of the Kidney & Urinary Tract

707-730

Diseases & Disorders of the Male Reproductive System

734-761

Diseases & Disorders of the Female Reproductive System

768-833

Pregnancy, Childbirth & the Puerperium

790-795

Newborns & Other Neonates with Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period

799-816

Diseases & Disorders of Blood, Blood Forming Organs, Immunologic Disorders
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820-849

Myeloproliferative Diseases & Disorders, Poorly Differentiated Neoplasms

853-872

Infectious & Parasitic Diseases, Systemic or Unspecified Sites

880-887

Mental Diseases & Disorders

895-897

Alcohol/Drug Use & Alcohol/Drug-Induced Organic Mental Disorders

901-923

Injuries, Poisonings & Toxic Effects of Drugs

927-935

Burns

939-951

Factors Influencing Health Status & Other Contacts with Health Services

955-965

Multiple Significant Trauma

969-977

Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections

981-989

O.R. Procedure Unrelated To Principal Diagnosis With or Without CC / MCC

998-998

Principal Diagnosis Invalid As Discharge Diagnosis

999-999

Ungroupable

Note: Adapted from information obtained at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareFeeforSvcPartsAB/downloads/DRGdesc08.pdf

Another means of organizing DRGs is to assign each code to either of two
categories: surgical and medical. These categorizations enable researchers to differentiate
between these two basic types of hospital admissions based on the DRG code assigned
for each admission (see Table 8).

Table 8 DRGs Sorted by Admission Type
DRGs Sorted by Admission Type
DRG Code Range

Admission Type

001-042

Surgical

052-103

Medical

113-117

Surgical

121-125

Medical

129-139

Surgical

146-159

Medical

163-168

Surgical

175-208

Medical

215-265

Surgical

280-316

Medical
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326-358

Surgical

368-395

Medical

405-425

Surgical

432-446

Medical

453-517

Surgical

533-566

Medical

573-585

Surgical

592-607

Medical

614-630

Surgical

637-645

Medical

652-675

Surgical

682-700

Medical

707-718

Surgical

722-730

Medical

734-750

Surgical

754-761

Medical

765-770

Surgical

774-795

Medical

799-804

Surgical

808-816

Medical

820-830

Surgical

834-849

Medical

853-858

Surgical

862-872

Medical

876-876

Surgical

880-897

Medical

901-909

Surgical

913-923

Medical

927-929

Surgical

933-935

Medical

939-941

Surgical

945-951

Medical

955-959

Surgical

963-965

Medical

969-970

Surgical

974-977

Medical

981-989
Other

Surgical
Other

Note: Adapted from information obtained at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareFeeforSvcPartsAB/downloads/DRGdesc08.pdf

4.3 Medicare Data Sources
Our study uses restricted, highly protected data available from CMS. These
restricted datasets, called Research Identifiable Files (RIF), contain actual data from all
Medicare beneficiaries’ reportable healthcare service activities. These are the most
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comprehensive datasets available for our study. CMS maintains these files in its Chronic
Conditions Warehouse, a virtual data repository for researchers. Access to RIFs requires
a formal, multi-month application process that includes research justification and data
management and security plans that must receive approval by representatives from CMS
and its designated contractors.
Traditional Medical data come from the providers’ (e.g., hospitals, doctors, home
health agencies) claims submitted to CMS and its contractors and contain demographical,
clinical coding, and financial data. The claims submittal and payment processes, also
called “adjudication,” are complex, comprehensive, and differing among the provider
types. A detailed examination of the process is available at
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/clm104c01.pdf. Exhibit 10 offers a simplified
portrayal of the claims submission and payment process.

Exhibit 10. Claims Adjudication and Payment

Provider
Submits
Claims

Medicare
Administrative
Contractor

CMS Chronic
Conditions
Warehouse

Payment

Traditional Medicare adjudicated claims data include several financial variables such as
the providers’ submitted charges, the allowed payments from Medicare, the amounts paid
to providers, and the patients' amounts due. Service start dates and stop dates enable
researchers to count and determine the length of each episode of care.
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Medicare Advantage information, called encounter data, is received from the
MAOs (i.e., the private insurers). As a condition of participation in the MA program, the
MAOs must report to CMS specific patient-provider encounters and related information
during the contract period. In turn, the MAOs require each contracted provider to submit
to them their patient encounter data. A detailed description of the process is available in
the Medicare Managed Care Manual (www.cms.gov, 2020). Exhibit 11 is a simplified
portrayal of CMS’ encounter data collection and storage process.

Exhibit 11. Encounter Data Processing and Storage

CMS
Standard
Analytic
Files

Provider

MAO

CMS

CMS
Chronic
Conditions
Data
Warehouse

CMS
Integrated
Data
Repository

CMS
Risk
Adjustment
System

CMS
Medicare
Advantage
Prescription Drug
System

One of the Medicare Advantage data limitations is that provider payments and cost
information are not included. Instead, the files include the dates, counts, and descriptions
of service types received by the beneficiaries and plan and demographical information.
Our conversations with MAOs inform us that Medicare Advantage fee payments
to their networks’ non-RB providers are approximately comparable to Traditional
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Medicare fee payments to providers. A recent study by a prominent research group
reported a similar finding (Curto, Einav, Finkelstein, Levin, and Bhattacharya, 2017).
Therefore, one may choose to use Traditional Medicare fees as proxies for the cost of
Medicare Advantage services to estimate some of the economic effects of the various
plan choices.
4.3.1 Medicare Data Sample. Data for this dissertation were acquired to support
a four-year program of research under strict protocols approved by the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. Following a six-month process for approval of the
research plan and data protection practices, we received our data in the form of 396
encrypted, compressed RIFs, equating to approximately 55 gigabytes and representing
the healthcare records for 999,999 of Missouri’s 1,160,093 Medicare beneficiaries. They
were installed on the dedicated HIPAA-compliant server for this research program at the
University of Missouri-St. Louis,
The CMS provides an encrypted beneficiary ID, a pseudo-identifier to enable
researchers to link records in various files to individual beneficiaries while protecting
their privacy. An annual “master beneficiary summary file” contains high-level
summaries of patients’ demographics, residential status, types of Medicare coverage over
the year, service utilization, and costs of service delivered under FFS reimbursement. In
separate files, encounter and diagnostic data are provided under five service categories:
a) inpatient, b) hospital-based outpatient, c) carrier (doctors and other non-hospital
suppliers), d) home-health assistance, and e) skilled nursing facility.
Several records in the encounter files often apply to the same service encounter.
For each type of service, we generally considered all records ascribed to a particular date
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as representing a single incident of related service activity in a particular category. We
constructed summaries of procedures and diagnoses ascribed to each day of the year for
each of the five services and merged them with the Master Beneficiary summaries and
complementary information from other sources to build a consolidated record for each
Medicare beneficiary. The consolidated record thus indicates medical services received,
diagnostic information, access to medical services, and demographic data tied to
individuals’ place of residence. We used SAS 9.4 for data consolidation and
transformation and for most of the statistical analysis. Exhibit 12 displays a schematic
that depicts the sources and uses of data for this research.
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Exhibit 12. Sources and Uses of Data
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4.3.2 Beneficiary record development. Our research requires a complete, annual
healthcare record for each beneficiary that reflects services covered under the insurance
plan while the person is resident in the same location over the entire year. Mid-year
changes to coverage and plan types could introduce bias into the study. From the plan
identification numbers, along with the beneficiary’s months of coverage under each plan,
we could determine if a beneficiary was in the same plan for the entire year. For our
study population, we, therefore, excluded the records of beneficiaries not having a
consistent 12-month coverage in the same plan. We also excluded beneficiaries under age
65, those with address changes, and those in hospice or experiencing an end-stage renal
disease. The reasons for exclusions are described in Table 9.
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Table 9 Beneficiary Records Excluded from the Study
Beneficiary Records Excluded from the Study
Excluded Group

Reason for Exclusion

Beneficiaries under age 65

To focus the study on the elderly population by
omitting younger beneficiaries who receive
Medicare coverage due to their physical disabilities

Beneficiaries with either non-Missouri residences
or non-Missouri mailing addresses

To eliminate the effects of healthcare utilization that
may occur outside of the state

Beneficiaries with mid-year zip code changes

To eliminate the effects of possible changes in
provider access

Beneficiaries with mid-year plan changes

To eliminate the effects of possible changes in
provider access and benefits coverage

Beneficiaries receiving hospice care

Medicare Advantage plans generally do not pay for
hospice care benefits

Beneficiaries experiencing end-stage renal disease

Beneficiaries in this category may receive care
through a special needs program (SNP), and access
to SNP plans varies throughout the state

In Table 10, we display the counts and percentages of total Missouri Traditional
Medicare (FFS) and Medicare Advantage (HMO) enrollees, the counts and percentages
for the random sample records, and the counts and percentages for the normalized records
used in our study. We note that the FFS program provides insurance coverage and
benefits for special classes of patients (e.g., hospice, end-stage renal disease) that may be
different from those generally available in the HMO plans. Consequently, compared to
the HMO population, a higher proportion of FFS beneficiaries are excluded from the
study. This adjustment helps to assure that the FFS and HMO study populations have
comparable, basic schedules of benefits. Our study population includes 55.7% of all
Missouri Medicare beneficiaries, thus enabling a robust study with a very high
confidence level.
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Table 10 Beneficiary Counts
Beneficiary Counts (2016)

We created summaries of annual service tallies that show mean usage by both the
included and excluded populations for FFS and HMO beneficiaries (see Tables 11 and
12). The tables reveal material differences in the means for several service categories
(also see SAS output in Appendices J and K). Reasons for the differences vary. Among
those excluded are individuals who died during the year, those who had partial coverage
for some other reason, and individuals who moved to another geographic area.

Table 11 Difference in Means for FFS Study Populations
Difference in Means for FFS Study Populations
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Table 12 Difference in Means for HMO Study Populations
Difference in Means for HMO Study Populations

Plan type and demographical information. Using the pseudo-identifier, we
extract from the Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) the desired variables to
construct a relevant portion of each Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage
beneficiary’s demographical record. The complete listing of MBSF variable names and
descriptors are in Appendix B.
Table 13 displays the names and descriptions of the variables used to develop
each beneficiary’s demographical and plan type profiles. The demographics include each
beneficiary’s unique identifying number, year of coverage (2016), gender, race, and place
of residence as defined by county, state, and zip code. The insurance plan variables are
used to describe the type of insurance coverage(s), as defined by an insurance plan
contract number, maintained by each beneficiary, and the length of time, in months, that
the coverage(s) was(were) in force.
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Table 13 Demographical and Insurance Plan Variables
Demographical and Insurance Plan Variables
Group

SAS Variable Long Name

Description

Demographics

BENE_ID
RFRNC_YR

Beneficiary identification number (encrypted)
Reference year (2016) to confirm that
beneficiary’s data is for the study period
Beneficiary age at year-end
Beneficiary sex (unknown, male, female)
Beneficiary race (seven categories)
Beneficiary county code base on mailing
address
Beneficiary state code based on mailing address
Beneficiary zip code based on mailing address

AGE_AT_END_REF_YR
SEX_IDENT_CD
BENE_RACE_CD
COUNTY_CD
STATE_CD
ZIP_CD
Insurance plan

BENE_HMO_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_01
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_12

Number of months beneficiary received their
benefits through an MA plan
Beneficiary’s MA plan identification number in
January
Beneficiary’s MA plan identification number in
December

Summary file. Among the data received for our study is a file named “Master
Beneficiary Summary File Cost & Use Segment” (MBSF). For each Traditional Medicare
beneficiary, this dataset contains annual summaries of patient care activity and associated
costs for each of several care categories. These data summarize many of the provider
payment elements of the study and are useful for validating the summation of specific
line item values contained within other data sets. The variables examined from this file
appear in Table 14. The MBSF Cost &Use segment contains very limited and incomplete
cost-of-service information for Medicare Advantage beneficiaries, and that data is not
useful for this study.
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Table 14 Cost and Use Segment File: Variables for Traditional Medicare Beneficiaries
Cost and Use Segment File: Variables for Traditional Medicare Beneficiaries
Group

SAS Variable Long Name

Description

Acute Inpatient

ACUTE_STAYS
ACUTE_COV_DAYS
ACUTE_MDCR_PMT
ACUTE_PERDIEM_PMT
ACUTE_PRMRY_PMT

Number of acute inpatient stays
Number of acute inpatient days
Acute inpatient payments from Medicare
Acute inpatient per diem payments from Medicare
Acute inpatient payments from non-Medicare
sources
Number of readmissions to Missouri hospitals within
30 days of a previous stay

READMISSIONS

Other Inpatient

OIP_STAYS
OIP_COV_DAYS
OIP_MDCR_PMT
OPI_PERDIEM_PMT
OIP_PRMRY_PMT

Other (non-acute) inpatient stays
Number of other (non-acute) inpatient days
Other (non-acute) inpatient payments from Medicare
Other (non-acute) inpatient per diem payments from
Medicare
Other (non-acute) inpatient payments from nonMedicare sources

Skilled Nursing

SNF_STAYS
SNF_COV_DAYS
SNF_MDCR_PMT
SNF_PRMRY_PMT
SNF_BENE_PMT

Number of skilled nursing stays
Number of skilled nursing days
Skilled nursing payments from Medicare
Skilled nursing payment from non-Medicare sources
Skilled nursing payment co-insurance and deductible
payment amounts

Hospital Outpatient

HOP_VISITS
HOP_MDCR_PMT
HOP_PRMRY_PMT

Hospital outpatient visits
Hospital outpatient payments from Medicare
Hospital outpatient payments from non-Medicare
sources
Hospital outpatient co-insurance and deductible
payment amounts

HOP_BENE_PMT

Home Health

HH_VISITS
HH_MDCR_PMT
HH_PRMRY_PMT

Home health visits
Home health payments from Medicare
Home health payment from non-Medicare sources

Inpatient file. Inpatient care occurs in a Medicare-certified facility where a
patient incurs an overnight stay that generally includes two or more midnights. (Some
single night stays are classified as observation-only stays and do not meet the inpatient
admission criteria.) Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the
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merged inpatient file the specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s inpatient
facilities record. The complete listing of inpatient variable names and descriptors appear
in Appendix B, but generally are described as


pseudo-identifier;



discharge dates;



facility identifiers;



ICD diagnosis codes.

Also, the diagnosis codes (ICD-9/10) recorded in any inpatient admission are placed into
their appropriate group as defined previously.
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) file. A beneficiary may receive skilled nursing
care provided for a limited time (on a short-term basis) if all of these conditions are met:


the beneficiary has Medicare Part A (hospital coverage) and a balance of days left
in their benefit period;



the beneficiary is discharged from a qualifying hospital stay;



the beneficiary’s doctor has decided that daily skilled care is required and that
care must be given by, or under the supervision of, a skilled nursing or therapy
staff;



the skilled services occur in a Medicare-certified SNF; and the skilled services are
required for a medical condition that’s either (a) a hospital-related medical
condition treated during a qualifying 3-day inpatient hospital stay, even if it was
not the reason for the hospital admission, or (b) a condition that started while
receiving care in the SNF for a hospital-related medical condition (for example,
an infection that requires IV antibiotics while receiving SNF care).
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Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the merged SNF file the
specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s skilled nursing activity record.
Appendix C displays the names and descriptors, but they generally can be described as
follows:


pseudo-identifier;



facility identifiers;



discharge dates;



ICD codes.

Also, the ICD codes recorded in any SNF admission are assigned to their appropriate
group.
Hospital-based outpatient services file. Outpatient services are generally received
in places other than an inpatient hospital or medical practice setting. They can be located
on a hospital campus or off a hospital campus. The hospital’s organizational structure,
including its arrangements for reimbursement from CMS, determines if an off-campus
service is a hospital-based service. Examples of hospital outpatient services include but
are not limited to, imaging, laboratory, therapies, endoscopic procedures, emergency
department visits, urgent care, and ambulatory surgeries. Using each beneficiary's unique
identifier, we extract from the merged outpatient file the specific variables to construct
each beneficiary’s outpatient services record. The variable names and descriptors appear
in Appendix D but generally are described as follows:


pseudo-identifier;



facility identifiers;



encounter dates;
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HCPCS codes;



ICD codes.

Also, the HCPCS and ICD codes recorded from any outpatient event are assigned to their
appropriate groups.
Home health care. Traditional Medicare beneficiaries with either or both
Medicare Part A and Part B coverage and who meet all of these conditions are eligible to
receive home health care services (Health Services Coverage,
https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/home-health-services):


the beneficiary is under the care of a doctor and is receiving services under
a plan of care created and reviewed regularly by a doctor;



a doctor has certified that one or more of the following is needed:


intermittent skilled nursing care (other than drawing blood);



physical therapy, speech-language pathology, or continued
occupational therapy services (note: these services are covered
only when the services are a specific, safe and effective treatment
for the condition being treated);



the amount, frequency, and time period of the services needs to be
reasonable, and they need to be complex or such that only qualified
therapists can do them safely and effectively;



either (1) beneficiary’s condition must be expected to improve in a
reasonable and generally predictable period of time, or (2) a skilled
therapist is needed to safely and effectively create a maintenance
program for the condition being treated, or (3) a skilled therapist is
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needed to safely and effectively do maintenance therapy for a
condition.


the home health agency is certified by Medicare;



the beneficiary is homebound, as certified by a doctor; and



the beneficiary does not need more than part-time or "intermittent" skilled
nursing care.

MAOs generally impose similar requirements on their members, but the MAOs are
allowed to expand these benefits as long as the Traditional Medicare benefits are
included in their plans.
Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the merged home
health files the specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s home health care record.
The variable names and descriptors appear in Appendix E, but generally can be described
as follows:


pseudo-identifier;



provider identifiers;



encounter dates;



HCPCS codes;



ICD codes

Also, the HCPCS and ICD codes recorded with any outpatient event are placed into their
appropriate groups.
Carrier file. This care category includes services performed by physicians, nurse
practitioners, therapists, and other licensed practitioners. It also may include certain
institutional providers such as clinical laboratories, urgent care centers, free-
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standing/walk-in clinics, ambulance services, suppliers, and stand-alone ambulatory
surgical centers. Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the merged
carrier file the specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s carrier records. The
variable names and descriptors for this file appear in Appendix F, but generally can be
described as follows:


pseudo-identifier;



encounter dates;



provider identifiers (NPI) codes;



provider taxonomy (specialty) codes;



HCPCS codes;



ICD codes.

Also, the HCPCS and ICD codes recorded from any carrier event are placed into their
appropriate groups.
4.4 CCMI score
The CCMI score is a predictor of a beneficiary’s survival rate during the next
year. A CCMI score is calculated for each service category for each beneficiary using
weighted values applied to specific ICD-10 codes reported by their providers. The ICD10 coding algorithm (see Exhibit 13) used in our study was proposed by Quan et al.
(2005). If any of the eligible ICD-10 codes appear one or more times in a beneficiary’s
aggregated record, the score for that code enters the CCMI calculation. The sum of the
values represents the CCMI score placed into each beneficiary’s aggregated record. The
score can range from 0 (no serious diseases) to 32 (multiple co-morbidities). Lower
CCMI scores predict higher survival rates, and higher scores predict lower survival rates.
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In this study, our application of a CCMI score is its use as an explanatory variable
relating to a beneficiary’s plan choice and service utilization in each care setting.
Exhibit 13. Charlson Comorbidity Algorithm

4.5 Access
We also investigate if a beneficiary’s access to medical care affects service
utilization. We define “access” four ways: physician access, hospital access, financial
resources, and level of education. We developed these access scores using the CMS files

79

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
and third-party sources, including the Missouri Division of Professional Registration, the
Essence 2016 Provider Directory, the Missouri Office of Primary Care Health and Rural
Health, the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, and the U.S. Census
Bureau.
4.5.1 Physician access score. Using data from the Missouri Division of
Professional Registration, we identified all physicians, both allopathic and osteopathic,
having a primary business address in a Missouri county. We totaled the number of
physicians in each county who were not under disciplinary action and had an active
license since 2015. Physician count by county is an explanatory variable. The resulting
directory is displayed in Appendix H.
4.5.2 RB PCP roster. We wish to note that we have been unable to locate a data
set that identifies the individual PCPs who participate in Medicare Advantage RB
arrangements. Consequently, we do not know how many PCPs have experience with
these types of agreements, and it is likely we could find them only with an extensive and
expensive search. Moreover, if such a search and identification process were feasible, it
presumes that PCPs are willing to cooperate and reveal the contract terms and other
arrangements with their MAOs. Furthermore, our conversations with PCPs and MAOs, as
well as a review of their contracts, indicate the contract information may be limited or
unavailable. There are at least three reasons: (a) various confidentiality provisions exist in
the MAO/PCPs contracts, (b) various disclosure prohibitions exist in the provider
group/provider contracts (e.g., Harmony IPA and its participating providers), and (c)
proprietary, closely guarded information is held by the MAOs. Collectively, these
constraints significantly hinder one’s ability to create an extensive directory of RB PCPs,
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including descriptions of critical financial elements contained in their contracts with
MAOs.
Fortunately, our familiarity with Harmony and two of its MAO presented the
opportunity to understand the RB arrangements with this group of PCPs. We learned
from our conversations with the MAOs that there are similarly structured contracts with
many PCPs in their plan networks. For example, we learned that Harmony is engaged in
an RB arrangement with an MAO called “Essence.” Three sources within Essence
confirmed that Harmony’s RB contract is structured similarly to those involving 200
PCPs in Essence’s St. Louis-area network. Accordingly, when examining characteristics
of the plans in which Harmony participates, we also can assess the presence of RB PCPs
(including Harmony PCPs) and evaluate whether their collective presence affects
healthcare service utilization.
4.5.3 Gatekeeping. The RB PCP typically is a medical “gatekeeper” who
determines how, when, and where a patient will receive services. The RB PCP may
choose to refer a patient for a service rendered at a hospital-based clinic, a specialty
medical practice, or other clinics (any of which likely requires an external referral for an
appointment on a future date). Alternatively, the RB PCP may render that same service
on the same day the patient visits the PCP’s medical practice. By rendering same day
service in the PCP’s office, the patient experiences greater convenience and possibly
avoids a co-pay or other costs associated with a visit to the external provider. If a referral
is warranted, then the PCP may choose to direct or refer patients to facilities, providers,
and services having competitive prices. These gatekeeping functions enable the PCP to
engage in medical care and cost management oversight that may not be done by non-
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gatekeepers. Accordingly, our study examines if the Essence beneficiaries use services
differently than beneficiaries in the other Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage
plans.
4.5.4 Hospital proximity. We use the Missouri Office of Primary Care and Rural
Health’s (MOPCRH) bi-annual 2018 report to quantify hospital access for each Missouri
county. We verified that the hospitals listed in the report were operational in 2016. We
also asked a MOPCRH representative to describe the method by which hospital distances
from each non-hospital county were determined, as stated in the report. The
representative indicated that the hospital distances were calculated by traveling the most
direct, primary roadways from the county seat to the nearest hospital. When we asked for
the definition of a county seat, the representative told us that information was not
available because the staff and consultants engaged in the study were no longer with the
office. Using Google maps, we tested the distances by conducting a visual inspection of
the roadways nearest the approximate geographical center of each of five no-hospital
counties (from differing areas of the state) to the nearest hospitals in their regions. Using
the Google maps driving distance results, we found that the tested distances were within
the parameters defined in the report. Therefore, we accepted the report’s travel distance
assumptions. We then assigned three groupings: (a) counties containing at least one
general access hospital, (b) counties without a hospital but having one within a distance
of 27 miles or less, and (c) counties with no general access hospitals within 28 miles of
the county seat. Each group was assigned a code of 1, 2, or 3. The hospital access results
are displayed in Appendix I.
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4.5.5 Missouri census data. One objective of our study is to consider explanatory
variables that are not contained within the CMS datasets. We specifically include
surrogate variables that predict each beneficiary’s financial resource and level of
education based on individuals who live in the beneficiary’s residential neighborhood. To
create these variables, we obtained data for geographic regions from the Missouri Census
Data Center (MCDC). The MCDC participates in a cooperative program with the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (Bureau). An innovation introduced by the Bureau as part of the
2000 U.S. census effort was creating Zip Code Tabulations Areas (ZCTAs) as an
alternative to using zip codes for constructing data analyses. From the Bureau’s
perspective, zip codes represent mail delivery locations that may not always represent
logical, spatial areas defined by geographical boundaries. Also, there are some zip codes
with little to no residential populations, such as those representing a specific location for
a group of post office boxes or a very sparsely populated rural area. To overcome these
deficiencies, the Bureau invoked the ZCTA methodology, based on census blocks (which
include the residence zip codes) rather than the zip codes themselves, to represent
geographically definable areas meeting minimum population thresholds (census.gov,
n.d.).
Also under the purview of the Bureau is the American Community Survey (ACS).
The ACS is an ongoing, long-form survey taken both during the decennial censuses and
in each interim year. The ACS seeks to capture various characteristics of the U.S.
population-based on survey answers supplied from approximately 3.5 million households
(census.gov, n.d.). The survey tabulations generate statistically relevant summaries of
demographical data applied to a geographic region such as a nation, state, county, or
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ZCTA. With the annual updates, longitudinal data can be structured to create more
accurate estimates, thereby improving the accuracy of estimates drawn from a single
point in time (such as the decennial census year). For our study, we access the MCDCsupplied dataset containing demographical estimates for financial resources and levels of
education assigned to the Missouri ZCTAs based on a five-year average (2014-2018) of
ASC survey responses. We incorporate the census data by matching our beneficiaries’
residence zip codes to their respective ZCTAs.
Financial resource. Whether in Traditional Medicare or Medicare Advantage
plans, beneficiaries may incur a personal cost for access to and use of medical services.
The amount of personal cost is, in part, determined by plan selection and the associated
schedule of benefits. Personal costs can include insurance premium payments, copayments, and deductibles. Sometimes, the aggregate costs of co-payments and
deductibles are limited to an annual maximum “out-of-pocket” expense. A beneficiary’s
affluence or ability to afford these costs could influence both plan selection and service
utilization. To allow for the effects of a beneficiary’s ability to afford the costs of
insurance premiums, co-payments, deductibles, and other costs of the selected plan, from
the MCDC-supplied dataset, we use the predicted “median household income” or the
predicted “median home value” of residents in the beneficiary’s ZCTA as the surrogate
for the beneficiary’s financial resources.
Level of Education. The selection of a Medicare plan can be a daunting task.
Beneficiaries have numerous choices for their coverage. Those choices include Medicare
with no secondary coverage, Medicare with Medicaid as secondary coverage, Medicare
with commercial insurance for secondary coverage, Medicare Advantage PPOs, and
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Medicare Advantage HMOs. Retirees may have additional choices arranged by their
former employers. There can be numerous insurer and plan selections within these
choices, and varying costs and benefits schedules can create additional complexities.
Much of this information exists on CMS’ and MAOs’ websites. Other means of
information distribution to inform or entice enrollees include elaborate marketing
campaigns and mailings of informational packets containing dozens of pages.
Further, there is a cadre of independent brokers and insurance agents willing to
meet one-on-one with potential enrollees to provide additional information and education
about insurance offerings and to sell the health insurance policies. Consequently, we
consider one’s level of education as a beneficiary attribute that may be a factor in plan
choice and service utilization. To allow for the effects of a beneficiary’s ability to
navigate the complexities of plan choice and utilization, from the MCDC-supplied
dataset, we select the predicted “percent of households having a bachelor’s degree or
more” in the beneficiary’s ZCTA as the surrogate for the beneficiary’s level of education.
4.6 Data sufficiency
Differences in data collection techniques for Traditional Medicare and Medicare
Advantage beneficiaries pose certain challenges for researchers. One notable concern is
dealing with multiple claims or accountings for a single medical event as a result of
various issues involving claims processing and MAO data reporting. While there are
potential remedies to refine the data and eliminate duplicative records, it can be a
daunting and imperfect task. To avoid the possibility of duplicative counting of any
service event, we consolidate records of all services in a category (inpatient, SNF,
outpatient, home health, and carrier) with the same date when counting the number of
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services for individual beneficiaries. This is one method recommended by ResDAC as
discussed in their workshops and contained in several of their training materials. For
inpatient and skilled nursing, we count the number of distinctive discharge dates. For the
outpatient, home health, and carrier categories, we count the dates when a patient
receives a service. If multiple service records occur on the same date within the same
category, the count is “one.”
4.6.1 Data Correlation Test. Service count summaries for FFS beneficiaries are
in the Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF), but comparable count summaries for
HMO beneficiaries are not. Therefore, to test our counting method, we subjected the FFS
results to a correlation test. We compared the summary counts that we tallied from each
of the FFS categories to their counterparts found in the MBSF. The results (see Appendix
J) gave us confidence in our counting methodology as demonstrated by the very high
correlation for each service category (inpatient r = 0.996, p-value < .001; skilled nursing
r = 0.999, p-value =<0.001; outpatient r = 0.993, p-value < 0.001; home health r = 0.979;
p-value < 0.001; and carrier r = 0.933, p-value < 0.001). Given the acceptable
correlations from the FFS service count summaries, we applied the same counting
methodology to the HMO service events.
4.6.2 MAO Data Collection Processes. In our conversations with the Essence
representatives, we inquired about their confidence in their encounter data reporting to
CMS. They told us that significant investments are made in their data collection and
reporting processes, and they have high confidence in the accuracy of their data. We
received similar comments from the UHC representatives. While this is encouraging, we
judge that further triangulation is required to verify the consistency between FFS and

86

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
HMO data. For example, primary data collection studies could be conducted to
investigate how data are collected and reported by all MAOs. This would include
examinations and tests of the processes and systems that exist between providers and
MAOs, and MAOs and CMS, as well as confirmation of their data accuracy. Second, data
accuracy should be verified by third party sources such as Medicare cost reports or
reviews of financial and medical records by independent auditors. We are aware that
CMS is engaged in some of these activities, and we are encouraged by reports that data
accuracy continues to improve.
4.7 Statistical Analysis
We employ various analyses, including summary statistics, tests of differences in
means, CHAID decision trees, and Poisson regressions to examine the data and test our
hypotheses.
4.7.1 Units of Analysis. The units of analysis are (a) for total system utilization:
per capita utilization for various medical services by type of coverage, and (b) for
individual beneficiaries (patients), annual summaries of their utilization of medical
services (inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home-health assistance, skilled nursing facility)
counted by the number of dates with records related to a service or diagnosis rendered in
the service category.
4.7.2 CHAID Decision Trees. Chi-square automatic interaction detection
(CHAID) decision trees are useful in uncovering relationships between variables. For this
portion of the study, we imported a SAS dataset into the IBM SPSS Statistics Version 26.
The dataset contained values for each of 143 variables representing services utilization
data derived from the CMS merged datasets for our study’s normalized population. To
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examine their effect on the Medicare plan choice target variable, we selected various
explanatory variables to represent the beneficiaries’ characteristics (see Exhibit 14). The
CHAID parameters were set for a minimum of 2,000 cases per node, significance levels
of 0.01, utilization of the Pearson chi-square statistic, a maximum of 100 model
iterations, and a tree depth of three. The purpose of the CHAID analysis is to cluster
individuals with similar values of “target” or “independent” variables with consideration
of possible nonlinear relationships and interactions between explanatory factors
(independent variables). The clusters reveal predicted values (e.g., plan choice, services
utilization) for beneficiary groups based on specific attributes such as age, race, or health
status. Statistically significant differences in the predicted values for the explanatory
variables will lend support to our hypotheses.

Exhibit 14. CHAID Tree Variables Used for Medicare Plan Choice Analysis
Explanatory (independent) variables
 Age – defined as the beneficiary’s age at the end of the year
 Gender – male, female, other
 Race – White, Black, Hispanic, North American Native, Other
 Health status – represented by the Charlson Co-morbidity Index from inpatient ICD codes
 Access to doctors – number of doctors in the beneficiary’s residence county
 Access to hospitals – value of 1, 2, or 3 to define the proximity of hospitals to the
beneficiary’s residence county
 Median home value – for the beneficiary’s ZCAT
 Education – American Community Survey estimate of the % of bachelor degree or more
households within the beneficiary’s residence ZCAT
Target (dependent) variables
 Medicare Plan Choice

Results of this clustering of beneficiaries according to choice of Medicare plans are
presented in Section 5.1
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4.7.3 Tests of Difference in Means. Our interviews and field observations
involving PCPs and MAOs inform us that many essential performance measures in the
Medicare industry involve calculating utilization ratios to determine the mean service
count per beneficiary for each service category. We use tests of differences in
independent means (e.g., mean number of inpatient admissions per beneficiary) to assess
the magnitudes and statistical significance of the variances in service utilization among
the plan beneficiaries. Specifically, we compare the service rates per beneficiary for each
of the five service categories (inpatient, skilled nursing, outpatient, home health, and
carrier) for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (HMO) plans with those
enrolled in Traditional Medicare (FFS) plans. We also examine differences between
utilization rates by enrollees in four Medicare Advantage market leaders versus enrollees
in FFS plans. These results are reported in Section 5.2.
4.7.4 Poisson Regression. Poisson regression is useful when analyzing the
effects of multiple variables on a target variable expressed as a count. This method is
helpful when predicting utilization rates (and estimated costs) attributable to a panel of
beneficiaries assigned to a specific plan, hospital system, medical group, or individual
practitioner. It also enables analysts to predict utilization changes driven by changing
attributes (such as aging or health status) of the individuals in the group being evaluated.
These types of analyses are critical in determining whether plans or providers should
enter into or continue with risk-bearing contracts. Plans and providers presumably would
prefer to forgo any situation where projected utilization (and costs) would outstrip the
associated revenues. Also, for budgeting and legislative purposes, policymakers may
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wish to know the projected utilization and costs of services authorized under the
Medicare program and its various plans.
Using SAS, we introduce 22 explanatory variables into our regression model and
determine the statistical relevance of each variable for each of the five service categories
(inpatient, skilled nursing, outpatient, home health, and carrier). The 22 variables and
their origins are shown in Exhibit 15. We examine the resulting “full” models that
contain all 22 variables and then employ backwards elimination to reduce each regression
model to exclude any variable that does not show statistical significance on the margin
(eliminating, at each stage, the variable with largest p-value > 0.01). Results of this
analysis are presented in Section 5.3.
Exhibit 15. Poisson Regression Variables
Variable

Description
Inpatient admissions based on discharge dates
numOPsrvcevents
Outpatient service events
numOPsrvcrecs
Outpatient service records
numcarsrvcrecs
Carrier services
numCARdiagevents\ Carrier events with recorded diagnoses
numhhasrvcrecs
Home health service records
numsnfdiagevents
Skilled nursing events based on dates with recorded diagnoses
maxchscoreallser
Highest charlson score of all service categories
female
Gender selection from male, female, and other
HMOplan
Enrolled in HMO rather than FFS plan
yrendage
Beneficiary aged at year end
Black
Race variable sub-category
Hispanic
Race variable sub-category
Asian
Race variable sub-category
Other non-white
Race variable sub-category representing all races other than Black, Hispanic, and Asian
medianhouseeval
Zip code median house value expressed in $100,000 increments
zpctbachelorsormore Zip code average percent households with bachelors degree or more
zpctmanprofoccs
Zip code average percent of households with managerial or professional employment
hospitalaccess1
Missouri counties having one or more hospitals
hospitalaccess2
Missouri counties without a hospital but having one ≤ 27 miles of county seat
hospitalaccess3
Counties without a hospital and with the nearest hospital being >27 miles from county seat
physiciansper1000
Average number of physicians per 1,000 beneficiaries in a county
numipadmits

Exhibit 15. Count variables such as discharges or service events represent annual amounts for an
aggregated beneficiary record.
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Data Summary. In Exhibit 16, we provide a diagram showing all of the sources
of uses of data contained within this study.
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Exhibit 16. Sources and Uses of Data
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Chapter 5: Statistical Results
In this chapter, we discuss the effects of beneficiary characteristics on Medicare
plan choice and service utilization. First, using CHAID decision trees, we construct
clusters of individuals with the same propensity to choose one health plan versus another
and examine the characteristics of individuals with which choice of plan is related.
Second, we employ tests of differences in means to compare service utilization of
beneficiaries enrolled in various Medicare Advantage (HMO) plans with those enrolled
in the traditional Medicare (FFS) plan. Lastly, using Poisson regression, we study, for the
different insurance plans, how the number of service encounters of each type depends
upon beneficiary characteristics and other factors.
5.1 Plan Choice
To analyze Medicare plan choice, we present the results of several CHAID
decision trees. We introduce into the models various beneficiary demographical attributes
to determine their relationships to the beneficiary’s Medicare Plan choice.
5.1.1 Beneficiary Characteristics. H1 states that the choice of Medicare
insurance plan depends on the characteristics of beneficiaries, their access to doctors and
hospitals, and their wealth and education. Our CHAID tree analyses support the
hypothesis. In Exhibits 18 to 27, we present a series of CHAID decision trees with
descriptions of the findings. The plan choice labels displayed in the output diagrams are
a) the Traditional Medicare plan [indicated as “None,” meaning not a Medicare
Advantage plan], b) each of the four Medicare Advantage market share leaders based on
their beneficiary enrollments [rankings are Essence #1, UHC #2, Humana #3, and Aetna
#4], and c) the collection of all other Medicare Advantage plans [indicated as “Other”].
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Age and Plan Choice. In Exhibit 17 and Table 15, we demonstrate the impact of
a beneficiary’s age on Medicare plans selection. This CHAID tree reveals five age
clusters having differing plan selection results, and those results are highly statistically
significant (p-value < 0.001, Χ2 = 1373.295, df = 20). The youngest age cluster (Node 1,
<=68.0, 69.3%) and the oldest age cluster (Node 5, >82.0, 69.6%) have a projected
Traditional Medicare enrollment of approximately the same rate, which is greater than
the other three age clusters. While the analysis does not explain why these results occur,
we speculate that beneficiaries in the youngest age cluster have not yet decided to move
from Traditional Medicare into an HMO plan. Further, we suspect that beneficiaries in
the oldest age cluster may have less experience with HMOs than the other beneficiary
groups, and, therefore, are likely to prefer the FFS plan option.
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Exhibit 17. Age and Plan Choice

Table 15 Percentage of Plan Members by Age Groups
Percentage of Plan Members by Age Groups

Plan Type

65-68

68-72

Age Clusters
72-76

76-82

>82

FFS

69.3

65.7

64.4

65.9

69.6

All HMOs

30.6
5.0
4.7
4.1

34.3
5.5
4.9
4.5

35.7
5.4
4.5
4.9

33.9
5.2
4.7
4.3

30.4
4.7
5.0
3.7

Aetna HMO

3.7

3.6

3.9

3.9

3.9

Other HMOs

13.1

15.8

17.0

15.8

13.1

Essence HMO
UHC HMO
Humana HMO

Note: FFS plus ALL HMOS may not total to 100.0 due to rounding.
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The distribution of choices among the top four HMO plans are consistent with
published statistics in secondary sources; however, their market shares vary from cluster
to cluster (see Exhibit 18). Further investigation of factors affecting choices of Medicare
plans is left for future research, perhaps with nationwide scope.

Exhibit 18. Top HMO Plans' % Market Share by Age Cluster
6.0

Percent Market Share

5.0
4.0

Essence HMO
UHC HMO

3.0

Humana HMO
2.0

Aetna HMO

1.0
0.0
65-68

68-72

72-76

76-82

>82

Gender and Plan Choice. In Exhibit 19, the CHAID tree reveals that the two
gender clusters (male, female) have differing plan selection results, and those results are
statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 69.033, df = 5). However, the projected
percentage of each gender’s selection of the Traditional Medicare plan selection is only
nominally different (male = 67.1%, female = 66.9%). We also note that the probable
Medicare Plan selections for both genders are consistent with each plan’s market share
rankings.

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
Exhibit 19. Gender and Plan Choice
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Race and Plan Choice. The CHAID tree in Exhibit 20 reveals five clusters based
on the beneficiary’s ethnicity (or race), and differences in choice of plan are highly
statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 5727.150, df = 20). The “Black” race
cluster shows a much lower probability of enrollment (51.8%) in the Traditional
Medicare plan than the other race clusters. The other race clusters predict enrollment in
Traditional Medicare from a low of 63.4% (Node 5, “Other”) to a high of 73.4% (Node 4,
“Unknown”). Nodes 1 and 2 represent 98% of the total population, and both nodes reflect
a Medicare Advantage plan choice that is consistent with each plan’s market share
rankings. One area of future research is to understand why Black race beneficiaries are
much more likely to enroll in HMOs than are other beneficiaries (see Exhibit 21). We
also note the significantly higher percentage of Blacks’ enrollment into Essence as
compared to the other HMO plans. Are the Essence plan benefits as compared to other
plans more appealing to Blacks? Compared to other plans, does Essence focus its
marketing efforts more intentionally toward the Black population? Does Essence offer its
plans in regions with higher than average Black populations? These and other questions
could be explored with further research.
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Exhibit 20. Race and Plan Choice

Exhibit 21. HMO Plan Choice by Race
60.0%
50.0%

48.2%
36.6%

40.0%

32.0%

30.8%
26.6%

30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Blacks

Other

White,
Hispanic, NA
Native

Asian

Unknown
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Charlson Score and Plan Choice. In this analysis, the maximum Charlson score
from all services categories was selected as the explanatory variable. In Exhibit 22, the
CHAID tree contains six Charlson-score clusters. The difference in predicted plan
selection for these clusters is highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 =
3968.490, df = 25). The beneficiaries with the greatest predicted enrollment in Traditional
Medicare are those with Charlson scores = 0 (Node 1, 69.9%). We note that a Charlson
score = 0 indicates those beneficiaries who either did not have any recorded diagnosis
codes in any service category during the year or their diagnosis codes not were severe
enough to be included in the Charlson scoring algorithm. Those with Charlson scores > 5
show the lowest predicted Traditional Medicare enrollment. (Node 6, 59.7%). The tree
suggests that higher Charlson scores associate with lesser Traditional Medicare
enrollment, although the difference in Traditional Medicare enrollment between each
score cluster is not dramatically different. We note that third place market leader Humana
is predicted to have the highest enrollment of beneficiaries with Charlson scores = 0
(4.1%) while market leader Essence is predicted to have the highest enrollment of
beneficiaries with Charlson scores > 5 (7.8%). Essence and UHC are predicted to extend
their market share leads as Charlson scores increase (see Exhibit 22.)

100

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
Exhibit 22. Maximum Charlson Score and Plan Choice

Exhibit 23. Plan Choice by Market Leaders and Maximum Charlson Score
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Physician Count and Plan Choice. The CHAID tree in Exhibit 23 reveals five
physician count clusters having differing plan selection results, and those results are
highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 80890.750, df = 20). Beneficiaries
residing counties with 18 or fewer physicians (Node 1) have the highest probability of the
FFS plan selection (78.2%). Because CMS has standards to assure adequate provider
coverage, we suspect this result shows that beneficiaries in many counties have little to
no access to HMO alternatives due to an insufficiency of physician coverage. In contrast,
beneficiaries in counties with more than 2,465 physicians (Node 5) are the least likely to
select Traditional Medicare (57.5%), and therefore most likely to select a Medicare
Advantage plan. We also note that specific Medicare Advantage plan choices within each
cluster are somewhat inconsistent compared to the individual plans’ market share
rankings.
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Exhibit 24. Physician Count and Plan Choice

The graph displayed in Exhibit 24 shows the variances in beneficiary enrollment, by plan,
relative to the midpoint of the number of physicians in the counties where those
beneficiaries reside. Here we wonder what factors might be contributing to these
variances. For example, does a plan with greater physician presence than others within
the same county make that plan more attractive to beneficiaries? Do some plans have
more effective marketing and recruitment campaigns in some counties than the other
plans, resulting in higher enrollment numbers? Do some plans choose not to have a
presence in some counties? These questions offer opportunities for additional research.
Clearly, the degree of physician presence in a county impacts beneficiary plan choice.
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Exhibit 25. % Enrollment by HMO Plan Based on County Physician Count

16

Essence
HMO

14
12

UHC
HMO

Percent

10
8

Humana
HMO

6
4

Aetna
HMO

2
0
0

1000

2000

3000

4000

Midpoint of # of County Physicians

Hospital Access and Plan Choice. The CHAID tree in Exhibit 25 reveals all three
hospital access code clusters, and the results are highly statistically significant (p-value <
0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 5360.428, df = 20). Beneficiaries residing in counties most distant from a
hospital (Node 3) show the highest probability of Traditional Medicare plan selection
(74.2%). Because CMS has standards to assure that plans have adequate hospital
coverage, we suspect this result is due to beneficiaries in many counties having little to
no access to Medicare Advantage alternatives because of an insufficient hospital
presence. In contrast, beneficiaries in counties with one or more hospitals (Node 1) are
the least likely to select Traditional Medicare (66.0%), and, therefore, the most likely to
select an HMO plan.
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Exhibit 26. Hospital Access and Plan Choice

Median Home Value and Choice. In Exhibit 26, the CHAID tree reveals five
child node median home value clusters of comparable populations having differing plan
selection results, and those results are highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2
= 67,055.308, df = 20). Beneficiaries in regions with the projected lowest value homes
(Node, 1, ≤ $96,800, 80.2%) are more likely to select the Traditional Medicare plan as
compared to beneficiaries residing in regions having higher median home values.
Beneficiaries in the regions with the projected highest median home values (Node 5,
>$161,000, 59.2%) are less likely to select the Traditional Medicare plan as compared to
other beneficiaries. Overall, the groupings indicate that Traditional Medicare plan
selection is higher in areas with lower median home values. Also, the Medicare
Advantage plan choices in each income cluster generally do not reflect the plans’ market

105

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
share rankings (see Exhibit 27). Future research could investigate this result to determine
what factors are driving these variances. For example, if median home values are greater
in urban and suburban areas as compared to rural areas, then it is likely that urban and
suburban beneficiaries have more Medicare Advantage alternatives that offer greater
attraction than Traditional Medicare.

Exhibit 27. Median Home Value and Plan Choice
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Exhibit 28. Plan Choice of Top HMOs by Median Home Value Cluster Midpoint

All Variables and Plan Choice. Lastly, we consider the implications of entering
all eight variables into the CHAID tree model. The resulting tree contains three levels
with 25 mutually exclusive clusters, making it unrealistic to display in this paper.
Alternatively, in Appendix M, we offer the tree results in a tabular form. Here we
summarize the results.
Five physician count clusters (number of physicians in a county) emerge as the
level one child nodes and they are highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 =
80560.808, df = 20). Beneficiaries in the counties with the fewest physicians (Node 1,
physician count ≤ 18) are most likely to enroll in the Traditional Medicare plan (78.1%).
Beneficiaries in the counties with the most physicians (Node 5, physician count > 2,465)
are least likely to enroll in the Traditional Medicare plan (57.5%). Nodes 2, 3, and 4 show
a similarly consistent pattern. We conclude that beneficiaries residing in counties with

107

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
fewer doctors have a higher probability of the Traditional Medicare plan selection,
possibly due to the lesser availability of HMO plans.
At Level Two (where statistically significant variables attach to Level One
nodes), hospital access emerges as a significant variable (Nodes 6 – 8) for counties where
physician count is low (physician count ≤ 18). Median home value becomes statistically
relevant, occupying four nodes (Nodes 12 -15) and representing beneficiaries residing in
counties having a broad range of physician counts (Count = 18 to 2465). Maximium
Charlson score occupies the final Level 2 clusters (Nodes 16 – 18) with significance for
beneficiaries residing in high physician count counties (Count > 2465).
At Level Three (where statistically significant variables attach to Level Two
nodes), education level (i.e., households with bachelors degree or more) is statistically
relevant for several nodes (Nodes 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26). Across the entire tree, the
highest probability of Traditional Medicare plan choice (Node 11, 85.7%) resides with
beneficiaries in counties having median home values ≤ $146,800 and a moderate
presence of physicians (109 - 540). The lowest probability of Traditional Medicare plan
choice (Node 12, 48.2%) resides with beneficiaries of residing in counties with median
home values ranging from $146,800 to $161,000 and with a moderate presence of
physicians (109 – 540). We find these results to be curious in that the highest and lowest
likelihood of Traditional Medicare enrollment is distinguished only by the median home
values in counties with the same physician presence (109 – 540). This is an opportunity
for future research.
From this collection of CHAID trees, we conclude that Medicare plan choice is,
indeed, related to the beneficiaries’ demographical attributes and those attributes are
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statistically significant. For example, the findings imply that HMOs are less prevalent in
rural communities (i.e., low physician count and low hospital access) and more prevalent
in metropolitan areas (i.e., high physician count and high hospital access). This is likely
due to CMS’ mandated provider thresholds. Those who are in the youngest and oldest
age clusters tend to enroll in the FFS plan more so than beneficiaries in the central
clusters. Perhaps the youngest and the oldest beneficiaries have less familiarity with their
Medicare HMO alternatives. Blacks are more likely to enroll in HMOs than are other
races. Perhaps a higher percentage of Blacks (compared to non-Blacks) live in
metropolitan areas where HMO plans are more plentiful than other areas. We also find
that when all eight variables enter the model, only “gender” shows no statistical
relationship to plan choice. Why isn't’ there a difference? Why do median home values
show some curious effects on plan choice? The data do not tell us “why” these results are
predicted, but they do leave open the door for more research. Nevertheless, we can
conclude that these variables, both singularly and combined, have differing effects on the
beneficiaries’ specific Medicare plan selections. These findings support our H1 that
beneficiaries’ attributes, proximity to hospitals and doctors, and levels of education and
wealth are statistically associated with Medicare plan choices.
5.2 Service Utilization: Tests of Differences in Means
In this section, we present averages and percentiles for measures of service
delivery derived from all 2016 transactional records for the study's population (see Table
10). Both H2 and H3 propose that plan choice impacts service utilization. To test H2, we
look at service utilization for the FFS plan, all HMO plans combined, and for each of the
four market leader HMOs. We find that beneficiaries in the HMO plans, including the top
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four market share plans, use fewer services in all service categories. Summary statistics
are displayed in Table 16, followed by the detailed SAS outputs and summaries for each
scenario, as shown in Exhibits 29 through 33.

Table 16 % Difference in Mean Utilization Per Beneficiary as Compared to FFS Plan
% Difference in Mean Utilization Per Beneficiary as Compared to FFS Plan
Service
Inpatient
Outpatient
Carrier
Home Health
Skilled Nursing

All HMO
-22%
-46%
-8%
-47%
-29%

Essence
-38%
-59%
-11%
-77%
-47%

UHC
-23%
-50%
-5%
-66%
-23%

Humana
-18%
-46%
-16%
-13%
-25%

Aetna
-27%
-44%
-12%
-39%
-26%

5.2.1 Overall differences for the study population. For the study’s normalized
sample population (n = 646,230), in every service category, the mean service utilization
per HMO beneficiary is less than the mean service utilization per FFS beneficiary, and
the differences are statistically significant. These results are displayed in Exhibit 29.
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Exhibit 29. Differences in FFS and HMO Events per Beneficiary

The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9.

Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are lower for the HMO beneficiaries by 62 per
1,000 enrollees (22% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test =
-33.5, p- value < 0.001).
Outpatient. Outpatient services are lower for the HMO beneficiaries by 3,813 per
1,000 enrollees (46% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = 150.9, p-value < 0.001).
Carrier. Carrier services are lower for HMO beneficiaries by 3,654 per 1,000
enrollees (8% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -31.0,
p-value < 0.001).
Home health. Home health services are lower for HMO beneficiaries by 709 per
1,000 (47% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -45.9, pvalue < 0.001).
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SNF. SNF discharges are lower for HMO beneficiaries by 21 per 1,000 enrollees
(29% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -24.4, p-value <
0.001).
5.2.2 MAO Variances. We also produced comparative statistics for each of the
top four MAOs (by market share) based on each MAO’s total beneficiary count.
Collectively, they account for 54.7% of the Medicare Advantage study population. In
every service category, the mean service utilization per HMO beneficiary derived from
transactional data is less than the mean service utilization per FFS beneficiary. The
differences are statistically significant.
Essence. Based on its beneficiary count (n = 33,472) within the study’s Medicare
Advantage population, this MAO holds the lead market position with a 15.7% share. The
Essence results are displayed in Exhibit 30.
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Exhibit 30. Differences in FFS and Essence Events per Beneficiary

The service category counts are shown in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9.

Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the Essence beneficiaries by 107 per
1,000 enrollees (38% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test =
-33.3, p-value < 0.001).
Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the Essence beneficiaries by 4,910
per 1,000 enrollees (59% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test
= -127.1, p-value < 0.001).
Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for HMO beneficiaries by 4,992 per 1,000
enrollees (11% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -22.8,
p value < 0.001).
Home health. Home health services are fewer for Essence beneficiaries by 1,169
per 1,000 (77% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -66.4,
p-value < 0.001).
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SNF. SNF discharges are fewer for Essence beneficiaries by 35 per 1,000
enrollees (47% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -24.0, p-value
< 0.001).
United Healthcare (UHC). Based on its beneficiary count (n = 30,764) within
the study’s Medicare Advantage population, this MAO holds the second place market
position with a 14.4% share. UHC results are displayed in Exhibit 31.

Exhibit 31. Differences in FFS and UHC Events per Beneficiary

The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9.

Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the UHC beneficiaries by 64 per
1,000 enrollees (23% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test =
-16.8, p-value < 0.001).
Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the UHC beneficiaries by 4,165per
1,000 enrollees (50% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test =
-116.2, p- value < 0.001).
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Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for UHC beneficiaries by 2,297 per 1,000
enrollees (5% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -8.6, p-value <
0.001).
Home health. Home health services are fewer for UHC beneficiaries by 996 per
1,000 (66% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -54.4, pvalue < 0.001).
SNF. SNF services are fewer for UHC beneficiaries by 17 per 1,000 enrollees
(23.3% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -9.3, p-value <
0.001).
Humana. Based on its beneficiary count (n = 27,930) within the study’s
Medicare Advantage population, this MAO holds the third-place market position with a
13.1% share. Humana results are displayed in Exhibit 32.

Exhibit 32. Differences in Number of FFS and Humana Events per Beneficiary

The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9.
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Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the Humana beneficiaries by 50 per
1,000 enrollees (18% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -12.1,
p-value < 0.001).
Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the Humana beneficiaries by 3,829
per 1,000 enrollees (46% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test
= -71.9, p-value < 0.001).
Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for Humana beneficiaries by 7,354 per 1,000
enrollees (16% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -31.2, pvalue < 0.001).
Home health. Home health services are fewer for Humana beneficiaries by 200
per 1,000 (13% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -4.9, p-value
< 0.001).
SNF. SNF services are fewer for Humana beneficiaries by 19 per 1,000 enrollees
(25% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -9.9, p-value < 0.001).
Aetna. Based on its beneficiary count (n = 24,538) within the eligible population,
this MAO holds the #4 MA market position with an 11.5% share of the sample
population. Aetna results are displayed in Exhibit 33.
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Exhibit 33. Differences in Number of FFS and Aetna Events per Beneficiary

The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9.

Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the Aetna beneficiaries by 75 per
1,000 enrollees (27% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -16.8,
p-value < 0.001).
Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the Aetna beneficiaries by 3,648 per
1,000 enrollees (44% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = 66.2, p-value < 0.001).
Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for Aetna beneficiaries by 5,732 per 1,000
enrollees (12% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -22.0,
p value < 0.001).
Home health. Home health services are fewer for Aetna beneficiaries by 596 per
1,000 (39% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -17.0, pvalue < 0.001).
SNF. SNF services are fewer for Aetna beneficiaries by 19 per 1,000 enrollees
(26% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -8.2, p-value < 0.001).
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5.2.3. Other comments. Under CMS requirements, the HMOs are required to
offer benefits that are the same as or comparable to Traditional Medicare; however, with
CMS approval, the HMOs may also enhance those benefits. For example, many HMOs
offer the “Silver Sneakers” program that allows beneficiaries to obtain memberships at
fitness clubs at little to no cost. Some HMOs enhance their prescription drug benefits by
lowering co-payments, placing higher cost drugs into lower co-payment tiers, and
including drugs that are not part of the Traditional Medicare authorized formulary.
HMOs plans vary in their annual maximum out-of-pocket costs, deductibles, and copayments. Furthermore, HMOs plans are not all available in all areas (i.e., counties), nor
do they all have the same networks of providers. All of these and other factors could
potentially affect the amount and mix of services received by the beneficiaries. It is
possible to gather data from third party sources to complement the CMS data and make
comparisons of the plans’ structures and operations. Accordingly, there are several
opportunities to initiate research that makes a deeper dive into the effects of plan
differences on services utilization, mix, and costs.
5.2.4 Comparative totals. One potential and significant plan difference is the
presence and proliferation of RB PCPs. To test H3, we compare Essence HMO (the plan
with known RB PCPs) results with all other plans. In Table 17, we present the side-byside comparisons of summary statistics expressed in service counts per thousand
beneficiaries for each of the plans.
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Table 17 Service Counts per Thousand Beneficiaries in Sample Population
Service Counts per Thousand Beneficiaries in Sample Population

Services categories
Inpatient discharges
Outpatient service dates
Carrier service dates
Home health service dates
Skilled nursing discharges

FFS
(TM)
279
8,364
46,435
1,512
73

All
HMO
(MA)
217
4,551
42,781
803
52

Essence
172
3,454
41,443
343
38

UHC
215
4,199
44,138
516
56

Humana
229
4,535
39,081
1,312
54

Aetna
204
4,716
40,703
916
54

We note that market leader Essence has the smallest service count per thousand
beneficiaries of every plan in every category excepting Carrier services. This finding
suggests that the presence of RB PCPs serving as medical gatekeepers may be a
statistically relevant factor in interpreting the utilization variances of beneficiaries from
differing plans.
Lastly, in Exhibit 34, we show per-beneficiary service usage for the top four
HMOs relative to FFS beneficiaries. Again, we note that beneficiaries in all four HMO
plans utilize fewer services than their FFS counterparts, and Essence ranks lowest in all
categories excepting carrier services.
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Exhibit 34. Relative Service Utilization for Top 4 HMOs vs. FFS

Exhibit 34. For relative comparisons, FFS = 1.

We do not know the extent to which HMO plans other than Essence engage RB
PCPs. Consequently, while this evidence offers support of H3, ultimately, it is
inconclusive. In future research, there is an opportunity to explore in greater detail the
utilization patterns of beneficiaries assigned to the specific PCPs in the Essence plan.
Comparing those results to similar beneficiary populations in the FFS plan and other
HMO plans may reveal relevant variances that lend more support to H3.
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5.3 Service Utilization: CHAID Decision Trees
The tests of differences in means are useful in examining summary statistics, but
they do not consider the effects of multiple variables. To initiate our investigation of
these effects, we constructed two CHAID decision trees to determine if any of the eight
explanatory variables have an effect on inpatient utilization or outpatient utilization. The
eight variables are shown in Exhibit 35.

Exhibit 35. CHAID Decision Tree Variables
Beneficiary Traits
 Race
 Gender
 Age at year-end
 Charlson scores
Beneficiary Access to Providers
 Proximity to hospitals based on county of residence
 Count of physicians in county of residence
Other
 Median home value in residence ZCAT
 % of households with a bachelors degree or more in residence ZCAT
 Beneficiary’s Medicare plan choice

The inclusion of all eight variables results in a very large CHAID tree with numerous
clusters, thus making interpretation difficult. Also, some clusters represent very small
populations that contribute little to the analysis. Therefore, to reduce the number of
clusters in our model, we adjusted the CHAID parameter to require a minimum of 20,000
records per cluster.
In our first tree (see Exhibit 36), we select the number of inpatient admissions as
the target variable. We find that three explanatory variables (inpatient Charlson score,

121

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
plan choice, and gender) have a strong relationship with inpatient utilization. At level
one, the model reveals that the inpatient Charlson score is a strong predictor of inpatient
utilization (p-value < 0.001, F value = 632,697.028, df1 = 1, df2 = 484,434). Plan choice
emerges at level two, and gender at level three. Predicted inpatient utilization is lowest
(27 admissions per 1,000, Node 4) for beneficiaries with Charlson scores = 0 and enrolled
in the UHC HMO. Highest utilization (1,653 admissions per 1,000, Node 2) is
experienced by beneficiaries with Charlson scores > 0. This is nearly six times greater
than the FFS mean. No child nodes appear under Node 4. From this tree, we conclude
that a beneficiary’s health status, as defined by their inpatient Charlson score, is the
primary driver of utilization. For those with a score equal to zero, plan choice is
statistically related to FFS beneficiaries experiencing higher utilization than HMO
beneficiaries. Also, there is a significant utilization variance between FFS males (41 per
1,000) and FFS females (53 per 1,000). The primary observation is that the group of
beneficiaries with Charleson scores > 0 predicts an admission rate 38 times greater than
those with scores = 0.
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Exhibit 36. Multivariate CHAID Tree for Inpatient Services
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In our second tree (see Exhibit 37), we examine outpatient activity. The model
reveals that three outpatient Charlson score clusters emerging at level one are significant
(p-value < 0.001, F value = 46,145.999, df1 = 1, df2 = 484,433). The first cluster (Node
1) represents beneficiaries with outpatient Charlson scores = 0, and they experience the
lowest utilization among the three clusters (3,312 outpatient service dates per 1,000). The
second cluster (Node 2) represents beneficiaries with outpatient Charlson scores greater
than zero and up to a value of 1. Their utilization (8,294 outpatient service dates per
1,000) is greater than those in Node 1. The third cluster (Node 3) represents beneficiaries
with outpatient Charlson scores > 1 and having the highest utilization of the Charlson
score clusters (14,019 outpatient service dates per 1,000). At level two, plan choice
clusters attach to each Charlson score node. Gender, age, and home values are relevant at
level three. The highest outpatient utilization is by FFS beneficiaries with Charlson
scores > 1 living in zip codes with home values ≤ $121,000 (16,942 service events per
1,000, Node 17). The lowest outpatient utilization is by beneficiaries with Charlson
scores = 0 who enroll in either Essence or Humana HMO (1,819 outpatient service dates
per 1,000, Node 6). We draw three conclusions from this tree: a) higher outpatient
Charlson scores are associated with greater outpatient service utilization, b) beneficiaries
enrolled in the FFS plan, especially those likely to be living in lower-income areas, use
more outpatient services than those enrolled in the HMO plans, and c) utilization
variances exist among the HMO plans.
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Exhibit 37. Multivariate CHAID Tree for Outpatient Services
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From these two CHAID trees, we demonstrate that variables have interactive and
predictive implications for services utilization. For more detailed analyses, we construct
Poisson regression models to account for the effects of several explanatory variables on
services utilization.

5.4 Service Utilization: Poisson Regression
For the Poisson regressions, we randomly selected 75% of the included sample
population (resulting in n = 484,436) for model fitting, reserving the remaining 25% (n =
161,764) for future testing of our models on an independent sample. For each plan and
service category, we extended our analysis from the previous 8 variables to 22 variables
(see Exhibit 38) in the regressions. With each regression model, any variable failing our
p-value test (marginal p-value > 0.01) was removed from the model by the backwards
elimination process. The full Poisson regression tables (i.e., before removal of variables)
are displayed in Appendix N. The reduced Poisson regression models (i.e., after removal
of variables that did not contribute statistically significant information on the margin) are
discussed in this section.
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Exhibit 38. Poisson Regression Variables
Variable

Description

numipadmits

Inpatient admissions based on discharge dates

numOPsrvcevents

Number of Outpatient service date

numCARdiagevents

Nubmer of Carrier events with recorded diagnoses

numhhasrvcrecs

Number of Home health service events

numsnfdiagevents

Skilled nursing events based on discharge dates with recorded diagnoses

maxchscoreallser

Highest charlson score of all service categories

female

Gender selection from male, female, and other

HMOplan

Enrolled in HMO rather than FFS plan

yrendage

Beneficiary age at year end

Black

Race variable sub-category

Hispanic

Race variable sub-category

Asian

Race variable sub-category

Other non-white

Race variable sub-category representing all races other than Black, Hispanic, and Asian

medianhouseeval

Zip code median house value expressed in $100,000 increments

zpctbachelorsormore Zip code average percent households with bachelors degree or more
zpctmanprofoccs

Zip code average percent of households with managerial or professional employment

hospitalaccess1

Missouri counties having one or more hospitals

hospitalaccess2

Missouri counties without a hospital but having one < 28 miles from county seat

hospitalaccess3

Counties without a hospital and with the nearest hospital being >27 miles from county seat

physiciansper1000

Average number of physicians per 1,000 beneficiaries in a county

The Poisson regression models are presented in a series of exhibits that indicate
the formula for the logarithm of the mean number of events for a patient over an entire
year, depending on the values of the explanatory (independent) variables. Coefficients of
the linear function for the mean (expected value) of the number of events and the
standard deviations of the coefficient estimates are followed by the “incidence impacts”
for each independent variable. The “incidence impacts” (exp[beta]) are the factors by
which the estimated incidence rate (the mean) will change with one-unit increases in the
values of individual independent variables if all the other independent variables are held
constant. The Z-values reveal the relative impact (worsening of fit) that would occur if
the respective variables alone should be removed from the model. The statistical
significance of each parameter is computed as a two-tail test using the Z-value. In the
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following sections, we identify the type and size of the population studied, display the
SAS output tables for each Poisson regression model, identify a few of the most
significant variables appearing in each model, and summarize our findings.
5.5 All Plans (n = 484,436)
In Exhibit 39, we present the regression results for inpatient service utilization by
beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For
this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any
medical service over the year, followed by whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized
as FFS versus HMO, and the beneficiaries’ age at year-end. After fixing the values of the
other seven variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase
the expected number of inpatient admissions by 29%. Ceteris paribus, enrollees in HMO
plans are expected to have 30% fewer inpatient admissions than enrollees in FFS plans.
Each additional year of age results in an approximate 2% increase in the number of
inpatient admissions per beneficiary.
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Exhibit 39. Effects on Inpatient Services for All Plans

In Exhibit 40, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization
by beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary.
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery
of any medical service over the year, followed by whether the beneficiary’s plan is
categorized as FFS versus HMO, and the beneficiaries’ gender. After fixing the values of
the other 13 variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase
the expected number of outpatient services by 18%. Ceteris paribus, enrollees in HMO
plans are expected to have 46% fewer outpatient services than enrollees in FFS plans.
Females would utilize 24% more outpatient services than males.
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Exhibit 40. Effects of Outpatient Services for All Plans

In Exhibit 41, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by
beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of carrier
service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this model,
the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum Charlson comorbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any medical service
over the year, followed by whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized as FFS versus
HMO, and the beneficiaries’ age at year-end. After fixing the values of the other 13
variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected
number of carrier services by 15%. Ceteris paribus, enrollees in HMO plans are
expected to have 18% fewer carrier services than enrollees in FFS plans. Females are
expected to utilize 14% more carrier services than males.
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Exhibit 41. Effects on Carrier Services for All Plans

In Exhibit 42, we present the regression results for home health services
utilization by beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’
year-end age and whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized as FFS versus HMO. After
fixing the values of 11 other variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score
would increase the expected number of home health services by 27%. Ceteris paribus,
each additional year of age results in a 6% increase in the number of home health services
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per beneficiary. Enrollees in HMO plans are expected to receive 53% fewer home health
services than enrollees in FFS plans.

Exhibit 42. Effects on Home Health Services for All Plans

In Exhibit 43, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility
utilization by beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’
year-end age and whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized as FFS versus HMO. After
fixing the values of 10 other variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score
would increase the expected number of skilled nursing services by 30%. Ceteris paribus,
each additional year of age results in an 8% increase in the number of skilled nursing

132

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
services per beneficiary. Enrollees in HMO plans are expected to receive 59% fewer
skilled nursing services than enrollees in FFS plans.

Exhibit 43. Effects on Skilled Nursing Facility Services for All Plans

5.6 Fee for Service Plans (n = 324,339)
In Exhibit 44, we present the regression results for inpatient utilization by
beneficiaries in the FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For
this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any
medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age and whether the
projected median household value (in hundred thousand dollars) in the zip code where
the beneficiary resides. After fixing the values of 7 other variables, each unit increase in
the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of inpatient
admissions by 29%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 2% increase
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in the number of inpatient admissions per beneficiary. Females would experience about
8% more admissions than males.

Exhibit 44. Effects on Inpatient Services for FFS Plans

In Exhibit 45, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization
by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary.
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery
of any medical service over the year, the beneficiary’s year-end age, and female gender.
After fixing the values of the other eight variables, each unit increase in the maximum
Charlson score would increase the expected number of outpatient services by 18%.
Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 1% increase in the number of
outpatient services per beneficiary. Females would experience about 25% more
outpatient services than males.
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Exhibit 45. Effect on Outpatient Services for FFS Plans

In Exhibit 46, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by
beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
carrier service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this
model, the most significant explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery
of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age, race,
and gender. After fixing the values of the other 12 variables, each unit increase in the
maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of carrier services by
15%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 0.5% increase in the
number of outpatient services per beneficiary. Blacks would experience about 17% fewer
outpatient services than Whites. Females would experience about 15% more carrier
services than males. We also note that all other non-White races are predicted to receive
fewer carrier services than Whites, as do beneficiaries in counties with no close hospital
proximity.
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Exhibit 46. Effects on Carrier Services for FFS Plans

In Exhibit 47, we present the regression results for home health services
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s
year-end age and gender. After fixing the values of the other ten variables, each unit
increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of home
health services by 28%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 6%
increase in the number of home health services per beneficiary. Females would
experience 37% more services than males.
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Exhibit 47. Effects on Home Health Services for FFS Plans

In Exhibit 48, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’
year-end age and female gender. After fixing the values of 10 other variables, each unit
increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of skilled
nursing services by 30%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an 8%
increase in the number of skilled nursing services per beneficiary. Females are expected
to receive 58% more skilled nursing services than males.
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Exhibit 48. Effects on Skilled Nursing Services for FFS Plans

5.7 HMO Plans (n = 160,097)
In Exhibit 49, we present the regression results for inpatient utilization by
beneficiaries in the HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For
this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any
medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age and gender.
After fixing the values of seven other variables, each unit increase in the maximum
Charlson score would increase the expected number of inpatient admissions by 29%.
Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in about a 2% increase in the number
of inpatient admissions per beneficiary. Females would experience about 12% more
admissions than males.

138

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES

Exhibit 49. Effects on Inpatient Services for HMO Plans

In Exhibit 50, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization
by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary.
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery
of any medical service over the year, followed by median home value and female gender.
After fixing the values of the other eight variables, each unit increase in the maximum
Charlson score would increase the expected number of outpatient services by about 18%.
Ceteris paribus, females would experience about 18% more outpatient services than
males. Each $100,000 increase in median home value predicts about a 27% reduction in
the number of outpatient services per beneficiary.
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Exhibit 50. Effects on Outpatient Services for HMO Plans

In Exhibit 51, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by
beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
carrier service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this
model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any
medical service over the year, followed by the female gender and Black race. After fixing
the values of the other 12 variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score
would increase the expected number of carrier services by about 14%. Ceteris paribus,
females would experience about 12% more carrier services than males, and Blacks would
utilize about 12% fewer carrier services than other races.
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Exhibit 51. Effects on Carrier Services for HMO Plans

In Exhibit 52, we present the regression results for home health services
utilization by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s
year-end age, and female gender. After fixing the values of the other 11 variables, each
unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of
home health services by about 26%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results
in an approximate 6% increase in the number of outpatient services per beneficiary.
Females would experience about 37% more services than males.
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Exhibit 52. Effects on Home Health Services for HMO

In Exhibit 53, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’
year-end age and gender. After fixing the values of 7 other variables, each unit increase
in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of skilled nursing
services by about 30%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an
approximate 7% increase in the number of skilled nursing services per beneficiary.
Females are expected to receive about 52% more skilled nursing services than males.
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Exhibit 53. Effects on Skilled Nursing Services for HMO Plans

5.8 Essence HMO (n = 24,114)
In this section, we examine the results specifically for Essence HMO, the plan
with known RB-PCPs, so that comparisons are made to the previously presented plan
segments. In Exhibit 54, we present the regression results for inpatient utilization by
beneficiaries in the Essence HMO plan. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual
beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided
by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in
delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age
and female gender. After fixing the values of 10 other variables, each unit increase in the
maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of inpatient admissions by
26%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an approximate 1% increase
in the number of inpatient admissions per beneficiary. Females would experience about
12% more inpatient admissions than males.
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Exhibit 54. Effects on Inpatient Services for Essence HMO

In Exhibit 55, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization
by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary.
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the
maximum Charlson score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any medical
service over the year, followed by median home value and female gender. After fixing
the values of the other eight variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score
would increase the expected number of outpatient services by about 17%. Ceteris
paribus, each $100,000 increase in median home value predicts an approximate 46%
reduction in the number of outpatient services per beneficiary. Females would experience
about 26% more outpatient services than males.
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Exhibit 55. Effects on Outpatient Services for Essence HMO

In Exhibit 56, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by
beneficiaries in Essence HMO. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of
carrier service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this
model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any
medical service over the year, followed by the Black race and female gender. After fixing
the values of the other 12 variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score
would increase the expected number of carrier services by about 13%. Ceteris paribus,
blacks would utilize approximately 15% fewer carrier services than other races, and
females would experience about 11% more carrier services than males.
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Exhibit 56. Effects on Carrier Services for Essence HMO

In Exhibit 57, we present the regression results for home health services
utilization by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s
year-end age and female gender. After fixing the values of the other eight variables, each
unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of
home health services by about 21%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results
in an approximate 5% increase in the number of outpatient services per beneficiary. Each
$100,000 increase in median home value predicts about a 74% decrease in home health
services per beneficiary. Why is this? Perhaps those with greater wealth have other
alternatives such as the employment of an in-home caregiver or the ability to afford more
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frequent visits with physicians or other providers. This is another area for further
exploration.

Exhibit 57. Effects on Home Health Services for Essence HMO

In Exhibit 58, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’
year-end age and gender. After fixing the values of 3 other variables, each unit increase
in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of skilled nursing
services by about 29%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an
approximate 7% increase in the number of skilled nursing services per beneficiary.
Females are expected to receive about 50% more skilled nursing services than males.
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Exhibit 58. Effects on Skilled Nursing Services for Essence HMO

5.9 Poisson Regressions Summary
In Table 18, we display the three variables showing the most significant impact
for each service for each plan. The Charlson score consistently presents as one of the top
three factors of most significant impact in every service for every plan. We also note that
the selection of an HMO plan predicts a substantial decline in service utilization of all
types. Compared to males, females are predicted to use more services of all types. Blacks
are predicted to use fewer carrier services than other races. Interestingly, increases in
median home value are associated with decreased outpatient service usage for
beneficiaries in HMO plans. Age sometimes has an effect, most notably for home health
and skilled nursing services.
For Essence, the “Median Home Value” variable is prominent in both outpatient
and home health services and that variable has a sizable, negative impact on utilization
for those services. Perhaps Essence has an operational strategy to constrain those
services. Perhaps there are less costly alternatives available from its schedule of benefits.
Perhaps aggressive care management by RB PCPs results in demand reduction for those
services. Perhaps the beneficiaries in the other plan categories are experiencing overutilization for some reason. Whatever the cause, this is a curiosity for further exploration.
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From the Poisson regressions, we conclude that beneficiary traits and plan
selection have a statistically significant effect on service utilization. These results support
our H2.

Table 18 Summary of Poisson Regressions: Effects of Top 3 Variables for Each Service
Summary of Poisson Regressions: Effects of Top 3 Variables for Each Service
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5.10 Services Mix
One additional analysis drawn from this research is an examination of the mix of
services by plan. In Table 19, for each service category, we show the service counts as
percentages of total services for FFS, all HMOs, and Essence plans. The table reveals
significant differences in the services mix experienced by beneficiaries in each plan
category, and an interesting pattern emerges. Compared to the FFS beneficiaries, the
HMO beneficiaries have a lesser proportion of services attributable to inpatient,
outpatient, home health, and skilled nursing services and a greater proportion attributable
to carrier services. These differences are even more pronounced when comparing FFS
and Essence results.
Carrier services include entities such as physician medical practices and nonhospital-based services such as ambulatory surgery centers, free-standing imaging
centers, and retail laboratories. We learned from our field research that these carrier
services generally represent less costly alternatives to hospital-based services (both
inpatient and outpatient) and, therefore, MAOs and risk-bearing PCP groups prefer them.
This suggests that the use of more carrier services results in a reduction of all other
services. Further research is needed to demonstrate the legitimacy of this claim and to
determine if there are cost implications. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the mix of
services is predicted to differ between FFS and HMO plans. The Essence results also
suggest that the presence of RB PCPs also may materially impact services utilization.
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Table 19 Service Mix by Plan Type
Service Mix by Plan Type (Using Counts per 1,000 Beneficiaries)

5.11 Hypotheses Summary
Hypothesis 1. Using CHAID decision trees, we tested eight predictor
(explanatory) variables against the target variable of the Medicare plan choice. The
results demonstrate that Medicare plan choice is statistically related to specific
beneficiary characteristics (age, gender, race, health status), the medical services
available in the beneficiary’s county of residence (i.e., physician count, hospital
proximity), and the demographic characteristics of individuals who reside in the same
Postal Zip code (education level and median household income). As a group, seven of the
eight predictor variables showed statistical relationships to Medicare plan choice.
Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Hypothesis 2. Again, using CHAID decision trees, we examined the relationships
of nine variables (age, gender, race, health status, physician count, hospital proximity,
education level, household income, and plan choice) to each of the five service
categories. The results show that the medical services received by Medicare beneficiaries
vary according to beneficiary characteristics (age, gender, race, health status), insurance
plan choice (Traditional Medicare, Medicare Advantage), medical services available in
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the beneficiary’s county of residence (physician count, hospital proximity), and the
demographic characteristics of individuals who reside in the same Postal Zip code
(education level and median household income). We also produced a series of Poisson
regression models to investigate the impact of 22 variables on each of the service
categories in each plan. Again, we demonstrated that variables such as health status (i.e.,
Charlson score), gender, race, median home value, and the choice of an HMO plan
impact service utilization. Collectively, these findings support H2.
Hypothesis 3. We note that our study does not explicitly include an analysis of
service utilization by beneficiaries receiving care from specifically identified RB PCPs.
However, our field research confirms that Essence HMOs engage RB PCPs to serve as
medical gatekeepers, and each Essence beneficiary is assigned to one of the RB PCP.
Accordingly, we offer the Essence plan as a proxy for a network of RB PCPs. We
conducted tests of differences in means of the five service categories for each of six plan
types (Traditional Medicare, All Medicare Advantage Plans, Essence, UHC, Humana,
and Aetna). The results show that the mean utilization statistic for each service category,
except carrier services, is lowest for Essence beneficiaries. We also examined the mix of
services and found that Essence beneficiaries experience a mix that differs from both FFS
and other HMO beneficiaries, including proportionately lesser use of inpatient, skilled
nursing, outpatient, and home health services. These finding support our hypothesis that
beneficiaries of medical groups with risk-sharing reimbursement schemes will have lower
utilization of medical services than do patients of physicians who practice under FFS
arrangements. However, because this research was not conducted at the physician level
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(rather than through the use of a proxy such as Essence), we can only state that support of
H3 is suggested and that further examination is required.

153

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
Chapter 6: Discussion
We developed a comprehensive method for analyzing healthcare services
utilization using data from several hundred thousand Missouri beneficiaries. Furthermore,
the method is valid for studying medical services usage by any patient population for
which detailed records of medical treatments and diagnoses are available.
We demonstrate that beneficiary traits and access to providers are associated with
Medicare plan choice, and all of those (traits, access, and plan choice) are statistically
related to utilization of services. Also, we provide some evidence that the presence of RB
PCPs in HMO plans results in less utilization of non-carrier services as compared to other
plans, especially the FFS plan.
We lay the groundwork for further investigation of factors affecting mix of
services received by patients and services rendered by medical practices under different
insurance coverages for patients and reimbursement practices for practitioners. In the
following sections, we present the implications of our research, opportunities for future
research, and concluding comments.
6.1 Implications
Operationally and clinically, the U.S. healthcare industry is complex, and the
associated data are massive. The industry needs skilled, knowledgeable researchers to
address industry challenges. For example, a significant component of the Medicare
program, specifically Medicare Part A (inpatient care benefits), is headed toward a
solvency problem (kff.org, 2019) in the year 2026. This is the estimated timeframe when
the Part A Trust Fund will encounter two problems: a) incoming revenues will be less
than benefits spending, and b) the fund’s assets will be depleted. Without sufficient
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changes, Medicare will not be able to pay for all of the costs of the current Part A
benefits commitment.
Solutions are needed to contain or reduce services utilization and associated costs.
Researchers and practitioners have the opportunity to offer solutions to policymakers. By
documenting the strengths and weaknesses of current plan offerings, researchers might
uncover more and better opportunities that lead to improved plan design at lower costs
for better care. Furthermore, with data already available from CMS, advanced data
analytics can be used for health policy and insurance plan refinements that better serve
the healthcare needs of specific beneficiaries based on their attributes, access to care, plan
choice tendencies, and provider compensation arrangements
Stakeholders want strategies to contain Medicare costs. By understanding the role
of each stakeholder as described in our Cascading Agency Theory model, one might
better understand how to generate cost containment strategies for both the Medicare and
Medicare Advantage enterprises. As one strategy, CMS has been transitioning Traditional
Medicare enrollment to Medicare Advantage enrollment. This transition is done, in part,
by encouraging private entities to become MAOs and to accept the administrative
responsibilities, financial risks, and financial rewards associated with member
recruitment into their Medicare Advantage plans, thereby increasing beneficiary access to
the Medicare Advantage alternative. Approximately one-third of Medicare beneficiaries
are now Medicare Advantage enrollees, and Medicare Advantage enrollment has been
growing at an annual rate of about 7% (kff.org, 2019). Supplementing existing research
with additional information that reveals the effects of beneficiary traits on plan choice
offers a greater understanding of why beneficiaries increasingly select the Medicare
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Advantage alternative. When they do, those traits and plan choices will help predict
services utilization, thereby offering an improved capability for predicting costs. Using
statistical models of the type demonstrated in this dissertation, stakeholders in healthcare
delivery can compare services received or delivered against norms that adjust for patient
characteristics and practice setting.
Our research also suggests that successful MAOs might benefit from engaging
RB entities with experienced PCPs who will render clinically sound and financially
prudent medical care and care management services to the Medicare Advantage
beneficiaries assigned to them. We learned from our discussions with Harmony PCPs and
their MAOs, that cooperation and shared data enable both groups to succeed financially.
Also important for this success is peer-to-peer discussion, education, and review among
the PCPs. We also learn from their joint operating reports that over 90% of the
beneficiaries extend their enrollment in the same plan year after year. By understanding
the problems predicted by agency theory, such as information asymmetry, the moral
hazard of agent self-interest, and agent’s risk-aversion, the MAOs have an opportunity to
mitigate those problems through the development of mutually beneficial contracts with
RB entities that wish to engage as willing partners.
In Appendix A of our study, we offer several conceptual examples of RB contract
components that have been in place for several years. Given the longevity of these types
of contract terms, we conclude that the MAOs and RB PCPs find these types of terms to
be agreeable. Our research also suggests that patients of RB PCPs receiving adequate
financial incentives (and timely information) will utilize fewer services than their FFS
counterparts, thus delighting their MAOs. This outcome reinforces the MAOs’ decisions
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to enter into and sustain their CMS contracts and grow their memberships, thereby
helping CMS achieve its stated strategy of shifting beneficiaries from Traditional
Medicare to Medicare Advantage.
6.2 Limitations
6.2.1 Data. Our study is subject to some important limitations. The study is
conducted from Missouri-only data, so the results may not be generalizable to the entire
Medicare beneficiary population. However, in many categories such as population,
geographical size, and household income, Missouri ranks near the average of all states
and, therefore, one might expect Missouri to be representative of a significant portion of
the Medicare population. Each state, however, has its own regulatory regimes for medical
insurance and medical practices and varies in concentration of medical facilities and
practicing professionals. Further, each state has differing histories with Medicare
Advantage plans; thus, patient care utilization management may be more advanced in
some regions.
The Traditional Medicare (FFS) claims data used in this research are dependent
upon claims filings. Claims are processed by third parties known as Medicare
Administrative Contractors (MAC). Among other duties, the MACs are responsible for
the processing and payment of claims from providers and reporting a vast amount of data
to CMS. Consequently, the accuracy, thoroughness, and timeliness of claims data may be
subject to errors and omissions by providers, MACs, and CMS. To mitigate these
concerns, CMS and its contractors undertake a regular and rigorous review of claims data
(https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-
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Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program; MedPAC,
2020).
Similarly, the Medicare Advantage (HMO) encounter data used in this research
are dependent upon MAOs’ efforts to collect and report data that are accurate, thorough,
and timely. According to MedPAC, in recent years, data collection efforts have improved
with the advent of more performance-driven payments to providers. MedPAC states that
researchers must be cautious in their use of these data as the data continue to evolve in
accuracy. In its March 2020 report to Congress, MedPAC reported that the data were
improved from prior years, but that further work is required to assure greater data
accuracy. Because of need for complete and accurate data, and with MedPAC’s
recommendation, CMS continues its efforts to improve data reporting by plans and
providers by establishing better audits and higher standards for reporting (MedPAC,
2020).
6.2.2 Gauging health status. Another limitation is our selection of the Charlson
Co-morbidity Index scoring tool to measure health status. This tool is only one of several
available. Researchers may prefer to adopt or modify the CCMI algorithm used in this
study or utilize other methods such as the Elixhauser Index, Chronic Disease Score, or
Health-related Quality of Life Comorbidity Index. The predictive validity of these
various methods is dependent upon the characteristics of the patients being observed, the
purpose of the study, and the sources of data used to construct the indicator (Ou,
Mukherjee, Erickson, Piette, Bagozzi, & Balkrishnan, 2012). CMS continues to refine its
metrics to determine a beneficiary’s health status, in part, to determine capitation
amounts to pay to MAOs. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries’ “official” risk scores are
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available to researchers only for the calendar year 2014. At this time, we do not know
when risk scores for other years will be released. Hence, we do not know if our
calculations will materially yield the same results produced by CMS for the not-yetpublished 2016 scores. With diagnostic data in the individual encounter records,
however, it is possible to produce alternative indicators of patients’ health status which
may be more sensitive than co-morbidity indicators for predicting needs for specific
medical services.
6.2.3 Beneficiary traits. The Medicare files do not contain any variables for
“level of education” or “household wealth.” Our surrogate variables are obtained from
U.S. Census-related data as organized by zip code tabulation areas (ZCAT), based on
results from the American Household Survey. In this study, for these two attributes, we
use averages based on individuals residing within the same ZCAT.
6.2.4 Quality considerations. This study does not address the quality of care
rendered by clinicians or the clinical outcomes experienced by beneficiaries. It is our
experience that conversations involving healthcare quantity inevitably lead to corollary
discussions regarding healthcare quality. Some may contend that quantity reduction can
lead to quality reduction. Search engines produce thousands of articles, editorials,
research papers, public policy statements, and other published subject matter on the topic,
and the topic is broad. We find that attempts to define healthcare quality can be very
narrow, such as for specific surgical procedures (Yuan & Chung, 2016), or more
comprehensive, such as for an industry-wide standard (AHRQ, 2020). Busse, Panteli, and
Quinten (2019) write: “despite the vast literature base and its universal acknowledgment
of its importance in health systems, there is no common understanding of the term
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‘quality of care,’ and there is disagreement about what it encompasses.” In proposing a
framework for defining quality, one research team acknowledges “the fact that patients,
clinicians, leaders, and other stakeholders might have different perspectives on healthcare quality makes it even harder to standardize and harmonize different conceptual
models of quality” (Nylenna, Bjertnaes, Saunes, and Lindahl, 2015). Others propose that
the absence of a standard characterization of healthcare quality, and the tensions created,
may be valuable. For example, Mitchell, Cribb, & Entwistle (2019) argue that efforts to
generalize or coordinate industry-wide definitions of quality could squash local and
legitimate quality initiatives, thereby limiting pathways to further quality improvements.
Consequently, in this study, we do not attempt to define or report quality and leave that to
future research. With an additional year of data, however, it would be possible to use the
detailed diagnostic information to examine how health status in the succeeding year is
affected by health status and services received in the previous year. This presents an
opportunity to introduce some type of quality component into the study.
Our agency structure is but one set of forces that might influence the quantity and
quality of care received by patients. In discussions with medical practitioners, the author
has found that physicians inherently seek to provide high quality care and are motivated
by factors such as:


The “Calling” to be a doctor;



The Hippocratic oath;



Personal and professional pride;



Preserving one’s community reputation;



Achieving patient and family satisfaction with services rendered;
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Peer review by professional colleagues of one’s clinical activity;



Peer review by MAOs of one’s clinical and patient satisfaction outcomes;



Rewards and penalties based on patient satisfaction and clinical outcome metrics;



The threat of malpractice lawsuits;



State sanctions, including loss of professional license; and



The threat of federal penalties due to improper medical care.

It may be possible to develop indicators of some of these forces and consider them
additionally when comparing services rendered in different environments. In this study,
however, there is no intention to measure quality as it relates to services utilization,
appropriateness or outcomes. For some, that may represent an important limitation.
Accordingly, we leave open the discussion of quality for future research.
6.2.5 Additional Comments. Despite the need for further investigation of the
accuracy and uniformity of data furnished to CMS by MAOs , the quantitative methods
presented herein collectively lay a foundation for productive multi-year studies of CMS
data as further evolution occurs in medical insurance programs for individuals and
reimbursement arrangements for service delivery.
6.3 Future Research
At this time, the Medicare Advantage encounter data were available only for
calendar years 2015 (released by CMS in 2018) and 2016 (released in 2019). (Data for
2017 were subsequently released in 2020). This study uses the data for the most recent
year available (2016), a year for which master beneficiary information also was
comparatively complete for enrollees in HMO plans. In 2015, the healthcare industry
underwent a significant transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10 diagnosis coding, and we are
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aware of concerns about coding accuracy in that year. This reinforces our decision to use
only 2016 data.
Should researchers be granted permission to review contract terms between
MAOs and providers (perhaps CMS should mandate such disclosure), their analyses
could expand to include the effects those terms have on many elements such as
beneficiary plan choice, enrollment trends, and services utilization. It is possible, perhaps
likely, that specific contract terms drive long-term principal-agent relationships,
accelerate enrollment of MAO beneficiaries, and contribute to optimal service utilization
patterns.
The granularity of the Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage datasets
offers a treasure trove of research opportunities, and we envision several additional
opportunities for ongoing research. Healthcare utilization can be analyzed by procedure,
diagnosis, patient, provider, plan, MAO, and demographical traits. Accordingly, we
suggest several future research topics to advance the Medicare body of knowledge.
Refinement of the Poisson regression models. When the Poisson regression
models were applied to individual cases and the cases were sorted according to the
estimated number of encounters for each type of service, it was apparent that predictions
could be refined to accommodate nonlinear impacts of Charlson scores and age of patient
on the log (expected encounters). Such refinements did not affect the statistical
significance of the factors included in the models presented in this dissertation or
materially affect the total number of services of a particular type that were predicted to be
delivered under the different insurance plans. They did, however, result in more accurate
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estimates for population subgroups. Results of experiments with alternative methods of
incorporating these effects will be reported in future work.
Other regions. Results using this (or similar) methodology with data from other
locales, states, and regions will help determine if the results from this study are
generalizable to the entire Medicare population.
Plan choice. In our research, we presented evidence that a beneficiary’s
demographical characteristics and access to care may affect their Medicare plan choice
and service utilization. Policymakers and MAOs alike may be interested in further
investigation into this line of research for tactical development of plans and benefits
schedules best suited for the beneficiaries they seek to accommodate. For example, would
CMS’ cost to incentivize MAOs and their healthcare providers to increase their presence
in an underserved community be less than the long-term cost attributable to a presumably
less healthy population? Or, could plan benefit structures somehow better incentivize
beneficiaries in underserved areas to be more proactive in seeking preventative care in
neighboring counties? These types of analyses are compelling opportunities to expand
research in these areas.
Effect of service prices on referrals. The Traditional Medicare (FFS) data
contain payment information for each healthcare service received, including the service
location and rendering provider. For each service event, there is a record of the specific
amounts paid by the Medicare program, secondary and supplemental insurers, and
beneficiaries. The sum of those payments is the total cost of the service. Researchers
could determine if the total cost of a specific service (or service provider) has a
relationship to the RB PCPs’ patient referral patterns. If so, this suggests that RB PCPs
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are price sensitive and may actively seek out low-cost providers as one strategy to
minimize expense payments from their medical risk pools.
PCP practice-based services. Researchers could examine the medical practicebased procedure codes and volumes reported by both RB PCPs and FFS PCPs to
determine if one cohort offers a broader selection of services as compared to the other.
The RB PCPs whom we interviewed believe they offer a comprehensive array of medical
practice-based services as another strategy to minimize both their referrals and the
associated deductions from their medical risk pools. We are not aware of any research
that supports their viewpoint, but the Medicare claims data are available to conduct such
research.
Medical practice modeling. Medical service providers, such as PCPs wishing to
enter into risk-bearing contracts, could utilize the tools contained in this research to
construct various models to predict the results given various assumptions about patient
attributes, services utilization, and compensation schemes (such as capitation and risk
pools). They could enter the profiles of their existing Medicare patients and the profiles
of incremental patients they anticipate receiving from participation in new agreements
with MAO. These analyses could be very instructive to providers when deciding to
accept or reject participation agreements from MAOs or negotiating better terms for
agreements that interest them.
Specialist referrals. Our research only examines the total volumes of general
category services used by beneficiaries of RB PCPs and FFS PCPs. Researchers could
utilize the provider identifiers, taxonomy codes, service centers, and associated volumes
to determine if there is a significant difference in the mix and quantity of services within
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each category used by beneficiaries of RB PCPs and FFS PCPs. Those results, compared
with results found in the PCP practice-based services research, might uncover meaningful
correlations between PCP practices and specialist referrals.
Service mix by plan. Researchers could examine the mix of services used by
beneficiaries for each unique plan and benefits structure. Among other potential findings,
researchers may discover that some MAO plans offer a broader selection of lower-cost
services while other plans offer a narrower selection of higher-cost services. Included in
this type of research would be the amount of the patient’s deductible and co-payment
responsibilities as potential explanatory variables in plan and benefit selections.
Clinical outcomes. Our brief discussion of quality, including clinical outcomes,
highlights a concern that the industry struggles with this element of patient care
evaluation. Researchers could assess the ongoing debate about clinical outcomes and
quality metrics, devise appropriate variables, extract the corresponding values from the
Medicare files, and utilize the methods shown in this study to determine what
relationships exist among those variables. Death rates, readmission rates, and alternative
measures for changes in health status can be examined with information in the CMS
datasets. Associations between patient characteristics, plan choice, provider access,
physician compensation structures and clinical outcomes would provide useful
perspective as participating parties collaborate in efforts to improve healthcare delivery.
Health status. Researchers could replace the CCMI score with an alternative
variable to determine if health status defined differently has a different relationship to
services utilization than shown in our research.
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Access to care. There may be alternative proxies for access to hospitals and
doctors. Refinements could be made by examining the effects of the availability of
specific physician specialties, clinics, and hospital types. Also, consideration could be
given to service availability in neighboring counties or regions. Transportation modes
(e.g., auto, public transportation, taxi) may affect access to health care service locations.
More recently, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, CMS has lifted several restrictions on
the use of telemedicine. The removal of physical barriers made possible by digital
transmission of conversations and images could have an effect on service utilization;
however, some beneficiaries may not have access to the necessary technology to access
those services. Consequently, future research could investigate these and other potential
barriers that beneficiaries encounter when trying to access the health services that they
require.
Longitudinal studies. As data integrity improves, and CMS releases more years
of data, researchers could identify longer-term patterns and trends of healthcare services
used by Medicare beneficiaries. Beneficiaries could be grouped into various subsets to
examine the effects of physician and plan choices over time. Policymakers could better
evaluate their strategy to steer Medicare beneficiaries into Medicare Advantage plans.
Also, by examining clinical outcomes derived from the data, more careful analyses could
be conducted to determine if there are differences in the long-term clinical outcomes of
Traditional Medicare and MA beneficiaries. Researchers could also look for evolution in
plan choices as driven by beneficiary attributes or industry changes.
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6.5 Conclusion
Our study found that personal traits, access to providers, and levels of wealth and
education, exhibit statistically significant relationships with a beneficiary’s choice of
Medicare plans. Using statistical methods such as CHAID decision trees and Poisson
regression, we show how those attributes (personal traits, access, wealth, education, and
plan choice) also predict service utilization in each of five general categories: inpatient
admissions, skilled nursing admissions, outpatient services, home health services, and
carrier services.
We identified major stakeholders in the Medicare system, demonstrated how they
preside as both principal and agent, and discussed their operational problems predicted by
agency theory. By conducting fieldwork that included discussions with PCPs and MAOs
and reviews of their participation agreements, we were able to identify the elements of
purportedly successful contract terms that serve to mitigate the problems posed by agency
theory. A review of results stemming from one such contract suggests that beneficiaries
of MAOs engaged with RB PCPs will utilize fewer healthcare resources than
beneficiaries in FFS plans and, possibly, those in other HMO plans. This is an area for
further exploration. Overall, our findings suggest that the features of health insurance
plans and compensation mechanisms for healthcare providers significantly affect the
services received by individual patients. Quantifying the impact of these effects with the
methods used in this dissertation can provide vital information to governmental officials,
health insurers, healthcare organizations and individual practitioners.
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Appendix A: Risk-bearing Contracts for Primary Care Physicians
Typically, Managed Care Organizations (MAOs) receive a monthly payment, sometimes
referred to as capitation, from CMS for each insured member in the MAO’s Medicare
Advantage plan(s) assigned to a physician or physician group. The capitation payment
emanates from a complex formula that includes, but is not limited to, such variables as
the MAO’s bid amount sent to CMS; the insured patient’s age, sex, geographic location,
place of residence and other demographics; risk adjustments for health conditions; prior
year adjustments that are posted in the current year; and incentive payments based on the
plan’s performance as indicated by the plan’s prior-year “Star” rating. Due to these
variables, monthly capitation payments will differ from patient to patient. The
complexities of this risk-adjusted payment structure are not addressed in this paper, but
they can be reviewed in detail at CMS’ website at www.cms.gov. For our purposes, we
shall refer to the CMS payment as the average risk-adjusted capitation payment received
for each insured member. We label this monthly capitation payment as “C.”
The MAO generally retains a portion of the C to fund its internal resources such
as general management, provider contracting and relations, marketing, sales, advertising,
information technology, other administrative functions, and potential profits. The
retention typically is a percentage of C. We label the retention percentage as “r.” The
difference between C and (C * r) is the pool of dollars available to pay all medical and
medically related expenses for the care of the insured member (patient). We label this
pool as “P.”
[C – (C * r)] = P
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Medical and medically related expenses include payments to hospitals, doctors, ancillary
service providers, laboratories, pharmacies, outpatient surgery centers, home health
companies, member/patient health club memberships, stop-loss reinsurance companies,
and other costs of care and services. We label the average expenses per patient as “E.” If
P > E, then there is a surplus in the pool. If P < E, there is a deficit. If P = E, the pool
has a zero balance. During contract negotiations, the PCP Organization (PCP) and MAO
negotiate each party's respective share of the surplus or deficit, and the terms of those
negotiations are written into the contract between the parties. If there is a surplus, the
contract requires the MAO to pay the PCPs’ share of the surplus to the PCPs within a
specified period. If there is a deficit, the contract requires the PCPs to pay their share of
the deficit to the MAO within a specified period. Alternatively, the PCPs and the MAO
may agree to provisions whereby current deficit payments due from the PCPs are
deducted from PCPs’ future surpluses, thus reducing those future payments, but easing
the PCPs’ near-term cash flow burden.
There also can be variations in this payment methodology. In recent years, it is
our observation that agreements between MAOs and PCPs have become increasingly
complex, especially regarding the calculations for both surplus/deficit sharing and
supplemental incentives such as the outcomes measures. For example, the contract
between the PCPs and a MAO might state that the ratio value of E to P (E/P) must be less
than a specific threshold to qualify for financial incentives. Alternatively, if E/P equals or
exceeds the threshold, then the PCPs may incur financial penalties. In this type of
arrangement, the MAO expects the overall cost of care to be such that E/P is less than a
predefined ratio, denoted by "X”. Thus, we can write:
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If E/P < X, then then PCPs receive a share of the surplus
If E/P > X, then the PCPs’ share of the surplus is voided and penalties are incurred
Our experience suggests that the PCPs’ share of surpluses (and deficits) ranges from 60%
to 80% in these types of risk-bearing arrangements. We label the PCPs’ percentage share
as “S”; therefore, we can write:
[C – (C * r)] = P
If E/P < X, then the PCP share of surplus = [(P * X) – E] * S
If E/P ≥ X, then the PCP repayment to MAO = [(P * X) – E] * S
The X may or may not be negotiable, and may reflect past precedent or the parties’ goals
for the upcoming contract year(s), or both.
In addition to financial incentives, contracts between MAOs and PCPs also may
contain outcomes incentives. Our experience with and review of Medicare Advantage
contracts between MAOs and PCPs suggests that outcomes incentives are calculated
differently in each contract based on the MAO’s objectives. Generally, it appears that
outcomes incentives are directly related to the MAO’s effort to maximize its Star rating.
Outcomes metrics contained in the Star rating program for MAOs, and the outcomes
incentives for PCPs, are derived, in part, from a listing of measures included in the
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), one of the most widely
used sets of health care performance measures in the United States (NCQA, 2018). This
information is collected, compiled, and published by the non-profit organization,
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). Background information about
NCQA and HEDIS is available at www.ncqa.org.
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Based on our conversations with MAOs and Harmony PCPs, we believe that
outcomes metrics achievement or non-achievement are introduced into the payment
model for at least four reasons: a) to create a critical check and balance offering
deterrence, in the form of opportunity costs, for underutilization of resources, resulting in
lower E, that potentially would harm members/patients, b) to help the MAO maximize its
CMS Star rating, c) to provide guidance and structure that assist PCPs in efforts to
improve clinical outcomes, and d) to reward PCPs for improving outcomes. Our review
of MAOs’ contracts with PCPs indicates that achievement of specified benchmarks,
either individually or collectively, is rewarded as dollar payments that supplement the
PCPs’ surplus share, or as additional percentages added to S, with either method resulting
in a potentially higher rate of compensation than offered by a financial incentive alone.
The outcomes incentives may be expressed as a pre-defined dollar value per
outcome attained, or a pre-defined percentage value that supplements S. We let 𝑖𝑗 be the
predefined dollar incentive for outcome 𝑗, 𝑖′𝑗 be the predefined percentage incentive for
outcome 𝑗, and 𝛼𝑗 = 1 if outcome 𝑗 is attained, and 0 otherwise. We illustrate the effects
outcomes incentives have on payment models with three hypothetical risk-bearing
contracts, as follows:
Scenario 1. Assumptions: E/P ratio is favorable (i.e., less than X), and 𝑛 dollar incentive
measures are available to supplement the surplus share.
Given [C – (C * r)] = P, and E/P < X,
Therefore, PCP Earnings = {[(P * X) – E] * S} + ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑗
Scenario 2. Assumptions: E/P ratio is unfavorable (i.e., E/P ≥ X), but 𝑛 dollar incentive
measures are available to help offset the penalty for not achieving the ratio X.
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Given [C – (C * r)] = P, and E/P ≥ X,
Therefore, PCP Earnings = {[(P * X) – E] * S} + ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑗 (a potential deficit)
Scenario 3. Assumptions: The contract terms do not include a threshold (X), but
𝑛 percentage incentive measures are available to supplement S.
Given [C – (C * r)] = P and P > E
Therefore, PCP Earnings = (P – E) * (S + ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖′𝑗 )
We note that these payment formulas generally are not calculated for each patient.
Instead, it is typically the summation of payments, expenses, and incentives for the entire
patient panel assigned to each PCP or the entire PCP group.
The MAO typically makes these calculations and reports them to the PCPs on a
monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Cumulative calculations sometimes are titled
“reconciliations” and typically occur on quarterly and yearly bases several weeks after
the close of those respective periods. This delayed reporting allows for “incurred but not
reported claims” (IBNR) to make their way into the MAO’s payment system before the
reconciliations.
The previously displayed Exhibit 7 illustrates the flow of funds for the various
components of a generic Medicare Advantage risk-bearing contract between an MAO
and PCP group organized to enter into such agreements. Our discussions with Harmony
physicians and reviews of their risk-bearing contracts inform us that Harmony PCPs may
generate revenue from any or all of five different sources: 1) advance from the MAO, 2)
FFS reimbursement for medical services rendered, 3) the share of the medical expense
pool surplus, 4) outcomes incentives earned, and 5) patient co-payments and unmet
deductibles (see Exhibit A1).
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Exhibit A1. MA-HMO Funds Flow

It is the summation of these five revenue sources that PCPs compare and contrast to
Traditional Medicare fee-for-service arrangements to determine if the financial reward
from MA-HMO participation justifies the risks incurred.
For illustrative and simplicity purposes, we shall examine the hypothetical results
for a single patient/member for one month, using the three scenarios described
previously. We use the following common data for all scenarios:
C (Monthly Capitation Payment) = $1,000
r (MAO Retention) = 10%
𝑖1 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $1.00
𝑖2 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $1.50
𝑖3 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $1.50
𝑖4 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $2.00
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𝑖5 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $2.00
𝑖6 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $2.50
𝑖′1 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 1.0%
𝑖′2 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 1.5%
𝑖′3 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 1.5%
𝑖′4 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 2.0%
𝑖′5 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 2.0%
𝑖′6 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 3.0%
In each scenario, the calculated pool P = [1,000 – (1,000 * 0.1)] = $900

Scenario 1. Assumptions: E/P ratio is favorable (i.e., less than X), and all six dollar
amount outcomes incentive measures are achieved. Let:
E (Medical Expense) = $700
X (Expense Threshold) = 85%
S (PCP Share) = 75%
Then:
PCP Earnings = {[(900 * 0.85) – 700)] * 0.75} + {1.00 + 1.50 + 1.50 + 2.00 +2.00 +
2.50}
= {48.75} + {10.50}
= 59.25, or $59.25 payment for one patient, for one month
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If one were to assume that a PCP has a panel of 150 patients of comparable demographics
and health, and the results were the same each month of the year for each patient, then the
PCP’s earnings would be as follows:

$59.25/month/patient * 150 patients * 12 months/year = $106,650 annually
Scenario 2. Assumptions: E/P ratio is unfavorable (i.e., E/P ≥ X), but all six dollar
outcomes incentive measures are achieved to offset the penalty for the E/P ratio not
exceeding X.
Let:
E (Medical Expense) = $800
X (Expense Threshold) = 85%
S (PCP Share) = 75%
Then:
PCP Earnings = {[(900 * 0.85) – 800)] * 0.75} + {1.00 + 1.50 + 1.50 + 2.00 +2.00 +
2.50}
= {-26.25} + {10.50}
= -15.75, or -$15.75 for one patient, for one month (to be repaid to the
MAO)

If one were to assume that a PCP has a panel of 150 patients of comparable demographics
and health (i.e., comparable risk factors), and the results were the same each month of the
year for each patient, then the PCP’s earnings would be as follows:

-$15.75/month/patient * 150 patients * 12 months/year = -$28,350 annually (payable to
MAO)
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In this scenario, the PCP provided services to a patient panel for one year but had to
reimburse the MAO for the shortfall. Further analysis would be needed to determine if
the PCP incurred an overall net loss because other payment sources such as patient copays and services paid on a fee-for-service basis could potentially offset some or all of
the loss, and possibly return the PCP to a net positive result.
Scenario 3. Assumptions: The contract does not contain a threshold (X), and the PCP
surplus share percentage S is increased due to the achievement of all six percentage
outcomes measures to supplements S.
Let:
E (Medical Expense) = $750
S (PCP Share) = 60%
Then:
PCP Earnings = (900 – 750) * (0.60 + 0.01 + 0.015 + 0.015 + 0.02 + 0.02 +0.025)
= (150) * (0.705)
= 105.75, or $105.75 payment for one patient, for one month

If one were to assume that a PCP has a panel of 150 patients each having comparable risk
factors, and the results were the same each month of the year for each patient, then the
PCP’s earnings would be as follows:

$105.75/month/patient * 150 patients * 12 months/year = $190,350 annually

Of course, these illustrations overly simplify the actual contract terms and conditions, as
well as the amount of data generated and resultant calculations, attributable to the 150

186

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
patients of varying demographics and illnesses contained in an actual reconciliation
process.
In addition to financial and outcomes measures, we observe other types of
incentives incorporated into these risk-bearing contracts. Examples include cash rewards
for patient satisfaction survey results (MAOs desire high ratings) and utilization metrics
(MAOs want reduced utilization) such as hospital inpatient days per thousand patients
and hospital emergency department visits per thousand patients. Further complexity
occurs when some contracts prescribe an advance payment to the PCPs as interim cash
flow support before reconciliation payments. These advance payments pose an additional
risk component because some or the entire advance would have to be repaid to the MAO
should the PCPs find themselves in a deficit position at reconciliation. Advance payment
also creates a cash management dilemma: should the advance be recognized as spendable
income, or should it be reserved for losses? The Harmony PCPs told us they install a
measure of both by using an internal risk share methodology that establishes an internal
reserve that offsets future deficits. If the reserve is not used by year-end, the proceeds are
distributed to the PCPs per a pre-defined formula.
These scenarios demonstrate the tremendous importance of PCPs familiarizing
themselves, and acting on, the information supplied by the MAO, but also received from
multiple sources: CMS, NCQA, contract terms and conditions, provider claims and
payment data, historical records, outcomes data, and other informational sources. When
Harmony PCPs discuss their risks inherent in these types of risk bearing (RB)
arrangements, they frequently mention that their total compensation as Medicare
Advantage HMO participating physicians is heavily dependent on several factors, some
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controllable, some not. From our field observations, we note that the Harmony PCPs
place substantial reliance on the MAOs to supply timely and useful information to help
the PCPs perform well. To get more contemporary and customized data, some PCP
groups invest in specialized technology and services to supplement the MAOs’
information.
Collectively, many elements comprise the payment scheme that attempts to
incentivize and compensate PCPs for the care of Medicare Advantage beneficiaries
assigned to them. Our interaction with the Harmony PCPs left us quite impressed with
their ability to analyze data and understand the extent to which various elements pose a
financial risk and therefore impact their payments from MAOs. However, the complexity
of these arrangements also makes one mindful of the significant body of knowledge a
fee-for-service-oriented PCP, or PCP group should possess before committing to a
Medicare Advantage risk-bearing contract. Additionally, the PCPs should ensure their
contract negotiator has experience with such contract complexities.
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Appendix B: Master Beneficiary Summary File Variables and Names

SAS Name

Label

Type

Length

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Reference Year
Source of enrollment data
Medicare 1, 5, or 20% strict sample group
indicator
Enhanced Medicare 5% Sample Indicator
Current Beneficiary Identification Code
State code for beneficiary (SSA code)
County code for beneficiary (SSA code)
5-digit ZIP code for beneficiary
State and county FIPS code - January
State and county FIPS code - February
State and county FIPS code - March
State and county FIPS code - April
State and county FIPS code - May
State and county FIPS code - June
State and county FIPS code - July
State and county FIPS code - August
State and county FIPS code - September
State and county FIPS code - October
State and county FIPS code - November
State and county FIPS code - December
Age of beneficiary at end of year
Beneficiary date of birth
Valid Date of Death Switch
Date of Death
Sex
Beneficiary Race Code
Research Triangle Institute (RTI) Race
Code
Medicare Coverage Start Date
Original Reason for Entitlement Code
Current Reason for Entitlement Code
End-stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Indicator
Medicare Status Code - January
Medicare Status Code - February
Medicare Status Code - March
Medicare Status Code - April
Medicare Status Code - May
Medicare Status Code - June

CHAR
NUM
CHAR
CHAR

15
4
3
2

CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
NUM
DATE
CHAR
DATE
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR

1
2
2
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
8
1
8
1
1
1

DATE
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR

8
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2

Base Claim File:
BENE_ID
BENE_ENROLLMT_REF_YR
ENRL_SRC
SAMPLE_GROUP
ENHANCED_FIVE_PERCENT_FLAG
CRNT_BIC_CD
STATE_CODE
COUNTY_CD
ZIP_CD
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_01
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_02
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_03
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_04
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_05
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_06
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_07
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_08
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_09
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_10
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_11
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_12
AGE_AT_END_REF_YR
BENE_BIRTH_DT
VALID_DEATH_DT_SW
BENE_DEATH_DT
SEX_IDENT_CD
BENE_RACE_CD
RTI_RACE_CD
COVSTART
ENTLMT_RSN_ORIG
ENTLMT_RSN_CURR
ESRD_IND
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_01
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_02
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_03
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_04
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_05
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_06
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MDCR_STATUS_CODE_07
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_08
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_09
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_10
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_11
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_12
BENE_PTA_TRMNTN_CD
BENE_PTB_TRMNTN_CD
BENE_HI_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS
BENE_SMI_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS
BENE_STATE_BUYIN_TOT_MONS
BENE_HMO_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS
PTD_PLAN_CVRG_MONS
RDS_CVRG_MONS
DUAL_ELGBL_MONS
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_01
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_02
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_03
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_04
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_05
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_06
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_07
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_08
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_09
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_10
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_11
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_12
HMO_IND_01
HMO_IND_02
HMO_IND_03
HMO_IND_04
HMO_IND_05
HMO_IND_06
HMO_IND_07
HMO_IND_08
HMO_IND_09
HMO_IND_10
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Medicare Status Code - July
Medicare Status Code - August
Medicare Status Code - September
Medicare Status Code - October
Medicare Status Code - November
Medicare Status Code - December
Part A Termination Code
Part B Termination Code
Part A Months Count
Part B Months Count
State Buy-In Coverage Count
HMO Coverage Count
Months of Part D Coverage
Months of Retiree Drug Subsidy Coverage
Months of Dual Eligibility
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator January
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator February
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator March
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator April
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator May
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator June
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator July
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator August
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator September
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator October
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator November
Medicare Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator December
HMO Indicator - January
HMO Indicator - February
HMO Indicator - March
HMO Indicator - April
HMO Indicator - May
HMO Indicator - June
HMO Indicator - July
HMO Indicator - August
HMO Indicator - September
HMO Indicator - October

CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
NUM
NUM
NUM
NUM
NUM
NUM
NUM
CHAR

2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
HMO_IND_11
HMO_IND_12
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_01
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_02
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_03
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_04
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_05
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_06
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_07
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_08
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_09
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_10
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_11
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_12
PTC_PBP_ID_01
PTC_PBP_ID_02
PTC_PBP_ID_03
PTC_PBP_ID_04
PTC_PBP_ID_05
PTC_PBP_ID_06
PTC_PBP_ID_07
PTC_PBP_ID_08
PTC_PBP_ID_09
PTC_PBP_ID_10
PTC_PBP_ID_11
PTC_PBP_ID_12
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_01
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_02
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_03
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_04
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_05
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_06
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_07
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_08
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_09
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_10
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_11
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_12
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_01
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_02
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_03
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_04
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_05
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_06
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_07
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HMO Indicator - November
HMO Indicator - December
Part C Contract Number - January
Part C Contract Number - February
Part C Contract Number - March
Part C Contract Number - April
Part C Contract Number - May
Part C Contract Number - June
Part C Contract Number - July
Part C Contract Number - August
Part C Contract Number - September
Part C Contract Number - October
Part C Contract Number - November
Part C Contract Number - December
Part C PBP Number - January
Part C PBP Number - February
Part C PBP Number - March
Part C PBP Number - April
Part C PBP Number - May
Part C PBP Number - June
Part C PBP Number - July
Part C PBP Number - August
Part C PBP Number - September
Part C PBP Number - October
Part C PBP Number - November
Part C PBP Number - December
Part C Plan Type Code - January
Part C Plan Type Code - February
Part C Plan Type Code - March
Part C Plan Type Code - April
Part C Plan Type Code - May
Part C Plan Type Code - June
Part C Plan Type Code - July
Part C Plan Type Code - August
Part C Plan Type Code - September
Part C Plan Type Code - October
Part C Plan Type Code - November
Part C Plan Type Code - December
Part D Contract Number - January
Part D Contract Number - February
Part D Contract Number - March
Part D Contract Number - April
Part D Contract Number - May
Part D Contract Number - June
Part D Contract Number - July

CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR

1
1
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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PTD_CNTRCT_ID_08
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_09
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_10
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_11
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_12
PTD_PBP_ID_01
PTD_PBP_ID_02
PTD_PBP_ID_03
PTD_PBP_ID_04
PTD_PBP_ID_05
PTD_PBP_ID_06
PTD_PBP_ID_07
PTD_PBP_ID_08
PTD_PBP_ID_09
PTD_PBP_ID_10
PTD_PBP_ID_11
PTD_PBP_ID_12
PTD_SGMT_ID_01
PTD_SGMT_ID_02
PTD_SGMT_ID_03
PTD_SGMT_ID_04
PTD_SGMT_ID_05
PTD_SGMT_ID_06
PTD_SGMT_ID_07
PTD_SGMT_ID_08
PTD_SGMT_ID_09
PTD_SGMT_ID_10
PTD_SGMT_ID_11
PTD_SGMT_ID_12
RDS_IND_01
RDS_IND_02
RDS_IND_03
RDS_IND_04
RDS_IND_05
RDS_IND_06
RDS_IND_07
RDS_IND_08
RDS_IND_09
RDS_IND_10
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Part D Contract Number - August
Part D Contract Number - September
Part D Contract Number - October
Part D Contract Number - November
Part D Contract Number - December
Part D PBP Number - January
Part D PBP Number - February
Part D PBP Number - March
Part D PBP Number - April
Part D PBP Number - May
Part D PBP Number - June
Part D PBP Number - July
Part D PBP Number - August
Part D PBP Number - September
Part D PBP Number - October
Part D PBP Number - November
Part D PBP Number - December
Part D Segment Number - January
Part D Segment Number - February
Part D Segment Number - March
Part D Segment Number - April
Part D Segment Number - May
Part D Segment Number - June
Part D Segment Number - July
Part D Segment Number - August
Part D Segment Number - September
Part D Segment Number - October
Part D Segment Number - November
Part D Segment Number - December
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator January
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator February
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator March
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator April
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator May
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator June
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator July
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator August
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator September
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator October

CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR
CHAR

5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

1
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RDS_IND_11
RDS_IND_12
DUAL_STUS_CD_01
DUAL_STUS_CD_02
DUAL_STUS_CD_03
DUAL_STUS_CD_04
DUAL_STUS_CD_05
DUAL_STUS_CD_06
DUAL_STUS_CD_07
DUAL_STUS_CD_08
DUAL_STUS_CD_09
DUAL_STUS_CD_10
DUAL_STUS_CD_11
DUAL_STUS_CD_12
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_01
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_02
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_03
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_04
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_05
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_06
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_07
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_08
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_09
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_10
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_11
CST_SHR_GRP_CD_12
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Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator November
Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator December
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code January
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code February
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code March
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code April
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code May
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code June
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code July
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code August
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code September
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code October
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code November
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility code December
Part D low-income cost share group code January
Part D low-income cost share group code February
Part D low-income cost share group code March
Part D low-income cost share group code April
Part D low-income cost share group code May
Part D low-income cost share group code June
Part D low-income cost share group code July
Part D low-income cost share group code August
Part D low-income cost share group code September
Part D low-income cost share group code October
Part D low-income cost share group code November
Part D low-income cost share group code December

CHAR

1

CHAR

1

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2

CHAR

2
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Appendix C: Inpatient and Skilled Nursing Variables and Names

SAS Name
Base Claim File
BENE_ID
SAMPLE_GROUP
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_FROM_DT
CLM_THRU_DT
SRVC_MONTH
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW
CLM_CNTL_NUM
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM
CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND
CLM_LTST_CLM_IND
EDPS_CREATE_DT
CLM_RCPT_DT
CLM_FAC_TYPE_CD
CLM_SRVC_CLSFCTN_TYPE_CD
CLM_FREQ_CD
CNTRCT_NUM
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM
CLM_MDCL_REC
ORG_NPI
ORG_TXNMY_CD
RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI
AT_PHYSN_NPI
AT_PHYSN_TXNMY_CD
OP_PHYSN_NPI
OT_PHYSN_NPI
CLM_ADMSN_DT
CLM_IP_ADMSN_TYPE_CD
CLM_SRC_IP_ADMSN_CD
PTNT_DSCHRG_STUS_CD
CLM_DAY_CNT
BENE_DSCHRG_DT
CLM_DRG_CD
DRVD_DRG_CD
ADMTG_DGNS_CD
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD
ICD_DGNS_CD1
ICD_DGNS_CD2
ICD_DGNS_CD3

Label

Type

Length

2015

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
CCW Beneficiary Random Sample
Group
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim From Date
Claim Through Date
Service Month
Claim Chart Review Switch
Claim Control Number
Claim Original Control Number
Claim Final Action Indicator
Latest Claim Indicator
Encounter Data Processing System
(EDPS) Create Date
Claim Receipt Date
Claim Facility Type Code
Claim Service classification Type Code
Claim Frequency Code
Medicare Part C Contract Number
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package
(PBP) Number
Claim Medical Record Number
Organization NPI Number
Organization Taxonomy Code
Claim Rendering Physician NPI Number
Claim Attending Physician NPI Number
Claim Attending Physician Taxonomy
Code
Claim Operating Physician NPI Number
Claim Other Physician NPI Number
Claim Admission Date
Claim Inpatient Admission Type Code
Claim Source Inpatient Admission Code
Patient Discharge Status Code
Day Count (Length of Stay)
Beneficiary Discharge Date
Claim MS-Diagnosis Related Group Code
(MS-DRG)
Derived MS-Diagnosis Related Group
Code (MS-DRG)
Claim Admitting Diagnosis Code
Claim Principal Diagnosis Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 1
Claim Diagnosis Code 2
Claim Diagnosis Code 3

Char

15

1

Char

2

2

Char
Char
Date
Date
Date
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
4
8
8
6
1
23
23
1
1

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Date

8

13

Date
Char
Char
Char
Char

8
1
1
1
5

14
15
16
17
18

Char

3

19

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

1
10
10
10
10

20
21
22
23
24

Char

10

25

Char
Char
Date
Char
Char
Char
Num
Date

10
10
8
1
1
2
4
8

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Char

3

34

Char

4

35

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

7
7
7
7
7

36
37
38
39
40
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ICD_DGNS_CD4
ICD_DGNS_CD5
ICD_DGNS_CD6
ICD_DGNS_CD7
ICD_DGNS_CD8
ICD_DGNS_CD9
ICD_DGNS_CD10
ICD_DGNS_CD11
ICD_DGNS_CD12
ICD_DGNS_CD13
ICD_DGNS_CD14
ICD_DGNS_CD15
ICD_DGNS_CD16
ICD_DGNS_CD17
ICD_DGNS_CD18
ICD_DGNS_CD19
ICD_DGNS_CD20
ICD_DGNS_CD21
ICD_DGNS_CD22
ICD_DGNS_CD23
ICD_DGNS_CD24
ICD_DGNS_CD25
CLM_POA_IND_SW1

CLM_POA_IND_SW2

CLM_POA_IND_SW3

CLM_POA_IND_SW4

CLM_POA_IND_SW5

CLM_POA_IND_SW6

CLM_POA_IND_SW7

CLM_POA_IND_SW8

CLM_POA_IND_SW9

CLM_POA_IND_SW10

Claim Diagnosis Code 4
Claim Diagnosis Code 5
Claim Diagnosis Code 6
Claim Diagnosis Code 7
Claim Diagnosis Code 8
Claim Diagnosis Code 9
Claim Diagnosis Code 10
Claim Diagnosis Code 11
Claim Diagnosis Code 12
Claim Diagnosis Code 13
Claim Diagnosis Code 14
Claim Diagnosis Code 15
Claim Diagnosis Code 16
Claim Diagnosis Code 17
Claim Diagnosis Code 18
Claim Diagnosis Code 19
Claim Diagnosis Code 20
Claim Diagnosis Code 21
Claim Diagnosis Code 22
Claim Diagnosis Code 23
Claim Diagnosis Code 24
Claim Diagnosis Code 25
Claim Diagnosis Code 1 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 2 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 3 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 4 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 5 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 6 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 7 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 8 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 9 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 10 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
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Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Char

1

63

Char

1

64

Char

1

65

Char

1

66

Char

1

67

Char

1

68

Char

1

69

Char

1

70

Char

1

71

Char

1

72
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CLM_POA_IND_SW11

CLM_POA_IND_SW12

CLM_POA_IND_SW13

CLM_POA_IND_SW14

CLM_POA_IND_SW15

CLM_POA_IND_SW16

CLM_POA_IND_SW17

CLM_POA_IND_SW18

CLM_POA_IND_SW19

CLM_POA_IND_SW20

CLM_POA_IND_SW21

CLM_POA_IND_SW22

CLM_POA_IND_SW23

CLM_POA_IND_SW24

CLM_POA_IND_SW25
CLM_1ST_DGNS_E_CD
ICD_DGNS_E_CD1
ICD_DGNS_E_CD2
ICD_DGNS_E_CD3
ICD_DGNS_E_CD4
ICD_DGNS_E_CD5
ICD_DGNS_E_CD6
ICD_DGNS_E_CD7
ICD_DGNS_E_CD8
ICD_DGNS_E_CD9

Claim Diagnosis Code 11 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 12 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 13 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 14 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 15 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 16 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 17 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 18 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 19 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 20 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 21 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 22 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 23 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 24 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 25 Diagnosis
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator
Code
First Claim Diagnosis E Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 1
Claim Diagnosis E Code 2
Claim Diagnosis E Code 3
Claim Diagnosis E Code 4
Claim Diagnosis E Code 5
Claim Diagnosis E Code 6
Claim Diagnosis E Code 7
Claim Diagnosis E Code 8
Claim Diagnosis E Code 9
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Char

1

73

Char

1

74

Char

1

75

Char

1

76

Char

1

77

Char

1

78

Char

1

79

Char

1

80

Char

1

81

Char

1

82

Char

1

83

Char

1

84

Char

1

85

Char

1

86

Char

1

87

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
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ICD_DGNS_E_CD10
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW1
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW2
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW3
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW4
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW5
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW6
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW7
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW8
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW9
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW10
ICD_PRCDR_CD1
ICD_PRCDR_CD2
ICD_PRCDR_CD3
ICD_PRCDR_CD4
ICD_PRCDR_CD5
ICD_PRCDR_CD6
ICD_PRCDR_CD7
ICD_PRCDR_CD8
ICD_PRCDR_CD9
ICD_PRCDR_CD10
ICD_PRCDR_CD11
ICD_PRCDR_CD12
ICD_PRCDR_CD13
PRCDR_DT1
PRCDR_DT2
PRCDR_DT3
PRCDR_DT4
PRCDR_DT5
PRCDR_DT6
PRCDR_DT7
PRCDR_DT8
PRCDR_DT9
PRCDR_DT10
PRCDR_DT11
PRCDR_DT12
PRCDR_DT13
CLM_OBSLT_DT
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_CD

Claim Diagnosis E Code 10
Claim Diagnosis E Code 1 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 2 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 3 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 4 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 5 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 6 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 7 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 8 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 9 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 10 Diagnosis
Present on Admission Indicator Code
Claim Procedure Code 1
Claim Procedure Code 2
Claim Procedure Code 3
Claim Procedure Code 4
Claim Procedure Code 5
Claim Procedure Code 6
Claim Procedure Code 7
Claim Procedure Code 8
Claim Procedure Code 9
Claim Procedure Code 10
Claim Procedure Code 11
Claim Procedure Code 12
Claim Procedure Code 13
Claim Procedure Code 1 Date
Claim Procedure Code 2 Date
Claim Procedure Code 3 Date
Claim Procedure Code 4 Date
Claim Procedure Code 5 Date
Claim Procedure Code 6 Date
Claim Procedure Code 7 Date
Claim Procedure Code 8 Date
Claim Procedure Code 9 Date
Claim Procedure Code 10 Date
Claim Procedure Code 11 Date
Claim Procedure Code 12 Date
Claim Procedure Code 13 Date
Claim Obsolete Date
Billing Provider Address - City
Billing Provider Address - USPS State

197
Char

7

98

Char

1

99

Char

1

100

Char

1

101

Char

1

102

Char

1

103

Char

1

104

Char

1

105

Char

1

106

Char

1

107

Char

1

108

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Char
Char

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
30
2

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
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CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME

Code
Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - City
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS
State Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP Code
Beneficiary County Code from Claim
(SSA)
Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State Code
Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence
Gender Code
Race Code
Date of Birth
Beneficiary Medicare Status Code
Provider Tax Number
Beneficiary State Postal Code
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Char
Char

9
30

138
139

Char

2

140

Char

9

141

Char

3

142

Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Char
Char
Char

2
9
1
1
8
2
10
2

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Char
Char
Char
Num
Num
Date
Char
Date
Date
Num

15
15
4
13
13
8
4
8
8
8

1
2
3
4
19
5
6
7
8
9

Char

5

10

Char
Char
Char

2
2
2

11
12
13

Char

24

14

Num

10

15

Char

2

16

REV_CNTR_RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Line Number
Original Claim Line Number
Claim Through Date
Revenue Center Code
Revenue Center From Date
Revenue Center Thru Date
Revenue Center Unit Count
HCFA Common Procedure Coding
System (HCPCS) Code
HCPCS Initial Modifier Code
HCPCS Second Modifier Code
HCPCS Third Modifier Code
Revenue Center IDE, NDC, or UPC
Number
Revenue Center National Drug Code
(NDC) Quantity
Revenue Center NDC Quantity Qualifier
Code
Revenue Center Rendering Physician NPI
Line Latest Claim Indicator

Char
Char

10
1

17
18

Condition Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_COND_CD_SEQ
CLM_RLT_COND_CD

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Condition Code Sequence
Claim Related Condition Code

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
15
4
2
2

1
2
3
4
5

Occurrence Code File
BENE_ID

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID

Char

15

1

CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_CD
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD
BENE_CNTY_CD
BENE_STATE_CD
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD
GNDR_CD
BENE_RACE_CD
DOB_DT
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD
TAX_NUM
BENE_STATE
Revenue Center File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_LINE_NUM
LINE_NUM_ORIG
CLM_THRU_DT
REV_CNTR
REV_CNTR_FROM_DT
REV_CNTR_THRU_DT
REV_CNTR_UNIT_CNT
HCPCS_CD
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_3RD_MDFR_CD
REV_CNTR_IDE_NDC_UPC_NUM
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY_QLFR_CD
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ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
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Char
Char

15
4

2
3

Char

2

4

CLM_RLT_OCRNC_CD
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_DT

Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Occurrence Code
Sequence
Claim Related Occurrence Code
Claim Related Occurrence Date

Char
Date

2
8

5
6

Span Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_SPAN_CD_SEQ
CLM_SPAN_CD
CLM_SPAN_FROM_DT
CLM_SPAN_THRU_DT

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Span Code Sequence
Claim Occurrence Span Code
Claim Occurrence Span From Date
Claim Occurrence Span Through Date

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date

15
15
4
2
2
8
8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Value Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_VAL_CD_SEQ
CLM_VAL_CD

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Value Code Sequence
Claim Value Code

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
15
4
2
2

1
2
3
4
5

RLT_OCRNC_CD_SEQ
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Appendix D: Hospital Outpatient Services Variables and Names
SAS Name
Base Claim File
BENE_ID
SAMPLE_GROUP
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_FROM_DT
CLM_THRU_DT
SRVC_MONTH
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW
CLM_CNTL_NUM
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM
•CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND
•CLM_LTST_CLM_IND
EDPS_CREATE_DT
CLM_RCPT_DT
CLM_FAC_TYPE_CD
CLM_SRVC_CLSFCTN_TYPE_C
D
CLM_FREQ_CD
CNTRCT_NUM
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM
CLM_MDCL_REC
ORG_NPI
ORG_TXNMY_CD
RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI
RFRG_PHYSN_NPI
AT_PHYSN_NPI
AT_PHSYN_TXNMY_CD
OP_PHYSN_NPI
OT_PHYSN_NPI
PTNT_DSCHRG_STUS_CD
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD
ICD_DGNS_CD1
ICD_DGNS_CD2
ICD_DGNS_CD3
ICD_DGNS_CD4
ICD_DGNS_CD5
ICD_DGNS_CD6
ICD_DGNS_CD7
ICD_DGNS_CD8
ICD_DGNS_CD9
ICD_DGNS_CD10
ICD_DGNS_CD11
ICD_DGNS_CD12

Label

Type

Len
gth

2015

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
CCW Beneficiary Random Sample Group
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim From Date
Claim Through Date
Service Month
Claim Chart Review Switch
Claim Control Number
Claim Original Control Number
Claim Final Action Indicator
Latest Claim Indicator
Encounter Data Processing System (EDPS)
Create Date
Claim Receipt Date
Claim Facility Type Code

Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date
Date
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
2
15
4
8
8
6
1
23
23
1
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Date

8

13

Date
Char

8
1

14
15

Claim Service classification Type Code

Char

1

16

Claim Frequency Code
Medicare Part C Contract Number
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package (PBP)
Number
Claim Medical Record Number
Organization NPI Number
Organization Taxonomy Code
Claim Rendering Physician NPI Number
Claim Referring Physician NPI Number
Claim Attending Physician NPI Number
Claim Attending Physician Taxonomy Code
Claim Operating Physician NPI Number
Claim Other Physician NPI Number
Patient Discharge Status Code
Claim Principal Diagnosis Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 1
Claim Diagnosis Code 2
Claim Diagnosis Code 3
Claim Diagnosis Code 4
Claim Diagnosis Code 5
Claim Diagnosis Code 6
Claim Diagnosis Code 7
Claim Diagnosis Code 8
Claim Diagnosis Code 9
Claim Diagnosis Code 10
Claim Diagnosis Code 11
Claim Diagnosis Code 12

Char
Char

1
5

17
18

Char

3

19

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

1
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
2
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
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ICD_DGNS_CD13
ICD_DGNS_CD14
ICD_DGNS_CD15
ICD_DGNS_CD16
ICD_DGNS_CD17
ICD_DGNS_CD18
ICD_DGNS_CD19
ICD_DGNS_CD20
ICD_DGNS_CD21
ICD_DGNS_CD22
ICD_DGNS_CD23
ICD_DGNS_CD24
ICD_DGNS_CD25
CLM_1ST_DGNS_E_CD
ICD_DGNS_E_CD1
ICD_DGNS_E_CD2
ICD_DGNS_E_CD3
ICD_DGNS_E_CD4
ICD_DGNS_E_CD5
ICD_DGNS_E_CD6
ICD_DGNS_E_CD7
ICD_DGNS_E_CD8
ICD_DGNS_E_CD9
ICD_DGNS_E_CD10
RSN_VISIT_CD1
RSN_VISIT_CD2
RSN_VISIT_CD3
ICD_PRCDR_CD1
ICD_PRCDR_CD2
ICD_PRCDR_CD3
ICD_PRCDR_CD4
ICD_PRCDR_CD5
ICD_PRCDR_CD6
ICD_PRCDR_CD7
ICD_PRCDR_CD8
ICD_PRCDR_CD9
ICD_PRCDR_CD10
ICD_PRCDR_CD11
ICD_PRCDR_CD12
ICD_PRCDR_CD13
PRCDR_DT1
PRCDR_DT2
PRCDR_DT3
PRCDR_DT4
PRCDR_DT5
PRCDR_DT6
PRCDR_DT7
PRCDR_DT8
PRCDR_DT9
PRCDR_DT10

Claim Diagnosis Code 13
Claim Diagnosis Code 14
Claim Diagnosis Code 15
Claim Diagnosis Code 16
Claim Diagnosis Code 17
Claim Diagnosis Code 18
Claim Diagnosis Code 19
Claim Diagnosis Code 20
Claim Diagnosis Code 21
Claim Diagnosis Code 22
Claim Diagnosis Code 23
Claim Diagnosis Code 24
Claim Diagnosis Code 25
First Claim Diagnosis E Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 1
Claim Diagnosis E Code 2
Claim Diagnosis E Code 3
Claim Diagnosis E Code 4
Claim Diagnosis E Code 5
Claim Diagnosis E Code 6
Claim Diagnosis E Code 7
Claim Diagnosis E Code 8
Claim Diagnosis E Code 9
Claim Diagnosis E Code 10
Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 1
Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 2
Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 3
Claim Procedure Code 1
Claim Procedure Code 2
Claim Procedure Code 3
Claim Procedure Code 4
Claim Procedure Code 5
Claim Procedure Code 6
Claim Procedure Code 7
Claim Procedure Code 8
Claim Procedure Code 9
Claim Procedure Code 10
Claim Procedure Code 11
Claim Procedure Code 12
Claim Procedure Code 13
Claim Procedure Code 1 Date
Claim Procedure Code 2 Date
Claim Procedure Code 3 Date
Claim Procedure Code 4 Date
Claim Procedure Code 5 Date
Claim Procedure Code 6 Date
Claim Procedure Code 7 Date
Claim Procedure Code 8 Date
Claim Procedure Code 9 Date
Claim Procedure Code 10 Date
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Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
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PRCDR_DT11
PRCDR_DT12
PRCDR_DT13
CLM_OBSLT_DT
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_C
D
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_C
D
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD
BENE_CNTY_CD
BENE_STATE_CD
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD
GNDR_CD
BENE_RACE_CD
DOB_DT
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD
TAX_NUM
BENE_STATE
Revenue Center File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_LINE_NUM
LINE_NUM_ORIG
CLM_THRU_DT
REV_CNTR
REV_CNTR_FROM_DT
REV_CNTR_THRU_DT
REV_CNTR_UNIT_CNT
HCPCS_CD
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_3RD_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_4TH_MDFR_CD
REV_CNTR_IDE_NDC_UPC_NU
M
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY_QLFR_
CD
REV_CNTR_RNDRNG_PHYSN_
NPI
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND
Condition Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
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Claim Procedure Code 11 Date
Claim Procedure Code 12 Date
Claim Procedure Code 13 Date
Claim Obsolete Date
Billing Provider Address - City

Date
Date
Date
Date
Char

8
8
8
8
30

93
94
95
96
97

Billing Provider Address - USPS State Code

Char

2

98

Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - City
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS State
Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP Code
Beneficiary County Code from Claim (SSA)
Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State Code
Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence
Gender Code
Race Code
Date of Birth
Beneficiary Medicare Status Code
Provider Tax Number
Beneficiary State Postal Code

Char
Char

9
30

99
100

Char

2

101

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Char
Char
Char

9
3
2
9
1
1
8
2
10
2

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Line Number
Original Claim Line Number
Claim Through Date
Revenue Center Code
Revenue Center From Date
Revenue Center Thru Date
Revenue Center Unit Count
HCFA Common Procedure Coding System
(HCPCS) Code
HCPCS Initial Modifier Code
HCPCS Second Modifier Code
HCPCS Third Modifier Code
HCPCS Fourth Modifier Code

Char
Char
Char
Num
Num
Date
Char
Date
Date
Num

15
15
4
13
13
8
4
8
8
8

1
2
3
4
20
5
6
7
8
9

Char

5

10

Char
Char
Char
Char

2
2
2
2

11
12
13
14

Revenue Center IDE, NDC, or UPC Number

Char

24

15

Num

10

16

Char

2

17

Revenue Center Rendering Physician NPI

Char

10

18

Line Latest Claim Indicator

Char

1

19

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key

Char
Char

15
15

1
2

Revenue Center National Drug Code (NDC)
Quantity
Revenue Center NDC Quantity Qualifier
Code
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CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_COND_CD_SEQ
CLM_RLT_COND_CD

Claim Type Code
Claim Related Condition Code Sequence
Claim Related Condition Code

Char
Char
Char

4
2
2

3
4
5

Occurrence Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_OCRNC_CD_SEQ
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_CD
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_DT

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Occurrence Code Sequence
Claim Related Occurrence Code
Claim Related Occurrence Date

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date

15
15
4
2
2
8

1
2
3
4
5
6

Span Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_SPAN_CD_SEQ
CLM_SPAN_CD
CLM_SPAN_FROM_DT
CLM_SPAN_THRU_DT

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Span Code Sequence
Claim Occurrence Span Code
Claim Occurrence Span From Date
Claim Occurrence Span Through Date

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date

15
15
4
2
2
8
8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Value Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_VAL_CD_SEQ
CLM_VAL_CD

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Value Code Sequence
Claim Value Code

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
15
4
2
2

1
2
3
4
5
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Appendix E: Home Health Variables and Names
SAS Name
Base Claim File
BENE_ID
SAMPLE_GROUP
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_FROM_DT
CLM_THRU_DT
SRVC_MONTH
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW
CLM_CNTL_NUM
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM
CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND
CLM_LTST_CLM_IND
EDPS_CREATE_DT
CLM_RCPT_DT
CLM_FAC_TYPE_CD
CLM_SRVC_CLSFCTN_TYPE_CD
CLM_FREQ_CD
CNTRCT_NUM
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM
CLM_MDCL_REC
ORG_NPI
ORG_TXNMY_CD
RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI
RFRG_PHYSN_NPI
AT_PHYSN_NPI
AT_PHYSN_TXNMY_CD
OP_PHYSN_NPI
OT_PHYSN_NPI
CLM_ADMSN_DT
PTNT_DSCHRG_STUS_CD
BENE_DSCHRG_DT
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD
ICD_DGNS_CD1
ICD_DGNS_CD2
ICD_DGNS_CD3
ICD_DGNS_CD4
ICD_DGNS_CD5
ICD_DGNS_CD6
ICD_DGNS_CD7

Label

Type

Lengt
h

2015

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
CCW Beneficiary Random Sample
Group
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim From Date
Claim Through Date
Service Month
Claim Chart Review Switch
Claim Control Number
Claim Original Control Number
Claim Final Action Indicator
Latest Claim Indicator
Encounter Data Processing System
(EDPS) Create Date
Claim Receipt Date
Claim Facility Type Code
Claim Service classification Type Code
Claim Frequency Code
Medicare Part C Contract Number
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package
(PBP) Number
Claim Medical Record Number
Organization NPI Number
Organization Taxonomy Code
Claim Rendering Physician NPI
Number
Claim Referring Physician NPI Number
Claim Attending Physician NPI
Number
Claim Attending Physician Taxonomy
Code
Claim Operating Physician NPI
Number
Claim Other Physician NPI Number
Claim Admission Date
Patient Discharge Status Code
Beneficiary Discharge Date
Claim Principal Diagnosis Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 1
Claim Diagnosis Code 2
Claim Diagnosis Code 3
Claim Diagnosis Code 4
Claim Diagnosis Code 5
Claim Diagnosis Code 6
Claim Diagnosis Code 7

Char

15

1

Char

2

2

Char
Char
Date
Date
Date
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
4
8
8
6
1
23
23
1
1

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Date

8

13

Date
Char
Char
Char
Char

8
1
1
1
5

14
15
16
17
18

Char

3

19

Char
Char
Char

1
10
10

20
21
22

Char

10

23

Char

10

24

Char

10

25

Char

10

26

Char

10

27

Char
Date
Char
Date
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

10
8
2
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
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ICD_DGNS_CD8
ICD_DGNS_CD9
ICD_DGNS_CD10
ICD_DGNS_CD11
ICD_DGNS_CD12
ICD_DGNS_CD13
ICD_DGNS_CD14
ICD_DGNS_CD15
ICD_DGNS_CD16
ICD_DGNS_CD17
ICD_DGNS_CD18
ICD_DGNS_CD19
ICD_DGNS_CD20
ICD_DGNS_CD21
ICD_DGNS_CD22
ICD_DGNS_CD23
ICD_DGNS_CD24
ICD_DGNS_CD25
CLM_1ST_DGNS_E_CD
ICD_DGNS_E_CD1
ICD_DGNS_E_CD2
ICD_DGNS_E_CD3
RSN_VISIT_CD1
RSN_VISIT_CD2
RSN_VISIT_CD3
CLM_OBSLT_DT
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME
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Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Char

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
30

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Char

2

67

Char
Char

9
30

68
69

Char

2

70

Char

9

71

Char

3

72

Char

2

73

BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD
GNDR_CD
BENE_RACE_CD
DOB_DT
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD
TAX_NUM
BENE_STATE

Claim Diagnosis Code 8
Claim Diagnosis Code 9
Claim Diagnosis Code 10
Claim Diagnosis Code 11
Claim Diagnosis Code 12
Claim Diagnosis Code 13
Claim Diagnosis Code 14
Claim Diagnosis Code 15
Claim Diagnosis Code 16
Claim Diagnosis Code 17
Claim Diagnosis Code 18
Claim Diagnosis Code 19
Claim Diagnosis Code 20
Claim Diagnosis Code 21
Claim Diagnosis Code 22
Claim Diagnosis Code 23
Claim Diagnosis Code 24
Claim Diagnosis Code 25
First Claim Diagnosis E Code
Claim Diagnosis E Code 1
Claim Diagnosis E Code 2
Claim Diagnosis E Code 3
Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 1
Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 2
Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 3
Claim Obsolete Date
Billing Provider Address - City
Billing Provider Address - USPS State
Code
Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - City
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS
State Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP
Code
Beneficiary County Code from Claim
(SSA)
Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State
Code
Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence
Gender Code
Race Code
Date of Birth
Beneficiary Medicare Status Code
Provider Tax Number
Beneficiary State Postal Code

Char
Char
Char
Date
Char
Char
Char

9
1
1
8
2
10
2

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Revenue Center File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code

Char
Char
Char

15
15
4

1
2
3

CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_CD
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_CD
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD
BENE_CNTY_CD
BENE_STATE_CD
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CLM_LINE_NUM
LINE_NUM_ORIG
CLM_THRU_DT
REV_CNTR
REV_CNTR_FROM_DT
REV_CNTR_THRU_DT
REV_CNTR_UNIT_CNT
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Claim Line Number
Original Claim Line Number
Claim Through Date
Revenue Center Code
Revenue Center From Date
Revenue Center Thru Date
Revenue Center Unit Count
HCFA Common Procedure Coding
System (HCPCS) Code
HCPCS Initial Modifier Code
HCPCS Second Modifier Code
HCPCS Third Modifier Code
Revenue Center IDE, NDC, or UPC
Number
Revenue Center National Drug Code
(NDC) Quantity
Revenue Center NDC Quantity
Qualifier Code
Revenue Center Rendering Physician
NPI
Line Latest Claim Indicator

Num
Num
Date
Char
Date
Date
Num

13
13
8
4
8
8
8

4
19
5
6
7
8
9

Char

5

10

Char
Char
Char

2
2
2

11
12
13

Char

24

14

Num

10

15

Char

2

16

Char

10

17

Char

1

18

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Condition Code
Sequence
Claim Related Condition Code

Char
Char
Char

15
15
4

1
2
3

Char

2

4

Char

2

5

Char
Char
Char

15
15
4

1
2
3

Char

2

4

CLM_RLT_OCRNC_CD
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_DT

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Occurrence Code
Sequence
Claim Related Occurrence Code
Claim Related Occurrence Date

Char
Date

2
8

5
6

Span Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_SPAN_CD_SEQ
CLM_SPAN_CD
CLM_SPAN_FROM_DT
CLM_SPAN_THRU_DT

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Related Span Code Sequence
Claim Occurrence Span Code
Claim Occurrence Span From Date
Claim Occurrence Span Through Date

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date

15
15
4
2
2
8
8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Value Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code

Char
Char
Char

15
15
4

1
2
3

HCPCS_CD
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_3RD_MDRF_CD
REV_CNTR_IDE_NDC_UPC_NU
M
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY_QLFR_C
D
REV_CNTR_RNDRNG_PHYSN_N
PI
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND
Condition Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_COND_CD_SEQ
CLM_RLT_COND_CD
Occurrence Code File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
RLT_OCRNC_CD_SEQ
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RLT_VAL_CD_SEQ
CLM_VAL_CD

Claim Related Value Code Sequence
Claim Value Code
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Char
Char

2
2

4
5
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Appendix F: Carrier Variables and Names
SAS Name
Base Claim File
BENE_ID
SAMPLE_GROUP
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_FROM_DT
CLM_THRU_DT
SRVC_MONTH
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW
CLM_CNTL_NUM
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM
CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND
CLM_LTST_CLM_IND
EDPS_CREATE_DT
CLM_RCPT_DT
CLM_FREQ_CD
CNTRCT_NUM
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM
CLM_MDCL_REC
ORG_NPI
ORG_TXNMY_CD
RFRG_PHYSN_NPI
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD
PRNCPAL_DGNS_VRSN_CD
ICD_DGNS_CD1
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD1
ICD_DGNS_CD2
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD2
ICD_DGNS_CD3
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD3
ICD_DGNS_CD4
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD4
ICD_DGNS_CD5
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD5
ICD_DGNS_CD6
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD6
ICD_DGNS_CD7
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD7

Label

Type

Lengt
h

2015

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
CCW Beneficiary Random Sample Group
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim From Date
Claim Through Date
Service Month
Claim Chart Review Switch
Claim Control Number
Claim Original Control Number
Claim Final Action Indicator
Latest Claim Indicator
Encounter Data Processing System
(EDPS) Create Date
Claim Receipt Date
Claim Frequency Code
Medicare Part C Contract Number
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package
(PBP) Number
Claim Medical Record Number
Organization NPI Number
Organization Taxonomy Code
Claim Referring Physician NPI Number
Claim Principal Diagnosis Code
Claim Principal Diagnosis Version Code
Claim Diagnosis Code 1
Claim Diagnosis Code I Diagnosis Version
Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 2
Claim Diagnosis Code II Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 3
Claim Diagnosis Code III Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 4
Claim Diagnosis Code IV Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 5
Claim Diagnosis Code V Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 6
Claim Diagnosis Code VI Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 7
Claim Diagnosis Code VII Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)

Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Date
Date
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

15
2
15
4
8
8
6
1
23
23
1
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Date

8

13

Date
Char
Char

8
1
5

14
15
16

Char

3

17

Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

1
10
10
10
7
1
7

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Char

1

25

Char

7

26

Char

1

27

Char

7

28

Char

1

29

Char

7

30

Char

1

31

Char

7

32

Char

1

33

Char

7

34

Char

1

35

Char

7

36

Char

1

37
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Char

7

38

Char

1

39

Char

7

40

Char

1

41

Char

7

42

Char

1

43

Char

7

44

Char

1

45

Char

7

46

Char

1

47

Char

7

48

Char

1

49

Date
Char

8
30

50
51

Char

2

52

Char
Char

9
30

53
54

Char

2

55

Char

9

56

Char

3

57

BENE_STATE_CD
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD
GNDR_CD
BENE_RACE_CD
DOB_DT
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD
TAX_NUM
BENE_STATE

Claim Diagnosis Code 8
Claim Diagnosis Code VIII Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 9
Claim Diagnosis Code IX Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 10
Claim Diagnosis Code X Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 11
Claim Diagnosis Code XI Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 12
Claim Diagnosis Code XII Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Diagnosis Code 13
Claim Diagnosis Code XIII Diagnosis
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10)
Claim Obsolete Date
Billing Provider Address - City
Billing Provider Address - USPS State
Code
Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - City
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS State
Code
Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP Code
Beneficiary County Code from Claim
(SSA)
Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State Code
Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence
Gender Code
Race Code
Date of Birth
Beneficiary Medicare Status Code
Provider Tax Number
Beneficiary State Postal Code

Char
Char
Char
Char
Date
Char
Char
Char

2
9
1
1
8
2
10
2

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Line File
BENE_ID
ENC_JOIN_KEY
CLM_TYPE_CD
CLM_LINE_NUM
LINE_NUM_ORIG
CLM_THRU_DT
PRVDR_NPI
PRVDR_SPCLTY
LINE_SRVC_CNT
LINE_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD
LINE_1ST_EXPNS_DT
LINE_LAST_EXPNS_DT
HCPCS_CD

Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID
Unique Encounter Join Key
Claim Type Code
Claim Line Number
Original Claim Line Number
Claim Through Date
Line Rendering Physician NPI
Line CMS Provider Specialty Code
Line Service Count
Line Place of Service Code
Line First Expense Date
Line Last Expense Date
HCFA Common Procedure Coding System

Char
Char
Char
Num
Num
Date
Char
Char
Num
Char
Date
Date
Char

15
15
4
13
13
8
10
2
12
2
8
8
5

1
2
3
4
20
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD8
ICD_DGNS_CD9
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD9
ICD_DGNS_CD10
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD10
ICD_DGNS_CD11
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD11
ICD_DGNS_CD12
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD12
ICD_DGNS_CD13
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD13
CLM_OBSLT_DT
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_
CD
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_
CD
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD
BENE_CNTY_CD
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HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_3RD_MDFR_CD
HCPCS_4TH_MDFR_CD
LINE_NDC_CD
LINE_RX_NUM
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND

(HCPCS) Code
HCPCS Initial Modifier Code
HCPCS Second Modifier Code
HCPCS Third Modifier Code
HCPCS Fourth Modifier Code
Line National Drug Code (NDC)
Line RX Number
Line Latest Claim Indicator
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Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char
Char

2
2
2
2
11
30
1

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
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Appendix G: Provider Variables and Names
Variable Name

Description

Data Source

npi

National provider identifier (NPI)

name_last
name_first

Provider last name

Claims
NPPES

Provider first name

NPPES

name_middle

Provider middle name

NPPES

sex

1=Male; 2=Female

NPPES

birth_dt

Birth date

PECOS

spec_broad

Broad specialty based on spec_prim_1 .
1 = Primary care
2 = Medical specialty
3 = Surgical specialty
4 = Obstetrics/gynecology with no primary care specialty.
5 = Hospital-based specialty (includes designated hospitalists)
6 = Psychiatry
7 = Non-physician
9 = Specialty Unknown

PECOS

spec_prim_1

Primary specialty (the most recently reported in PECOS)

PECOS/claim
s

spec_prim_1_name

Name of primary specialty

spec_prim_2

Concurrently reported primary specialty

spec_prim_2_name

Name of concurrently reported primary specialty
Source data for specialty
1=PECOS
2=claims
Source data for hospitalist specialty designation
1=PECOS
2=claims

ID variables

Demographic variables

Specialty variables

spec_source

spec_source_hosp

PECOS/claim
s
PECOS/claim
s
PECOS/claim
s

Place of service (POS)
Claims

pos_inpat

% of line items delivered in office
% of line items delivered in inpatient hospital

pos_opd

% of line items delivered in hospital outpatient department (OPD)

Claims

pos_er

% of line items delivered in emergency room (ER)

Claims

pos_nursing

% of line items delivered in nursing facility or skilled nursing facility

Claims

pos_asc

% of line items delivered in ambulatory surgery center (ASC)

Claims

pos_resid

% of line items delivered in the patient’s residence (i.e., home, assisted

Claims

pos_office

Claims
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Data Source

living facility, custodial care facility, or group home)
pos_other

% of line items delivered in other places of service

Claims

Geographic location
state
state_multi

cbsa_type

cbsa_cd

State abbreviation with the most line items for that NPI
99=missing
Multiple state indicator (1=multiple states; 0=single state)
Type of CBSA for physician
1=Metropolitan area
2=Micropolitan area
3=non-CBSA
9=missing CBSA code
CBSA code with the most allowed line items for that NPI
00000=non-CBSA
99999=missing CBSA code

Claims
Claims

Claims

Claims

cbsa_name

CBSA name

Claims

cbsa_multi

Multiple CBSA indicator (1=multiple CBSAs; 0=single CBSA)

Claims

Utilization summary measures
npi_srvc_lines

Count of line items billed by NPI

Claims

npi_allowed_amt

Total allowed charges billed by NPI

Claims

npi_unq_benes

Number of unique beneficiaries for whom the NPI billed

Claims

tin1

Tax identification number (TIN) with the most service lines

Claims

tin1_legal_name

PECOS
Claims

tin1_srvc_lines

TIN1 legal name
Twelve monthly flags for whether the NPI billed for any services under
TIN1. Position 1 pertains to January; position 12 to December.
1= billed
0= did not bill
Count of line items billed under TIN1

tin1_allowed_amt

Total allowed charges billed under TIN1

Claims

tin1_unq_benes

Number of unique beneficiaries for whom the NPI billed under TIN1

Claims

tin2

Tax identification number (TIN) with the most service lines

Claims

tin2_legal_name

PECOS
Claims

tin2_srvc_lines

TIN2 legal name
Twelve monthly flags for whether the NPI billed for any services under
TIN2. Position 1 pertains to January; position 12 to December.
1= billed
0= did not bill
Count of line items billed under TIN2

tin2_allowed_amt

Total allowed charges billed under TIN2

Claims

TIN1 variables

tin1_srvc_month

Claims

TIN2 variables

tin2_srvc_month

Claims
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Variable Name

Description

Data Source

tin2_unq_benes

Number of unique beneficiaries for whom the NPI billed under TIN2

Claims
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Appendix H: Physician Count by County

County
ADAIR
ANDREW
ATCHISON
AUDRAIN
BARRY
BARTON
BATES
BENTON
BOLLINGER
BOONE
BUCHANAN
BUTLER
CALDWELL
CALLAWAY
CAMDEN
CAPE
GIRARDEAU
CARROLL
CARTER
CASS
CEDAR
CHARITON
CHRISTIAN
CLARK
CLAY
CLINTON
COLE
COOPER
CRAWFORD
DADE
DALLAS
DAVIESS
DEKALB
DENT
DOUGLAS
DUNKLIN
FRANKLIN
GASCONADE
GENTRY
GREENE

2016
Physician
Count
82
37
6
34
33
18
12
7
1
1019
209
97
2
30
93
362
6
2
69
9
2
55
5
584
5
273
6
2
5
2
3
23
8
3
18
149
10
4
1012
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GRUNDY
HARRISON
HENRY
HICKORY
HOLT
HOWARD
HOWELL
IRON
JACKSON
JASPER
JEFFERSON
JOHNSON
KNOX
LACLEDE
LAFAYETTE
LAWRENCE
LEWIS
LINCOLN
LINN
LIVINGSTON
MACON
MADISON
MARIES
MARION
MCDONALD
MERCER
MILLER
MISSISSIPPI
MONITEAU
MONROE
MONTGOMERY
MORGAN
NEW MADRID
NEWTON
NODAWAY
OREGON
OSAGE
OZARK
PEMISCOT
PERRY
PETTIS
PHELPS
PIKE
PLATTE
POLK

8
6
60
2
2
3
92
8
2465
385
161
39
0
24
18
17
5
21
10
21
12
8
2
115
6
1
9
6
3
3
2
7
4
19
30
2
2
3
12
17
57
100
16
130
56
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PULASKI
PUTNAM
RALLS
RANDOLPH
RAY
REYNOLDS
RIPLEY
SALINE
SCHUYLER
SCOTLAND
SCOTT
SHANNON
SHELBY
ST. CHARLES
ST. CLAIR
ST. FRANCOIS
STE GENEVIEVE
ST. LOUIS CITY
ST. LOUIS
COUNTY
STODDARD
STONE
SULLIVAN
TANEY
TEXAS
VERNON
WARREN
WASHINGTON
WAYNE
WEBSTER
WORTH
WRIGHT

31
5
1
22
7
1
0
31
1
10
53
2
1
540
6
87
20
2673
3678
11
6
4
109
19
23
9
17
5
24
1
7
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Appendix I: Hospital Access by County

County
Adair
Andrew
Atchison
Audrain
Barry
Barton
Bates
Benton
Bollinger
Boone
Buchanan
Butler
Caldwell
Callaway
Camden
Cape Girardeau
Carroll
Carter
Cass
Cedar
Chariton
Christian
Clark
Clay
Clinton
Cole
Cooper
Crawford
Dade
Dallas
Daviess
Dekalb
Dent
Douglas
Dunklin
Franklin
Gasconade

In County=1
<28 Miles=2
>27 Miles=3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
2
1
3
1
1
1

2020 Licensed
Beds
93
0
18
70
18
25
60
0
0
563
393
410
0
37
130
361
25
0
106
25
0
0
0
873
58
268
32
35
0
0
0
0
55
0
116
148
24
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Gentry
Greene
Grundy
Harrison
Henry
Hickory
Holt
Howard
Howell
Iron
Jackson
Jasper
Jefferson
Johnson
Knox
Laclede
Lafayette
Lawrence
Lewis
Lincoln
Linn
Livingston
Macon
Madison
Maries
Marion
McDonald
Mercer
Miller
Mississippi
Moniteau
Monroe
Montgomery
Morgan
New Madrid
Newton
Nodaway
Oregon
Osage
Ozark
Pemiscot
Perry

1
1
1
1
1
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
3
1
1
3
2
3
1
1

218
35
1957
25
19
110
0
0
0
139
15
146
3030
321
62
0
58
32
53
0
25
25
25
25
144
0
99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
729
81
0
0
0
167
25
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Pettis
Phelps
Pike
Platte
Polk
Pulaski
Putnam
Ralls
Randolph
Ray
Reynolds
Ripley
Saline
Schuyler
Scotland
Scott
Shannon
Shelby
St. Charles
St. Clair
Ste Genevieve
St. Francois
St. Louis City
St. Louis County
Stoddard
Stone
Sullivan
Taney
Texas
Vernon
Warren
Washington
Wayne
Webster
Worth
Wright

1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
2
2

219
99
242
25
97
86
0
15
0
99
34
0
30
60
0
25
125
0
0
1016
12
47
133
2715
4927
48
0
25
157
66
140
0
25
0
0
0
0
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Appendix J: Correlations between MSBF and FFS Summary Data
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Correlation between MBSF and FFS Summary Data (continued)
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Appendix K: FFS Sample Population Service Usage
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Appendix L: HMO Sample Population Service Usage
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Appendix M: Tabular Results for Plan Choice CHAID Tree
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Appendix N: Poisson Regressions Tables Before Variable Reduction

All Plans

225

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES

226

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES

227

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES

228

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES

229

MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES
FFS Plan Only
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All HMO Plans
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Essence HMO
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